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         Report
        Nº 124/99 I.           
        SUMMARY 
        1.                 
        This report concerns a petition presented to the Inter-American
        Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter “the Commission”) by Saul
        Lehfreund Esq., Solicitor, of Messrs. Simons, Muirhead & Burton,
        Solicitors, in London, United Kingdom, (hereinafter “the
        petitioners”) by letter dated June 17, 1997, on behalf of Mr. Paul
        Lallion. The petition alleges that the State of Grenada (hereinafter
        “the State”) violated Mr. Lallion’s rights under the American
        Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “the Convention”) and the
        American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (hereinafter
        "the Declaration").  2.                 
        The petitioners indicate that Mr. Lallion, a national of Grenada,
        was convicted of murder on December 19, 1994, and a mandatory death
        sentence was imposed on him pursuant to the domestic law of Grenada.[1] 
        According to the petitioners, Mr. Lallion appealed his conviction
        and sentence to the Court of Appeal in Grenada, and his appeal was
        dismissed by the Court on September 15, 1995.   3.                 
        The petitioners argue that the Petition is admissible because Mr.
        Lallion has satisfied the requirements of Articles 46 of the Convention
        and Articles 37 and 38 of the Commission’s Regulations. The
        petitioners also allege that the State has violated Mr. Lallion’s
        rights under Articles 4(1), 4(6), 5(1), 5(2), 5(6), 7(2), 7(4), 7(5), 8
        and 24 of the Convention and Articles I, II, XVIII and XVIII of the
        Declaration.   4.                 
        In their petition, the petitioners requested the Commission to
        issue Precautionary Measures pursuant to Article 29(2) of its
        Regulations against the State and ask that the State suspend Mr.
        Lallion’s execution to avoid irreparable damage to him while his case
        was pending determination before the Commission. The petitioners also
        requested that the Commission recommend to the State that it quash Mr.
        Lallion’s death sentence and release him from prison.  5.                 
        In this report, the Commission concludes that the petitioners'
        claims relating to violations of the Convention satisfy the requirements
        of Article 46 of the Convention and are therefore admissible. The
        Commission also concludes that the petitioners' claims relating to
        violations of the Declaration are inadmissible.  II.           
        PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION  6.                 
        Upon receipt of the petition and submissions of the parties, the
        Commission has complied with the requirements of its Regulations.  It has studied the petition, requested information from the
        parties and forwarded the pertinent parts of each party’s submissions
        to the other party. The letter presenting the petition to the Commission
        was dated June 17, 1997, and was received by the Commission on June 18,
        1997. By letter dated June 19, 1997, the petitioners informed the
        Commission that they intended to forward supplemental arguments
        concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies to the Commission. On
        June 23, and July 2, 1997, the petitioners forwarded these supplemental
        arguments to the Commission.   7.                 
        On July 2, 1997, the Commission forwarded the pertinent parts of
        the petition and the petitioners’ supplementary arguments to the State
        and requested observations within 90 days with respect to claims raised
        in the petition, as well as any additional information regarding
        exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Commission also requested that the
        State stay Mr. Lallion's execution pending an investigation by the
        Commission of the alleged facts.  8.                 
        By letter dated November 3, 1997, the petitioners requested that
        the Commission hold a hearing in the case and conduct an on-site visit
        to Richmond Hill Prison, St. Georges, Grenada, where Mr. Lallion is
        presently incarcerated. By letter dated January 23, 1998, the Commission
        informed the State and the petitioners that a hearing in the case was
        scheduled for Friday, February 27, 1998, during the Commission’s 98th
        Period of Sessions.   9.                 
        By communication dated February 3, 1998, the State replied to the
        petition. In its reply, the State indicated that Mr. Lallion'
        mandatory death sentence, as well as hanging as a method of
        execution, were lawful under the Constitution of Grenada. The State also
        claimed that “all domestic legal remedies and procedures have been
        exhausted and the sentence of the Court would have to be executed as
        there have been no undue and unconscionable delay in the
        execution."  10.             
        The Commission transmitted the pertinent parts of the State’s
        response to the petitioners on February 11, 1998 and requested that the
        petitioners submit its observations within 30 days.   11.             
        On February 24, 1998, the Commission received additional
        observations from the petitioners, claiming that the State had also
        violated Mr. Lallion’s right to liberty pursuant to Article 7 of the
        American Convention.  The Commission forwarded the pertinent parts of the
        additional information to the State on February 24, 1998, with a
        response requested within 30 days. Also on February 24, 1998, the
        Commission received the petitioners’ arguments for the hearing
        scheduled on February 27, 1998 and forwarded them to the State on
        February 25, 1998.  12.             
        The Commission convened a hearing on the admissibility and merits
        of the petitioners' case on February 27, 1998 during its 98th
        Period of Sessions. The petitioners attended the hearing and made oral
        representations to the Commission in respect of the claims raised in
        their petition. The State did not appear at the hearing.   13.             
        By communications dated September 1, 1998 and August 18, 1999 to
        the State, the Commission reiterated its request for information
        pertaining to the petitioners' additional submissions dated February 24,
        1998.  III.           
        POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES ON ADMISSIBILITY  A.               
        Position of the petitioners   a.           
        Claims by the petitioners  14.             
        In their petition, the petitioners allege violations of Articles
        4(1), 4(6), 5(1), 5(2), 5(6), 7(2), 7(4), 7(5), 8 and 24 of the
        Convention and Articles I, II, XVIII and 
        XXVI of the Declaration. In particular, the petitioners argue
        that the mandatory death sentence imposed on Mr. Lallion under the
        State's penal law governing the crime of murder violates Mr. Lallion’s
        right to life under Article 4(1) of the Convention and Article I of the
        Declaration, and the right to humane treatment under Article 5 of the
        Convention and Article XXVI of the Declaration.   15.             
        In addition, the petitioners argue that the State has violated
        Mr. Lallion’s rights to a fair trial and to equality before the law
        under Articles 8 and 24 of the Convention and Articles II and XVIII of
        the Declaration because of the manner in which the Advisory Committee on
        the Prerogative of Mercy in Grenada grants amnesty, pardon and
        commutation of sentence. In particular, they complaint that Mr. Lallion
        does not have the right to make representations to the Advisory
        Committee, to receive and comment upon information before the Advisory
        Committee when it considers his case, or to otherwise have the benefit
        of any other procedure regulated by law providing an objective and
        proportionate decision on whether the death penalty is an appropriate
        punishment in the circumstances of Mr. Lallion's case.  16.             
        The petitioners also allege violations of Mr. Lallion’s right
        to humane treatment under Article 5(1), 5 (2), and 5(6) of the
        Convention, and Article XXVI of the Declaration, because of his
        conditions of detention, and allege that these violations also render
        the implementation of his death sentence unlawful.   17.             
        Finally, the petitioners allege violations of Article 7(2), 7(4)
        and 7(5) of the Convention, because Mr. Lallion was detained in police
        custody for over 48 hours and was not promptly notified of the charges
        against him or brought promptly before a judge or other judicial
        officer. The petitioners contend that these rights are also protected
        under Grenada's domestic law.   b.           
        Exhaustion of domestic remedies  18.             
        The petitioners argue that Mr. Lallion has exhausted the domestic
        remedies of Grenada because, after being convicted of capital murder on
        December 19, 1994, he appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal in
        Grenada, and the Court dismissed his appeal on September 15, 1995. 
        Mr. Lallion did not pursue a petition for Special Leave to Appeal
        to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, based upon a legal
        opinion received from British Barristers Kuldip Sing QC and Martin Evans
        Esq., on January 2, 1997 indicating that the petition may be
        unsuccessful.  The
        petitioners claim in this regard that the grounds for appealing to the
        Privy Council are very narrow, and the Privy Council has no jurisdiction
        to vary the sentence of death and substitute a lesser sentence, and
        therefore there are no domestic remedies available to Mr. Lallion in
        respect of his sentence.  19.             
        The petitioners also argue that Mr. Lallion is unable to pursue a
        Constitutional Motion to the Supreme Court of Grenada to challenge his
        mandatory death sentence as being inhuman or degrading punishment or
        treatment because Mr. Lallion is indigent, and the State’s domestic
        law does not provide private funds nor legal aid to indigent persons to
        pursue such Motions. The petitioners claim that the Constitution is a
        complex legal document and that expert legal representation is therefore
        required to have a reasonable prospect of success on a Constitutional
        Motion.  They argue further
        that Mr. Lallion's lack of private funding and the unavailability of
        legal aid prohibit him from pursuing a Constitutional Motion and
        therefore render this remedy illusory. The petitioners also state that
        there is a dearth of Grenadian lawyers who are prepared to represent Mr.
        Lallion without payment.   20.             
        The petitioners contend that the absence of legal aid for an
        impecunious individual is sufficient to establish that domestic remedies
        are not available for the purposes of exhaustion. In support of their
        position, they rely upon the decision of the United Nations Human Rights
        Committee (hereinafter referred to as "HRC") in Champagnie,
        Palmer & Chisolm v. Jamaica,[2]
        in which the HRC stated as follows:  With
        respect to the authors’ possibility of filing a Constitutional Motion,
        the Committee considers that, in the absence of Legal Aid, a
        Constitutional Motion does not constitute an available remedy in the
        case.  In light of the
        above, the Committee finds that it is not precluded by Article 5(2)(b)
        of the Optional Protocol from considering the communication.[3]  21.             
        In addition, the petitioners argue that Mr. Lallion should be
        excused from exhausting domestic remedies pursuant to Articles 37(1) and
        37(2) of the Commission’s Regulations because of the State’s failure
        to provide Mr. Lallion with legal aid to challenge his Constitutional
        rights in respect of his mandatory death sentence.  c.           
        Timeliness of the petition 
        22.             
        The petitioners submit that Mr. Lallion’s petition was timely
        filed for two reasons. First, they argue that they were unable to
        present a petition to the Commission until June 1997, because they did
        not received the final opinion of the Barristers until January 2, 1997
        respecting the prospects of an appeal to the Privy Council, and they did
        not receive the supplemental documentation in Mr. Lallion's case until
        May 8, 1997. Second, the petitioners argue that the violations alleged
        on Mr. Lallion’s behalf relating to the mandatory nature of the death
        penalty and his treatment and conditions of his detention are a
        “continuing situation” against which there are no domestic remedies
        available to invoke and exhaust.  23.             
        In support of their position, the petitioners rely upon the
        decision of the European Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter
        referred to as the "European Commission") in Application/Requete
        Nº 11123/84[4]
        in which the European Commission held that there was a close correlation
        between the exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 26 of the
        European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
        Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as “the European Convention”)[5]
        and the six-month rule under that Convention. The European Commission
        noted that the State in Application 11123/84 acknowledged that domestic
        remedies for the petitioner's allegations were not available. As a
        consequence, the European Commission found that the six-month rule under
        the European Convention did not bar the petitioner's claim in the case,
        stating as follows:  The
        [European] Commission has held in its case-law that when the alleged
        violation consists, as in the present case, in a continuing situation
        against which there is no domestic remedy available, the six [month]
        period begins to run only when the continuing situation has ended (cf. Nº
        214/56; loc.cit: cf. Also Nº 6852/74, Dec. 5.12.78, D.R.15 p.5). This
        is not so in the present case, as the impugned provisions are still in
        force, and hence the six month time-limit does not apply. It follows
        that the Government’s objections to admissibility under Article 26 of
        the Convention cannot be accepted.[6]  B.           
        Position of the State            
         
        24.             
        The State responded to the petition on February 3, 1998, and
        indicated that Mr. Lallion' mandatory
        death sentence, as well as hanging as a method of execution, were lawful
        under the Constitution of Grenada. The State also claimed that “all
        domestic legal remedies and procedures have been exhausted and the
        sentence of the Court would have to be executed as there have been no
        undue and unconscionable delay in the execution.” The State has not
        contested the admissibility of the petition.  IV.           
        ANALYSIS  A.                
        Competence of the Commission  25.             
        The Commission has subject matter jurisdiction in this case, as
        the State deposited its instrument of accession to the American
        Convention on July 18, 1978,[7]
        and the petitioners allege that the State has violated Articles 4, 5, 8,
        and 24 of the Convention. The Commission also has temporal jurisdiction,
        as the petitioners' complaints pertain to acts or omissions that
        transpired after the State's accession to the Convention. Finally, the
        Commission has personal jurisdiction, as the victim is a citizen of
        Grenada and the petitioners were authorized under Article 44 of the
        Convention to lodge a petition on behalf of Mr. Lallion. The Commission
        is therefore fully competent to examine this petition.  26.             
        The petitioners have also alleged violation of Articles I, II,
        XVIII and XXVI of the Declaration. In this regard, the Commission notes
        that once the Convention entered into force for the State of Grenada on
        July 18, 1978, the Convention, and not the Declaration became the source
        of legal norms for application by the Commission,[8]
        insofar as the petition alleges violations of substantially identical
        rights set forth in both instruments and those claimed violations do not
        involve a continuing situation.[9]
        In Mr. Lallion's case, the rights alleged to have been violated by the
        State under the Declaration are similarly guaranteed in the Convention.
        In addition, acts or omissions to which the alleged violations relate
        occurred after the State manifested its consent to be bound by the
        Convention. Therefore, the Commission declares the petitioners' claims
        relating to the Declaration inadmissible, and will only consider the
        petitioners' claims relating to the Convention.  B.                
        ADMISSIBILITY OF PETITION  a.                 
        Exhaustion of domestic remedies  27.             
        The petitioners argue that Mr. Lallion exhausted the domestic
        remedies of Grenada upon the dismissal of his appeal against his
        conviction and sentence by the Court of Appeal of Grenada on September
        15, 1995. The State has likewise stated that Mr. Lallion has exhausted
        all domestic legal remedies and procedures. Based upon the record before
        it, the Commission finds that this petition is admissible under Article
        46(1)(a) of the Convention   b.           
        Timeliness of the petition  28.             
        The petitioners argue that this petition was timely filed under
        Article 46(1)(b) of the Convention and Article 38(2) of the
        Commission’s Regulations.[10] 
        The State has not contested the admissibility of the petition on
        the ground of timeliness or otherwise demonstrated that the petition was
        not timely filed.[11] 
        Therefore, the Commission finds that this petition is not
        inadmissible under Article 46(1)(b) of the American Convention.   c.           
        Duplication of procedures  29.             
        The petitioners have indicated that the subject of Mr.
        Lallion’s petition has not been submitted for examination under any
        other procedure of international investigation. The State has not
        contested the issue of duplication of procedures. Therefore, the
        Commission finds that the petition is not inadmissible under Articles
        46(1)(c) and 47(d) of the Convention.  d.           
        Colorable claim  30.             
        The petitioners have alleged that the State has violated Mr.
        Lallion's rights under Articles 4, 5, 7, 8 and 24 of the Convention, and
        have provided factual allegations that tend to establish that the
        alleged violations may be well-founded. The Commission therefore
        concludes, without prejudging the merits of the case, that the
        petitioners' case is not inadmissible under Articles 47(b) or 47(c) of
        the Convention.  V.               
        CONCLUSION  31.             
        In accordance with the foregoing analysis of the requirements of
        the Convention and the applicable provisions of the Commission's
        Regulations, and without prejudging the merits of this petition, the
        Commission decides to declare admissible the alleged violations of the
        Convention presented on behalf of Mr. Lallion, and to declare
        inadmissible the alleged violations of the Declaration presented on
        behalf of Mr. Lallion.  THE
        INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,  DECIDES:  1.         
        To declare the violations of the Convention alleged in the
        petition admissible.  2.         
        To declare the violations of the Declaration alleged in the
        petition inadmissible.  3.         
        To transmit this report to the State of Grenada and to the
        petitioners.  4.         
        To place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned with a
        view to reaching a friendly settlement of the matter.  5.         
        To maintain in effect the precautionary measures issued on July
        2,1997.  6.         
        To make public this report and publish this report in its Annual
        Report to the General Assembly.  Done
        and signed in the city of Washington, D.C., on the 27th day
        of the month of September, 1999. (Signed): Robert K. Goldman, Chairman;
        Hélio Bicudo, First Vice-Chairman; Claudio Grossman, Second
        Vice-Chairman; Commissioners: Alvaro Tirado Mejía, Carlos Ayala Corao
        and Jean Joseph Exumé. [ Table of Contents | Previous | Next ] [1]
            Section 234 of the Criminal Code 
            (Cap. 76 of the 1958 Revised Laws of Grenada). [2] U.N.H.R.C., Champagnie, Palmer & Chisolm v. Jamaica, Communication No. 445/1991. [3]
            Article 5(2) of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
            on Civil and Political Rights provides: “The Committee shall not
            consider any communication from an individual unless it has
            ascertained that: (b) The individual has exhausted all available
            domestic remedies.  This
            shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is
            unreasonably prolonged. [4]
            Decision of 9 December 1987 on the admissibility of the Application,
            pp. 52 to 69. [5]
            Article 26 of the European Convention provides: “The Commission
            may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been
            exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of
            international law, and within a period of six months from the date
            on which the final decision is taken. [6]
            Id. p. 67. [7]
            Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American
            System, OEA/Ser.L.V/ii.92 doc.31 rev.3 (3 May 1996), p. 53. [8]
            The Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its Advisory Opinion
            OC-10/89, (interpretation of the
            American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the
            Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights.)
            July 14, 1989, para. 46, stated that “For the States Parties to
            the Convention, the specific source of their Obligations with
            respect to the protection of human rights is, in principle, the
            Convention itself.” [9]
            The Commission has established that it can find violations both of
            the Declaration and the Convention when there is a continuous
            situation, such as a denial of justice, which begins before and
            persists after the State concerned has ratified the American
            Convention.  See:
            Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report 1987-1988. 
            Resolution 28/88 Case 10.109 (Argentina), September 13, 1988. [10]
            Article 38(2) provides
            that: “In the circumstances set forth in Article 37(2) of these
            Regulations, the deadline for presentation of a petition to the
            Commission shall be within a reasonable period of time, in the
            Commission’s judgment, as from the date on which the alleged
            violation of rights has occurred, considering the circumstances of
            each specific case.” [11]
            See I/A Court H.R., Neira Alegria Case, Preliminary
            Objections, Judgment, December 11, 1991 pp. 44-45, at paras. 25-31. 
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