OEA/Ser.L/V/II.74
ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION
REPORT
CASES NO. 9777 AND 9718 ARGENTINA MARCH
31, 1988 I.
INTRODUCTION
1.
The cases discussed in this report deal primarily with the presumed
violation by the Government of the argentine Republic of Article 16 of the
American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter called the Convention), which
stipulates freedom of association. The
plaintiffs contend that by virtue of passage of Law 23,187 of June 5, 1985,1
which creates the Colegio Publico de Abogados de la Capital Federal (Federal
Capital Bar Association), the aforementioned right is violated by requiring
obligatory registration of attorneys in that city, “making it impossible to
practice the profession if the aforementioned registration is not carried
out,” according to paragraph tow of Article 18 (Title III) of the
aforementioned law.
2.
Cases 9777 and 9718 have been combined into the first of the two to
facilitate their processing (Article 40.2 of the Regulations), and since both
cases deal with petitions on substantially the same matter.
Further more, the cooperating petitioners themselves have stated that
they agree in all terms with the complaint or principal petition submitted by
Mr. Maximo Bomchil in his own behalf and that of Mr. Alejandro Meliton Ferrari
(Case (9777).
3.
Nevertheless, in consideration of the request by the parties to the
complaint in the sense that each one of their presentations be transmitted in a
request for information to the interested government, pursuant to Article 34.1.a
of the Regulations, the Commission decided to allow this procedure in order to
afford each opportunity to state his points of view, with the understanding that
this decision in now way affected the combining of the cases nor the review of
the question as through it dealt, as in fact it did, with just one problem.
4.
For its part, the Government of the Argentine Republic (hereinafter
called the Government) replied separately to the requests for information from
the Commission, in the form they were transmitted to it.
5.
In this way, the Commission believes it has accorded the plaintiffs fair
treatment in the processing of the case and thanks the Government of the
Argentine Republic for its cooperation in this sense and for having expressly
accepted the combining of the cases, in accordance with the terms of its note
dated March 26, 1986.
6.
Included below is a written summary submitted by the principal plaintiff
in the matter and the reply from the Government of the Argentine Republic.
The other petitions and the replies to them from the argentine Government
are discussed in summary fashion, in the same way as the principal charge. II.
PETITION OF MESSRS. MAXIMO BOMCHIL AND ALEJANDRO M. FERRARI
7.
The petition of the persons mentioned above, dated August 8, 1986,
complies with the requirements of form stipulated in Article 32.a of the
Regulations of the Commission and related provisions of the Convention (Art.
46.d)/ 8.
In summary, the petition sets out the following:1 a.
That Law 23,187 violates fundamentally the freedom of association and
further violates domestic legislation of Argentina regarding that right as well
as the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and Convention 87 of the International Labour
Organization (ILO); b.
That the causa pretendi is that the Commission submit to the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter called the Court) “the
decision on the existence of the alleged violations, with the pertinent legal
consequences” and that “in the hypothetical case that the Commission does
not agree to permit the Court to intervene, the former (the Commission) should
issue its opinion to the effect that such violations have occurred”; c.
That everything set out in the petition “is formulated under sworn
oath” and the documents attached are authentic; d.
That attached is a copy of the appeal for protection filed with the
Argentine Courts to request that Law 23,187 be declared unconstitutional, a copy
of the official document (at the second instance) answering the allegation by
the state and a copy of the allegation to the supreme Court of Justice on
special appeal of the ruling by the Federal Chamber which overturned the ruling
of the first instance court; e.
That the petitioner is directly affected by the provisions of Law 23,187
since he acts professionally in the city of Buenos Aires and was enrolled on the
register of the Supreme Court of Justice of the nation until the aforementioned
law was passed; f.
That all remedies under domestic jurisdiction have been exhausted, as
required by Article 46.a of the Convention (Art. 37.1 of the Regulations of the
IACHR), considering that since the passage of Law 23,187, the following rules
have been reached on the matter: i. First instance court ruling on the protection appeal against the
national government, handed down by a judge of Federal
Administrative-Contentious Court No. 3, declaring Law 23,1 87 unconstitutional; ii. Appeal Chamber (Court IV) ruling, on appeal of the ruling of Judge
No. 3 filed by the Minister of Education and Justice, overturning the ruling of
said judge and denying the protection appeal; iii. Ruling of the Supreme Court of Justice, on a special appeal filed
by the petitioner, which upheld the denial ruling of the Chamber of Appeals and,
therefore, that Law 23,187 was constitutional.
g.
That the Supreme Court’s ruling was notified to the plaintiff on June
27, 1986, and thus the complaint was submitted to the IACHR within the term of
Article 46.b of the Convention (Art. 38 of the Convention); h.
That the subject of the petition is not pending in any other
international procedure (Art. 46.c of the Convention) and the charge is not the
same as an earlier petition (Art. 46.d of the Convention); i.
That Law 23,187, establishing the Colegio Public de Abogados encompasses
basically four aspects, namely: requirements
to practice law *Title I), enrollment system (Title II), mandatory membership
(Title III), and disciplinary powers (Title IV); that the provisions of the law
dealing with points a, b and d are not the subject of the complaint since they
do not possess the character of violations of human rights invoked even though
they do constitute “useless regulation” which makes matters already properly
legislated more complex, onerous, and bureaucratic, and transfers to this bar
association and professional registration that was until that time a free
service of the Supreme Court of Justice, and that, as a consequence, the
petitioner wishes to have it clearly stated that this claim “is aimed
exclusively at declaring as a violation of the Convention the system of
obligatory, compulsory, and automatic membership stipulated by the articles of
Law 23187” which set up this mandatory membership system;1 j.
That the city of Buenos Aires has two bar associations that offer open
membership to practicing attorneys in either one or the other, although some
attorneys are not affiliated with either of them while others are affiliated
with smaller bar associations for these professionals.
Examples are the Corporación de Abogados Católicos, the Colegio de
Abogados del Estado, and the Asociación de Abogados de Empresa; k.
The first of these bar associations is the Colegio de Abogados de Buenos
Aires. This association, founded in
1913, has stood for more than thirty years for opposition to any form of
compulsory membership, and has long fostered initiatives to maintain a
democratic structure in Argentina and an independent posture by the judicial
branch of government; l.
That the second is the Asociación de Abogados de Buenos de Buenos Aires
which, even though it has a democratic leaning and has fought for civil
liberties, “has turned its efforts toward establishing the mandatory
membership requirement,” and has prepared a draft law to this end (which was
the reference document for current Law 23,187), to establish a single bar
association in the federal capital city; m.
That while the Colegio Público de Abogados de la Capital Federal,
established by Law 23,187, is a not-for-profit association whose purpose is to
bring together persons of the same stature and profession–which legally is a
contractual and consentual act perfected by the “later admission and
membership of others to the association already created”–it too must follow
all the requirements of corporate law according to which “there is no
association without free expression of will formulated upon the founding or
joining of the association and acceptance as a member”; n.
That sufficient proof that the “Colegio Público” created by Law
23,187 is an association is that “such qualification is conferred to it by the
Chamber of Deputies, according to the record of the minutes of meetings” and
that, it should be added, “as an association it constitutes a legal person
under non-state public law, which status arises from the source of its creation
(Art. 17, Law 23,187), the nature of its objectives (public interest), its
financial independence and the fact that it is not part of the active, central
or decentralized public administration”; it should be recalled, it is stated,
that “colegio” and “asociación” are legally and grammatically
synonymous terms [describing organizations that] can exist only with the free
will to join of their members (affection societatis);
o.
That, furthermore, Law 23,187 violates the American Declaration of Rights
and Duties of man (Art. XII) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
expressly provides (Art. 20.2) that “no person may be obligated to join an
association.”1
It also violated Art. 29.c of the Convention in that it excludes other
inherent human rights and guarantees, limiting the effect of the American
Declaration and other international acts of the same nature, although the
terminology of the law, especially that of Art. 18, leads to confusion by
equating the terms “matriculation” [enrollment or registration] and
“asociación” [association] and making such enrollment obligatory; it also
violates Art. 11 of the Convention because the act of requiring membership “is
an abusive attack on private life which is victimized when the state seeks to
impose on it a compulsory life which is victimized when the state seeks to
impose on it a compulsory association as a consequence … to the establishment
of a cooperative body …”
p.
That the right to establish professional associations in Argentina ought
to attend to the context and quality of degrees issued in Argentina since
“argentine universities award certifying degrees” which authorize those who
hold the degrees to exercise the profession and there fore the state’s action
should be limited to “being vigilant to prevent the state from certifying
irresponsibly any person who is not prepared and also ensuring that the same
state does not sue that power to discriminate or limit in any way access to the
profession. Under such conditions,
then, the matter of obligatory association is subordinate to other guidelines,
is a response also to other tradition sans has well defined purposes.”
q.
That, likewise, Argentine domestic law (Arts. 14 and 14 bis of the
Constitution) guarantees all inhabitants freedom of association for useful
purposes, with trade union organizations being free, a fact that entails the
right of not being obligated to join any social or trade union organization.
r.
That, likewise, Argentine jurisprudence has recognized, in several
Supreme Court of Justice rulings, the nonbonding nature of the freedom of
association (Article 14 of the Constitution)2
and that, therefore, the court’s ruling in relation to Law 23,187 is not
consistent with the right because it based its ruling upholding the
constitutionality of that law on the belief that the Colegio Público is neither
an association nor a trade union. The
terms of the dissenting vote of judge Dr. Pablo Galli, set out below, are
applicable here: The
trade union is a voluntary associational union which is set up for those in the
same skill category of workers or employees ….” (Livio,
Labor, Sindicalismo y Sociedad, Ediciones de Atlántico, Buenos Aires,
1957, page 17). “Every
trade union is an association…” (Guillermo Cabanella, in Enciclopedia Jurídica
Omeba, Voz Asociaciones Profesionales, Tomo I, page 857), and finally, and I
transcribe this once again: “What
is this Colegio Público lacking to make the grade as a trade union?
since the law entrusts to it the representation of professionals …
Necessarily, these persons feel compelled to have a common opinion …”1
s.
That this case ought to be remitted to the Court given the optional
authority conferred by Article 51 of the Convention.
This request, already mentioned, is based on the criterion expressed by
the Court in consultative opinion OC 5/85,2
which states that the Court ought to have submitted to it cases in which there
could have been domestic legal problems in the country against which the charge
would have been made, such as opposing court decisions on the same case
submitted to the Commission, or if the latter did not reach a unanimous opinion
in its review of the matter. In
support of this petition, the plaintiff recalls that in connection with Law
23,187 there has been an initial contrary ruling from the Federal
Contentious-Administrative Court, which held the law unconstitutional.
t.
That in this case, the “nature of the matter submitted to this
Honorable Commission leaves no room for a friendly settlement” since, being
faced with a law passed by the Argentine Congress, the executive branch of
government has no power to amend its provisions and therefore a compromise
agreement is manifestly impossible. Consequently,
the claimant asks that the procedure of friendly settlement not be applied
(Article 45.7 of the IACHR Regulations).
9.
In a note dated September 5, 1986, the Commission transmitted the
denunciation in full to the Argentine government, following authorization by the
petitioner who further renounced his right to secrecy of identification, in
accordance with Article 34 of the Regulations.
A copy of the letter was remitted to the Argentine mission to the OAS.
10.
The Argentine government, in a note dated March 26, 1986 (No. 15),
replied to the Commission’s request for information in a lengthy brief whose
principal points are set out further on.3
a.
Regarding the description of the law, the Government states: Description
of Law No. 23,187: Analysis of
Argentine Law 23,187 leads to the conclusion that it establishes the Official
Association of Lawyers of the Federal capital with jurisdiction and exclusive
competence in the territory of the City of Buenos Aires. This
Law was enacted by the Argentine Congress in accordance with and under the terms
of Article 67, paragraph 27 of the National Constitution. This
Article states: Article
67: The Congress shall have power:
… 27. To exercise sole power of
legislation throughout the territory of the Capital of the Nation…” This
legal norm is directly related to article 86, paragraph 3 of the National
Constitution, which states:
Article 86: The President of
the national has the following powers: …
He is the immediate and local head of the Capital of the Nation. Article
3 of the Argentine National Constitution States:
Article 3: The authorities
who direct the federal Government shall reside in the city that is declared the
capital of the Republic by a special law of Congress, after cession by one or
more provincial legislatures of the territory to be federalized. Law
23,187 applies exclusively to the territory of the city of Buenos Aires. b. As for stipulating bar association systems, the Government says: Information
on systems of association of lawyers in Argentina:
Argentina is a Federal State (Article 1 of the National Constitution).
Distribution of competence between the Federal State and the provinces is
governed by the National Constitution. The
basic article is Article 104, which reads as follows: Article 104. The provinces
shall retain all powers not delegated by this Constitution to the Federal
Government and those expressly reserved by special pacts at the time of their
incorporation. The
powers of the Legislative Branch are fundamentally set forth in article 67 of
its components of the National Constitution; those of the Executive branch in
Article 86 et seq.; and those of the Judiciary Branch in Articles 100 and
102 of the Argentine National Constitution, which apportions competence. The
purpose of this chapter, as indicated by its title, is to inform the Honorable
Commission of the system of association of lawyers as it exists in Argentina. The
Argentine federal system has been explained above.
In consequence, the power of supervision of the exercise of the free
professions is reserved for the provinces, and therefore each province has
solved for itself the question of association. It
is very important to point out that there are 22 provinces:
Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Catamarca, Corrientes, Entre Ríos, Jujuy,
Mendoza, La Rioja, Salta, Santiago del Estero, San Juan, Santa Fé, San Luis,
Tucumán, Formosa, Chaco, Misiones, La Pampa, Chubut, Río Negro, Neuquén, and
Santa Cruz, in addition to the Federal Capital, which is Buenos Aires, and a
territory consisting of Tierra de Fuego, the Malvinas, and the Islands of the
South Atlantic and Antartica. The
topic of association thus involves the 22 provinces, the Federal Capital and the
territory of Tierra del Fuego, that is, 24 judicial districts.
Of the 22 provinces, 19 have an official association similar to that of
the Federal Capital under the terms of Law 23,187.
It should also be pointed out that in the provinces the associations fall
within the competence of their respective courts.
Thus, for example, in the province of Buenos Aires there are numerous
judicial districts. The law
authorizes an official association for each judicial district, and those
registered in an association are empowered to exercise their profession
throughout the jurisdiction of the province with no need to register again in
the province. The same situation
obtains in other provinces, as Santa Fé, Córdoba, Mendoza, and so forth. Association
as described in the provisions of Law 23,1 87 applies in 19 Argentine provinces
and in the Federal Capital. The three provinces that do not have associations are in the
process of forming them. In
the three remaining provinces there is a strong movement toward association in a
manner similar to that prescribed by Law 23,187. c. In connection with the effective term of the law, the Government states: The
fact is that the legal profession in the city of Buenos Aires has registered
somewhat more than 32,000 lawyers. The
Bar Association has approximately 1,700 members and the Association of Lawyers
some 3,600 members. All
lawyers are registered under Law 23,187 in the Official Bar Association of the
Federal Capital, to which original membership under de facto Law 22,192
was transferred, a law which was largely repealed by Law 23,187. In
this respect, see Article 65 of Law 23,187, and also Decision No. 54 of the
Supreme Court dated August 22, 1985, which partially establishes the limits of
the repeal of de facto Law 22,192. It
is a concrete fact, nevertheless, that the patter initiated by de facto
Law 22,192 in November 1982, and continued in Law 23,187, by virtue of its
transitory provisions and Article 60 of its component parts, the number of
registered lawyers as of the date of this presentation is that specified above. Numerical
comparison of these figures provides a sufficiently objective example of the
extent of membership of the two voluntary organizations that have attracted the
lawyers of the city of Buenos Aires in the past and continue to do so at the
present time. It
should also be noted that the position of the complainants with respect to Law
23,187 is accompanied by only a minuscule number of lawyers in the legal
profession in the city of Buenos Aires. d.
On the legitimacy of the Colegio Público de Abogados de la Capital
Federal, the Government makes the following statement: 5.
Legitimacy of the Official Bar Association of the Federal Capital as a
legal entity under Law 23,187 in the legal profession in the city of Buenos
Aires: There is not the least
doubt that the legality of the Official Bar Association of the Federal Capital
in the city of Buenos Aires is founded on Law 23,187. This
law is founded on Article 67, paragraph 27 of the National Constitution, but the
legitimacy of the Official Bar Association of the Federal Capital is based on a
sociopolitical fact and on its precedents and consequences. This
legitimacy is manifested as follows: Law
23,187 makes voting on the Law compulsory, but establishes no penalties for
those who fail to vote on it. This
is absolutely objective and is evident from reading the Law. Although
under the terms of this legal provision elections were called for April 29,
1986, no fewer than nine voting lists contended in the election.
What is truly extraordinary is that from a list of approximately 27,000
registered, no fewer than 17,500 turned out to vote. Consequently,
it should be pointed out that of the 27,000 registered approximately 10,000 were
and are lawyers residing more than 400 or 500 kilometers from Buenos Aires,
losses for other reasons in the voting lists notwithstanding. This
means that if voting on April 29, 1986, is analyzed in detail, it may be
concluded that more than 95% of those who resided less than 400 or 500
kilometers from Buenos Aires voted–and this without sanctions for those who
did not vote. Without fear of error
it may be said that such extraordinary support for the vote gave the Official
Bar Association of the Federal Capital absolute and total legitimacy.
There were not more than 900 blank or invalidated ballots out of a total
of more than 17,500 voters and the elections took place in a single day. Some
3,500 votes were cast for the majority list as the first minority.
This was followed by some 3,200, 2,000, and more than 1,5oo for the
second, third, and fourth lists respectively.
The remaining lists garnered fewer than 1,000 votes each. Participation
in the election was the most impressive political event taking place in Buenos
Aires in 1986. All
the newspapers and magazines commented on the extraordinary support shown for
Law 23,187, which involved participation of more than 17,500 voters in the
election held on April 29, 1986. The
foregoing facts are public knowledge, to which must be added the strictest
regularity and propriety during and after the election.
It should also be noted that the electoral campaign preceding the
electing on April 29, 1986, was of unusual intensity, a factor that further
supports the legitimacy of this extraordinary attendance at the polls.
Law 23,187 gave legal status to the Official Bar Association of the
Federal Capital, and participation in the election on April 29, 1986, gave it
legitimacy. It
must be remembered that failure to vote in this emergency was not penalized in
any way, thereby objectively demonstrating the legitimacy of Law 23,187 in the
minds of those exercising the legal profession in Buenos Aires. e.
As regards the nature of the “Colegio Público de Abogados,” the
Government makes the following statement: The
means by which the distinguished petitioners present the problem to the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights fail to take into consideration the
fact that all systems designed to protect human rights internationally are
founded on presumed, concrete denunciation of violations. In
this regard the requirements of Article 32 of the Regulations of the Commission
are clear:
Petitioners addressed to the Commission shall include: … an account of
the act or situation that is denounced, specifying the place an date of the
alleged violations and, if possible, the name of the victims of such violations
a well as that of any official that might have been appraised of the act or
situation that was denounced. The
petitioners do not consider that the part of Law 23,187 that refers to the
admission requirements and the disciplinary powers of the Official Bar
Association is in violation of the pact (See p.9). Nor
do they object to the payment of annual dues by members considering such annual
dues to be a natural and necessary consequence of membership. On
the other hand they consider to be a violation of the Convention the fact that
(in the opinion of the petitioners) forced representation of lawyers is imposed
upon the Bar Association (See p. 10). This
topic will be taken up again later on, but it may be pointed out here and now
that such representation does not appear expressly or tacitly in the text of the
Law. Further more, the complainants
do not mention any specific case in which such representation has taken place. As
a consequence of the alleged force representation the complainants state that
the lawyers are compelled to have a common opinion by means of the Association
(See p. 10). This
topic will also be taken up later on. At
this point the complainants do not present any specific cases in which such
alleged violation of the freedom of expression, referred to in the beginning of
the preceding paragraph, has taken place. It
should additionally be emphasized that the complainants fail to specify which of
the provisions of the Pact are in conflict with the alleged opinion. The
complainants add that the regulations providing for compulsory voting on the
part of the members in elections to the Bar Association violate the Pact.
Again in this case, however, they fail to specify which of the provisions
of the Pact are in conflict with compulsory voting. As
has been pointed out already in this reply, the complainants also fail to
mention that Law 23,187 does not provide for any penalties for non-participation
in elections. As
a first significant reply to the alleged charges of conflict of Law 23,187 with
the Pact, it is to be noted that in presenting their transcript the complainants
have not demonstrated that they have exhausted all applicable Argentine domestic
juridical procedures. In
the case in which Attorney Alejandro Meliton Ferrari was the complainant in the amparo
procedure that questioned various aspect of the constitutionality of Law 23,187,
the Argentine Supreme Court handed down a decision on June 26, 1986. This
decision has legal foundations that extend beyond the resolution of the topics
debated in the case itself. It
is a unanimous decision, although two of the Judges of the Court presented
separate explanations of their votes. The conclusions, however, were unanimous and the arguments
supportive and to the point. The
essence or core of the decision implies and signifies a juridical demonstration
of the nature of the Official Bar Association of the Federal Capital as the
originator of Law 23,187. The
decision may be summarized as follows: The Official Bar Association of the Federal Capital is a
legitimate delegation of the State’s administrative power to an organization
established for the purpose of receiving such delegation of power. The
Official Bar Association of the Federal Capital is a public law democratically
organized legal person in which rights and obligations were exercised in
accordance with reciprocal controls of the internal organs of this body as
established by law. These organs
are democratically constituted by election. The terms of office are reasonable. Inter-organ controls guarantee sound functioning of the
organization. b. On the essence of Law, the government points out: The
essence of Law 23,187 lies not only in the prestige it accords the exercise of
the legal profession but also, fundamentally, to the protection of the liberty
and dignity of lawyers. Four
articles provide the key to the Law under discussion.
The essence of Law 23,187 is the respect shown for the liberty and
dignity of lawyers in the exercise of their profession. This
is expressly stated in article 1 of Law 23,187. Article,
1, which is the essence of Law 23,187, has been incomprehensibly omitted in the
transcript to which the present statement is a reply. It
may be said that Article 1 constitutes the totality of Law 23,187 insofar as its
objectives, purposes, and essence are concerned. A
reading of the Law is essential for understanding it and is sufficient to answer
all the charges of the complainants. It
is the crux of reply to the alleged charges and demonstrates how the Law
dovetails with the political philosophy of the Argentine National Constitution
and the political philosophy of the Pact of San José, Costa Rica. Article
1 of Law 23,187 agrees with the Argentine Constitution and with the Pact of San
José, Costa Rica, in that it is the best reply to all the alleged charges of
the complainants. Article 1 reads:
Article 1: The exercise of
the legal profession in the Federal Capital shall be governed by the provisions
of the present Law and subordinately by the provisions of the national
procedural codes and any other laws that are not repealed by the present Law. g.
On the purpose of the Law: In
the alleged violation of freedom of association, it is pertinent to point out
that under the terms of Law 23,187 the Official Bar Association of the federal
Capital is a creation of that same Law, that is, a delegation of the exercise of
enforcing power with regard to the legal profession in the city of Buenos Aires. Article
17 accurately describes the Association as being of a public nature, as follows:
Article 17: The Official Bar
Association of the Federal Capital is hereby established, which shall supervise
the exercise of the legal profession and be responsible for registration in the
Association in the geographic area of the Federal Capital and with reference to
professional activities in that jurisdiction in conformity with the provisions
of this Law. The
Official Bar Association of the Federal Capital shall function with the
character, rights, and obligations of legal persons under public law. Special
waivers notwithstanding, the Association’s administrative activities assigned
it by his Law shall be carried out supplementary by observing Law 19,549 on
administrative procedures. Private
associations or organizations that may be constituted in the future shall be
prohibited from using the denomination Official Bar Association of the Federal
Capital or any others which by their similarity may lead to confusion. Lawyers
registered in the Official Bar Association are and were those registered in the
list maintained by the Office of the Undersecretary for Registration of the
Supreme Court of Argentina under the terms of de facto Law 22,192. Moreover,
the numeration of de facto Law 22,192 was continued in the same books the
Supreme Court used for that purpose. At
the present time the Official Bar Association continues with the same books, and
registration is now being recorded in Volume 37 under the terms of Article 18 of
Law 23,187, which states:
Article 18: Lawyers
presently registered in the list maintained by the Office of the Undersecretary
for Registration of the Supreme Court of Argentina shall be registered in the
Official Bar Association of the Federal Capital, as shall lawyers who in the
future are registered in the Association under the terms of the present Law. There
is no difference between registration with the Supreme Court and with the Bar
Association at the present time. Moreover,
judicial control of legality exists with regard to all matters concerning
registration under the provisions of Articles 12 and 13 of Law 23,187. It
is most instructive to bear this in mind in noting that, far from violating the
right of association, all matters concerning practice of the legal profession in
the Federal Capital are presently guaranteed in exactly the same matter as they
were previously. Effective
delegation to the Association by virtue of Law 23,187 with respect to
registration of the police power of the State is consequently evident. Also
evident is the State’s control of legality through the Judiciary Branch, all
of which demonstrate that no essential modification has taken place in detriment
to the right of association. An
opinion was provided on these procedures by Dr. Nieto Navia in advisory opinion
OC-5/85 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which states “… freedom
of association is violated if the law compels individuals to join associations,
if the proposed aims of that association are such that they could be achieved by
associations created by individuals using their freedom …” It
is evident that police power does fall within the scope of such creative powers
of individuals. Police power is
within the political-juridical structure of the state. Consequently,
Dr. Nieto Navia’s opinion is not applicable in the case at hand. h.
As for the mandatory nature of the registration and other characteristics
of the Law, the Government expresses: Compulsory
registration of the Official Bar Association of the Federal Capital under Law
23,187 constitutes reasonable regulation of a public function and personal
services as legitimized in Articles 16 and 17 of the Argentine Constitution.
Consequently, those registered in the Official Bar Association of the
Federal Capital have no associative ties among themselves. The
relationship of each lawyer and the Association is therefore an ope legis
relationship, and consequently the obligations imposed by the law on those
registered are also ope legis obligations. An
important segment of the statement of Dr. Augusto C. Belluscio, Supreme Court
Judge, regarding Ferrari, Alejandro Meliton V. Argentina (P.E.N.) regarding
remedy of Amparo decision handed down on June 26, 1986 and published in Derecho
on June 29, 1986. Professor
Belluscio stated:
Control of professional practice is indispensable by virtue of the great
number of professionals on the condition that it does not impair their
particular and private nature and the essence of sound social order.
This may be achieved through control of a state body or by the social
entity formed by the members of each profession.
The constitutionality and indisputable common benefit must be emphasized
here of a legal system that provides the regularly constituted members of a
specific social sector with attention to the problems concerning their own
interests and not to an exclusively public organization. The
Judge also stated with regard to the Ferrari case that the Official Bar
Association constituted by Law 23,187 is not an association in that the law does
not contain any provisions under which registration signifies entering into
associative ties with the other members. On
the contrary, its juridical nature and essential purpose are defined in Article
17, which provides it with the character of a public law juridical person, and
therefore the position of lawyers regarding the Association is one of ope
legis submission to the public authority it exercises and the obligations
the same Law directly imposes, without any societal ties and without detriment
to the freedom to associate in trade unions provided for in Article 14 bis of
the Constitution, inasmuch as the association under discussion is not a trade
union organization. Member
of the Court Enrique Petracchi said in the Ferrari case: Law
23,187 does not contain any provisions according to which compulsory
registration in the Official Bar Association involves entering an associative
tie with the other members of the organization, which is a public organization
designed to fulfill public functions and play a non-associative, advisory, and
participatory role, founded on the principles of social democracy and
subordination. The
individualistic viewpoint according to which each being appears to be isolated
is not compatible with the social spirit of the Constitution, since although the
human personality can only develop through intercommunication and solidarity, it
should not be forgotten that it is also preserved in the autonomy of its
decisions by Article 19 of the Constitution. The
Sate cannot impose membership in a given association or group, nor should it
regulate actual links among persons that derive from the spontaneously
restrictive structures emerging in the course of history of society rather than
from consensus. The
functioning of representation can be strengthened and improved through
socio-professional consultation and participation without such modalities
involving compulsion of the members of each sector to participate regularly in
societal activities. It
is not a question of the Bar Association, in its advisory function, of
compromising the opinion of each of its members, but rather of the members,
without prejudice to the expression of their opinions as individuals or in
spontaneously established groups, contributing to the establishment of
discussion and planning forums sponsored by those who desire to improve
representative democracy. In
the same Ferrari decision Dr. Belluscio stated: The
right to associate for practical purposes doubtless implies the right not to
associate, but that refers to societies whose existence is not required for the
order and welfare of society as a whole. Consequently,
the system of association does not damage the right to associate and the
correlative right not to do so because it is precisely a question of the legal
statute of a social structure preconstituted by the nature of things in which
the formation of a society is not imposed on the lawyers that is different from
that which they are joining by the mere fact of registration and the exercise of
their profession in that forum in a community organized for discipline and the
greatest possible moral safeguard of professional practice. Substantively,
paragraph 28 of Article 67 of the Argentine Constitution authorizes the
constituted powers–specifically the Congress–to make all laws, and the
Executive Branch all appropriate regulations to exercise such powers, and all
others granted by the Constitution to the Government of Argentina. The
delegation of police power, as provided for in Law 23,187, is compatible with
this doctrine and with jurisprudence. Delegation
was accorded a body established by the delegating Law.
It granted to that body, the Bar Association, police power in all matters
pertaining to the legal profession, its registration and discipline.
Its purpose is the liberty and dignity of lawyers in practicing their
profession in accordance with Article 1 of Law 23,187.
Control by the Judiciary and control of administration and government by
the Executive Branch through possible intervention in the Bar Association were
set aside. The delegation is legitimate, since all the precepts in this
respect are present and also because the delegator continues to hold power,
inasmuch as it merely delegates and transfers the exercise of powers. Congress
may amend Law 23,187 at will. The
State is the original holder of the power it delegates and is at the same time
the entity that conserves the power of control.
Consequently, delegation of police power and its adjuncts to the Bar
Association under Law 23,187 is legitimate in accordance with Article 67,
paragraphs 27 and 28, and Article 86, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Constitution. i)
As precedents for registration of attorneys of the Argentine Republic,
the Government notes the following: In
addition to the case already referred to in the present case as a valid legal
basis for the topics under discussion, mention should be made again of the
Supreme Court decision in Inchauspe, Pedro V. Junta Nacional de Carnes,
handed down on September 1, 1944, and published in Fallos, volume 199, p.
516, which is applicable to the case; and of Supreme Court decision of September
7, 1944, in Oscar Augustín Avico V. Saúl G. de La Pesa, in Fallos,
Volume 172, p. 29, in which delegation is legitimized as in Law 23,187. Also
of interest is Cavic V. Maurin y Cia SRL Juan, published in Volume 139,
p. 527 et seq. In this
important decision the Supreme Court recognized police power to intervene
through the use of legal instruments to guarantee reasonable interests of the
community.
9.
Inconsistency on the part of Attorney Alejandro Meliton Ferrari as a
member of the Bar Association of the City of La Plata, Province of Buenos Aires,
from March 3, 1955, to date in accepting there a membership system absolutely
analogous to Law 23,187, which he impugns in this procedure and in the preceding
judicial actions. Application of the principle of estoppel by deed
(Translator’s note: See Black’s
Law Dictionary: Nemo contra
factum suam venire potest. Arbitrariness
of the contradiction and its consequences: This chapter is brief and points to actions of juridical importance that invalidate the objections of Attorney Alejandro Meliton Ferrari. Attorney
Meliton Ferrari, as set forth in his objections on page 2, Chapter 4, Vital
statistics, graduated with a law degree in 1954 from the School of Law and
Social Science of the University of Buenos Aires.
In addition to registering as a lawyer in the Civil Chambers of the City
of Buenos Aires, he also registered in the city of La Plata, capital of the
Province of Buenos Aires. As
is well known, in the Province of Buenos Aires a registration system exists that
is practically identical to that established by Law 23,187.
Attorney Ferrari, at least as far as is known, never questioned
registration in the Judicial Department of La Plata, Province of Buenos Aires. It
has already been explained that in accordance with the law, registration in the
Province of Buenos Aires is structured in accordance with the judicial
departments into which the province is divided.
Each judicial department has a bar association, and registration in one
association gives lawyers the right to practice in all judicial departments.
All the associations are centered around the Bar Association of the
Province of Buenos Aires. The
provincial law that established the bar association system in the province of
Buenos Aires is Law 5177, which has been in force in the Province of Buenos
since November 13, 1947. Membership
is compulsory under the provisions of Chapter Two, Article 6 and its components
of the law. j)
As for exhausting all remedies of domestic jurisdiction, the Government
stated: In
the two cases being replied to jointly it may be considered that the remedies
under domestic law have been exhausted. This
being the case, by its decisions the Supreme Court of Justice formally admitted
the special recourses (Law No. 48), examined the substance of the question and
upheld the decisions of the previous instance.
However, notwithstanding compliance with this formal requirement (Art.
46, American Convention on Human Rights), for the reasons given earlier, it is
incumbent on the Commission to evaluate the possible admissibility of these
cases. By virtue of the foregoing, the Government of Argentina
requests that communications No. 9777 and 9819 be declared inadmissible in light
of the provisions of Article 47, b and c, of the American Convention on Human
Rights. 11.
The Commission, in a letter dated April 15, 2987, transmitted to the
petitioner the reply from the government and gave him a terms of 45 days to
formulate his observations and comments. 12.
The plaintiff, in a letter dated June 1, 1987, formulated the
observations that are summarized below:1 a)
That Law 23,187, under the pretext or “innocent excuse of an
enrollment, the consequence of the delegation of power by the state, manipulated
a mechanism used to bring all attorneys together into a single body that groups
them in an obligatory fashion.” (p.8); b)
That the bar association established by Law 23,187 is not a “public law
agency that exercises the function of professional police power delegated by the
state, as the Argentine government contends, but is, on the other hand, a
professional association with all the characteristics of such since it groups
attorneys, acts in their defense, represents them before public authority and
the community at large, issues opinions on problems and current events in their
behalf” and, in short, carries out all the purposes that qualify it as a
representative association of the attorneys of the federal capital city (p. 11). c)
That in view of the characteristics of the situation created by Law
23,187 with regard to which violations of the Convention (Article 16) occur, as
well as the right to dignity (Article 11) and the right to free expression
(Article 13), and the controversy that exists in the area of domestic
jurisdiction, considering that there are opposing court decisions on the
constitutionality of that law, it is requested again that the IACHR submit the
case to the Court in accordance with Article 51 of the Convention. 13.
The Commission, in a letter dated June 17, 1987, transmitted the
observations of Mr. Meliton Ferrari to the government for the purpose of
replying to them if it considered such action appropriate.
A copy of that letter was transmitted to the Argentine mission to the OAS
on the same date. 14.
Meanwhile, the government transmitted in a letter dated July 7, 1987,
(No. 19) additional information on the case, consisting of a copy of the
ruling of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, dated March 3, 1987, in
the documents filed under the “Bereraggi de la Rua and others vs. the National
State:” the subject of those documents would be substantially analogous to
those presented to the Commission, that is, the constitutional validity of Law
23,187.2 15.
The Argentine government, in a letter dated September 17, 1987, (No. 24)
referring to the letter dated June 17, 1987, submitted its reply to the
observations made by the petitioner. A
discussion of the principal points of that reply follows.3 a)
With respect to the scope of Law 23,187 and from a reading of its Article
1, 2, 18 and 60, the Government observes the following (pp. 304). Pursuant
to these articles, the State has delegated to the Official Bar Association the
control of the registration of those who, being legally licensed to practice
law, seek to do so in the jurisdiction of the Federal Capital.
Since that is the case, it is logical that all lawyers registered
according to the system previously in effect in their jurisdiction shall be
considered as being listed on the registry kept by the Bar Association. The
petitioner has seen in these provisions an “associative linkage,” a sort of
“affectio soietatis” that would link each lawyer registered with the Bar
Association. That is not the case. In
fact, Article 17 of Law 23,187 states:
Article 17. The Official Bar
Association of the Federal capital, which shall supervise the exercise of the
legal profession and be responsible for registration with the association in the
geographic area of the Federal capital, with reference to professional
activities in that jurisdiction in conformity with the provisions of this law,
is hereby established. The
Official Bar Association of the Federal Capital shall function with the
character, rights and obligations of legal persons under public law.
Except for special waivers, the Association’s administrative activities
assigned to it by this Law shall also be governed by Law 19,549 on
Administrative Procedures. … The
Bar Association then is an organization that acts “with the character, rights,
and obligations of legal persons under public law.”
According to Article 33 of the Argentine Civil Code, these persons are
the State, the Provinces, the Municipalities, independent agencies, and the
Catholic Church. A
reasonable legal interpretation leads to the view that the Bar Association acts
“with the character, rights, and obligations of legal persons under public
law” because it acts by delegation of power from the National Government.
This assertion is in accord with the same Article 17 when it provides for
the application–in addition to Law 23,187–of National Law 19,549 on
Administrative Procedures, which governs nation-wide actions of and before the
National Government, except for military, defense and security agencies. The
provisions of the functions and jurisdiction of the Bar Association support this
interpretation, particularly the following:
“Keeping
the registry of lawyers practicing law in the Federal Capital …” (Article
20, subparagraph b). “The
exercise of disciplinary power over registered lawyers” (Article 20,
subparagraph b).
“Monitor
and control of the practice of law to see that persons who are not qualified, or
are not registered do not practice …” (Article
21, subparagraph b).
“The
rules of professional ethics shall apply …” (Article
21, subparagraph c). The
mere reading of these paragraphs indicates that the Organization concerned can
only be a public agency under national law. This
reasoning is found in the ruling of the Supreme Court of June 26, 2986, as a
result of which the petitioner has filed a complaint with the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. That
the Law mentioned (23.187) contains no provisions where by being listed on the
registry would entail entry into an associative linkage with the other persons
registered with that Bar Association. On
the contrary, the Association’s legal nature and basic purpose are defined in
Article 17 of the Law, which assigns it the character of a legal person under
public law, so that the position of a lawyer vis-à-vis the Bar association is
that of being subject ope legis to the public authority that the agency
exercises, and to those obligations the Law imposes directly on such attorney,
without regard to his linkage with any organization (F.446-XX- Ferrari,
Alejandro Melitón V. Argentina (P.E.N.) on Amparo.
CSJ June 26, 1986, paragraph 10 of the preamble.
b)
With respect to the consultative opinion, the Government states the
following: In
OC-5/85 the Court stated that “the assertion that compulsory membership is
structural by the way to organize the practice of professions in general …
implies that such membership is based on public order.”
In this regard, it has considered that “a possible meaning of public
policy in the Convention is that it refers to conditions that ensure the
harmonious and normal operation of institutions on the basis of a consistent
system of values and principles. In
that sense, restrictions on the exercise of certain rights and duties might be
justified to ensure public order “ (CF. OC-5/85 paragraph 64). In
the same context, the Court has said that “it can be maintained in general
that the exercise of the rights guaranteed by the Convention must be consistent
with the general welfare,” which is understood as “a concept referring to
the conditions of life in a society the enables its members to achieve a higher
democratic values,” so that “statements that compulsory membership is a way
to ensure professional ethics and responsibility … must be considered as based
on the idea that such membership represents a requirement of the general
welfare” (CF. OC-5/85 paragraphs 65 and 66). However,
the ideas of “public policy” and “general welfare” are not enough in
themselves to make restrictions on protected rights legitimate except to the
extent that such rights are “necessary in a democratic society.”
Democratic public policy and democratic general welfare are involved in a
restriction imposed by a democratic law. Along
these lines, the Court has recognized that organizing professions in general
into professional associations is not per se contrary to the Convention, and it
concludes that such organization is implied in democratic public policy (CF.
OC-5/85 paragraph 68). c)
As for Argentine Law the Government says: It
is in light of law in force in the Argentine Republic, including the American
Convention on Human Rights, binding since September 5, 1984, that the delegation
of powers by the Government to the Official Bar Association of the Federal
Capital should be analyzed. According
to the view expressed, there can be no doubt that keeping the Registry (Article
18 and 20 subparagraph 2) of Law 23,187), the exercise of disciplinary power and
supervision (Article 20, subparagraph b) and 231 (subparagraph B) idem) and the
enforcement of standards of professional ethics (article 21 subparagraph c),
idem) are government powers expressly delegated to the Official Bar Association
by Law 23,187. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court has stated: “…
(The Official Bar Association) is an organization intended to accomplish public
purposes that were originally the Province of the State and that the State by
delegation, as specified normatively, transfers to the institution that it
establishes to administer the registration and the disciplinary regime of all
lawyers in the Federal capital, as auxiliaries of the administration of
justice” (F.446-xx-Ferrari Alejandro Melitón vs. Argentina (Federal
Executive Branch) (PEN) on amparo, CSJ, June 26, 1986, preambular clause 11). d)
With respect to the point that the law violates freedom of association,
the Government adds the following: 3. In another part of its observations, the petitioner contends that violation of the right protected by the Convention, Freedom of Association (Article 16), occurred with the passage of National Law 23,187. The
GOVERNMENT OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC is pleased that its national are enabled
under the law to have recourse to an international non-judicial body in the
field of human rights, as a result of Argentina's ratification of the American
Convention on September 5, 1984. Along
this line of thought, it regards as legitimate the petitioner’s labeling as a
“violation” an act of the State that, in its view, breached a human right
whose free and full exercise the Argentine Government has undertaken to respect
and guarantee. This
characterization by the petitioner is legitimate insofar as it is a ground for a
complaint or denunciation (Article 4 of the American Convention) but it is not
definitive because the American describes such characterization as
“alleged.” Thus, Article 44,
paragraph 2, subparagraph b) on admissibility refers to “alleging
violation.” Similarly, the
regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights regarding
conditions for considering a petition uses the term “alleged violations”
(Article 31) and regarding requirements for petitions refers to “alleged
violations” (Article 32.b). Accordingly,
the ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT maintains that this is not a matter of the type of
violation but rather of a legitimate restriction of freedom of association,
which is necessary in a democratic society in the interest of public policy. Since
the position of a lawyer vis-à-vis the Official Bar Association is that of
being subject ope legis to the public authority that the association
exercises and to the obligations that the law directly imposes on him, without
relation to membership in any organization, the petitioner cannot point to any
specific damage or damages that enforcement of national Law 23,187 has caused
him. Actually,
he has continued practicing his profession in the jurisdiction of the federal
capital without the need for going through any formalities.
His membership in other professional organizations under
private–specifically the Bar Association (Colegio de Abogados) that he
mentions in his brief–have not been affected by enforcement of National Law
23,187. e) In connection with the previous conduct of the petitioner, the Government points out the following: The
petitioner’s previous behavior has not been taken into consideration in these
observations. He contends that,
since he is registered with a number of associations other than the one we are
now discussing, circumstances in the national context did not allow him to raise
this question previously. The
Government of the Argentine Republic only wishes to go into two aspects of this
topic. First, it should be recalled
that since 1954, when the petitioner graduated from the university with a law
degree, the Argentine Republic went through two separate and of course
unfortunately brief periods of the jure governments:
The presidency of Dr. Arturo Frondizi (12/10/58 to 27/3/62), the
presidency of Dr. Arturo Humberto Illía 12/10/63 to 28/6/66), the presidencies
of Dr. Héctor J. Cámpora, Dr. Raúl Lastiri, General Juan Domingo Perón and
Mrs. María Estela Martínez de Perón (25/5/73 to 24/3/76).
In none of these constitutional intervals did the petitioner initiate any
action to defend a right that he now considers to be violated. Secondly,
and not less important for being obvious, it should be borne in mind that this
government took power on December 10, 1983, and the American Convention on Human
Rights entered into force for the country on September 5, 1984, and thereby
provided the legal authority to set in motion its system of control.
In other words, if it had been desired, a procedure could have been
initiated–at the domestic level first, and if necessary, at the international
level later, to give satisfaction to the petitioner whose freedom of association
would have been limited professionally by his membership in the Official Bar
Association of the Province of Buenos Aires. However,
it is only after entry into force of Law 23,187, that the petitioner found a
reason to take action. Attorney
Alejandro M. Ferrari recognizes (point 6) that in 1955, he voluntarily joined
the Bar Association of the city of La Plata, Province of Buenos Aires, and that
that professional association has the same characteristics as the association
established by Law 23,187. In
this regard, there are several references relating to our historic past on which
this government will refrain, for reasons already given, from making comment. It
regrets, however, that the complainant has not stated categorically what motives
caused him to join voluntarily an organization similar to that
established by Law 23,187. If
the system that he joined voluntarily was responsible, as he states, for the “profound
imbalances that dragged the Argentina community, which was previously prosperous
and proud, put down into a continuous slide toward backwardness and poverty”
(see p. 14), what reasons impelled attorney Ferrari to join voluntarily the Bar
Association of the city of La Plata, which he could practice his profession
without that requirement in the district of his domicile, that is in the Federal
Capital? The
petitioner unfortunately does not state whether this was due to necessity,
error, violent emotion, alienation, compulsion, ignorance or other justifying
grounds. His silence is tantamount
to admitting that he joined voluntarily the system that he now attacks so
severely and inappropriately. f) As for the appropriateness of the IACHR referring the case to the Court for settlement, the Government states: 8. As a final point in his observations, the petitioner speaks of what he calls the procedural situation. Mentioning Case Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, the petitioner contends that it is clear that in a case where controversial legal problems arise and their domestic legal proceedings result in conflicting judicial decisions, the Commission remits the case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The
Government of the Argentine Republic considers that the statement is incomplete.
In fact, in the advisory opinion cited, four different kinds of factors
were differentiated in concluding that the case should be remitted to the Court.
Only tow of those were mentioned, namely:
1) a case that raises controversial legal issues and 2) conflicting court
decisions. The petitioner,
therefore, omits 3) that the case could not be amicably settled before the
Commission and 4) that the Inter-American Court has not ruled on the subject. It
is precisely these two omitted factors that are of the greatest importance in
this case. In fact, this case has
not even been inadmissible by the Commission.
Therefore, there is no reason to speculate about a possible failure of a
friendly solution. In addition, regarding the fourth factor, the Inter-American
Court has ruled on the compulsory membership of journalists in OC-5/85, and
especially has devoted a paragraph to the Bar Association (OC-5/85 paragraph
73). For
the above reasons and since the communication does not present any facts that
constitute a violation of the rights protected by the Pact of San José, Costa
Rica, and the petition is clearly unfounded, the Argentine Government requests
that, pursuant to Article 47, subparagraphs b) and c) of the American Convention
on Human Rights and Article 35, subparagraph c) of the Commission’s
Regulations, the petition be declared inadmissible and that the case is
dismissed. continued... (*)
This report was approved by an affirmative vote by Messrs. Marco Tulio
Bruni Celli, Chairman; John Stevenson, vice-Chairman; Gilda M.C.M. Russomano;
Leo Valladares; and, Patrick Robinson. Mr.
Oliver Jackman voted against and Mrs. Elsa Kelly abstained under Article 18 of
the Regulations.
[ Table of Contents |Next ] 1. Official Gazette, June 28, 1985. 1. See Annex I. 1. Title III – Arts. 17 or 42, both in Law 23,187. 1. On this point, the petitioner agrees with the arguments set
out in the consultative opinion of the Court OC-5/85 of November 13,1985, on
obligatory association of journalists, drawing from pages 8 and 9 the
opinion of judges Nieto Navia and Pizza Escalante about the scope of Art. 16
of the Convention. 2. See Chapter XV of the petition. 1. See page 23 of the petition. 2. See pp. 14-15, Court, Series A., Fallos y Opiniones, San José,
1985. 3. See Appendix II. 1. See Annex III. 2. In documents. 3. See Annex IV.
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