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CHAPTER V AREAS IN WHICH STEPS NEED TO BE TAKEN TOWARDS FULL OBSERVANCE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SET FORTH IN THE AMERICAN DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MAN AND THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
In its last annual reports, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights has been submitting to the General Assembly of the
Organization of American States a number of topics that it felt were
especially important regarding respect for human rights. The Commission
has suggested that the Assembly take specific measures to achieve
greater observance of those rights in accordance with the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the American Convention
on Human Rights.
The General Assembly has endorsed many of the suggestions of the
IACHR, and has passed resolutions on them, including proposed
inter-American conventions recommended by the Commission. Thus, the
General Assembly this year is to consider the adoption of an Additional
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights covering economic,
social and cultural rights, based on a draft prepared by the Commission
at the request of the General Assembly.
While continuing to urge the adoption of its previous
recommendations, the Commission this year would like to direct its
recommendations to the governments of member countries to urge them to
adopt two instruments that, when they enter into force, will, in the
Commission’s view, surely contribute to increasing the observance of
the most important and fundamental of all human rights, the right to
life.
As the Commission has repeatedly stated, the right to life is the
foundation and cornerstone of all other human rights.1
For that reason, it can never be suspended by any State, and under no
circumstances can persons be executed to restore public order. Moreover,
it is necessary to create all the circumstances required for this basic
right to be fully observed.
Regarding the latter, the Commission reiterates what it has said
in its prior reports in the sense that terrorism is never justified and
that in every instance in which a state of emergency is involved, human
rights must be respected.
Terrorism committed by individuals is as worth of condemnation as
terrorism committed by the State. Therefore, extra judicial executions
must always be condemned and may not be justified under the rule of law
which must without exception maintain a respect for human rights.
However, there are two measures frequently employed in recent
years that entail a serious denial of the right to life: imposition of
the death penalty by court decision and the forced or involuntary
disappearance of persons. The Commission is not unaware that in the
Americas other violations of the right to life have occurred; but it
considers that from the standpoint of the duties that have been given to
it and to the appropriate organs of the inter-American system, the
adoption of the legal instruments it is recommending at this time could
help to create more favorable conditions for the observance of the right
to life in the American Hemisphere.
The legal instruments the Commission is recommending at this time
are: 1) the adoption by the States Parties to the American Convention on
Human Rights of an Additional Protocol on the abolition of the death
penalty; and 2) the adoption of an inter-American convention to prevent
and punish the forced disappearance of persons. I.
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, concerned about
the behavior of some States in extending the death penalty or applying
it in a generalized manner, has appealed, on previous occasions, to all
governments of the Americas to abolish the death penalty, in keeping
with the spirit of Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights
and in line with the universal trend toward abolition of the death
penalty.2
As is widely known, in order to facilitate adoption by the
largest number of states, the American Convention on Human Rights did
not abolish the death penalty but only restricted its application.
Specifically, Article 4 of the Convention in five of its six paragraphs
established various limitations on the imposition of the death penalty.
These limitations are as follows: 1) the death penalty may be imposed
only for the most serious crimes; 2) it may be imposed only pursuant to
a sentence handed down by a court of competent jurisdiction; 3) also it
may be imposed only under a law providing for such punishment, enacted
prior to the commission of the crime; 4) it may not be re-established in
States that have abolished it; 5) in no case shall capital punishment be
inflicted for political offenses or related common crimes; 6) it may not
be imposed upon persons who, at the time the crime was committed, were
under 18 years of age or over 70 years of age; 7) nor may it be applied
to pregnant women; and 8) every person condemned to death shall have the
right to appeal for amnesty, pardon or commutation of sentence, which
may be granted in all cases. Capital punishment shall not be imposed
while such an appeal is pending decision by the authority of competent
jurisdiction.
Although the Commission understands that in 1969, when the
American Convention on Human Rights was adopted, prevailing conditions
would have not permitted abolishing the death penalty through a
convention, experience in almost two decades since and the trend in the
vast majority of the countries of the Americas to amend their criminal
codes or even their constitutional provisions, as has occurred with
Haiti and Nicaragua, in order to ban the death penalty, cause the
Commission to consider that conditions are now ripe for adopting an
instrument to abolish the death penalty.
In recent years, the Commission has observed that the purported
purpose of capital punishment—that is, by imposing it, the State helps
to save the lives of others by preventing the commission of the crimes
for which the death penalty has been established—has not been achieved
in practice, and on the contrary, the death penalty often has had a
counterproductive effect by generating greater violence. In that regard,
the Commission can only share the views set forth in numerous studies
according to which it has not yet been shown that capital punishment has
any impact on reducing criminality.3
Moreover, there are a great many ethical and legal reasons and
even reasons of civic harmony, which the Commission shares, requiring
the abolition of the death penalty. From the ethical standpoint, one
cannot justify defending an absolute value like human life by resorting
to a strict application of the talionic principle of “an eye for an
eye,” which in this case becomes “a life for a life.” The
foregoing involves a concept of law and punishment that is purely
retributive, that is, one evil must be answered by another of a similar
kind. In that sense, the State’s right to punish certain criminal
behavior cannot be absolute and must surely be limited by those rights
of the human person that are inalienable, foremost among them being the
right to life.
From the standpoint of criminal policy, the death penalty
violates the principle of special prevention by denying the possibility
of rehabilitation or reform of the offender, a rationale that
constitutes one of the fundamental purposes of punishment.
The irreparable nature of the death penalty must also be kept in
mind, that is, it does not admit of judicial errors. However, as
unfortunately has occurred in the past, it has in hundreds of cases been
shown later that the death penalty was imposed as a result of a judicial
error.
It is also necessary to point out, as the Commission has, that
the death penalty has been used by totalitarian regimes and military
dictators as an instrument to eliminate dissidents or even to hide those
really guilty of other crimes.
Finally, the Commission considers that the right to life, as has
occurred with the right to humane treatment, should be protected in the
most absolute manner possible under international law.
It is now possible to state that, thanks to the fact that the
international community has become mindful of how intolerable the
practice of torture is under any circumstances, the right not to suffer
physical torment has become absolute. Consequently, how could it be
accepted that the right to life, which is at the very basis of the other
human rights, does not have similar protection? In this regard, the
Commission considers that the death penalty is one of the most serious
offenses against a human being that can be conceived of, because it
terminates the person’s very existence.
The above reasons, as well as the repugnance produced by the
cruel, inhumane and degrading nature of this punishment, has led most
American countries to abolish the death penalty, at least for common
crimes. Thus, of the 19 countries that today are parties to the American
Convention on Human Rights, only four retain the death penalty. It is
also significant that those countries that are not parties to the Pact
of San José, Costa Rica,—that is, States that have not shown an
interest in undertaking international commitments to respect human
rights, with the sole exception of Brazil, which is in the process of
completing its internal procedures to be party to that instrument, all
of them maintain the death penalty for all types of crimes.
Of the States that are parties to the American Convention on
Human Rights, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela, have
abolished the death penalty for all kinds of crimes. The domestic law of
Argentina, El Salvador, Mexico, and Peru does not impose the death
penalty for common crimes, and maintains it only for serious military
offenses committed under exceptional circumstances, such as in time of
war.
This trend to abolish the death penalty can also be seen in other
regions. Thus, in April 1983, several States parties to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Liberties—which, like the American Convention, allows the death
penalty, under certain restrictions—adopted Protocol 6 to that
Convention, abolishing the death penalty. Likewise, the United Nations
is now considering, as a result of successive General Assembly
resolutions, an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which declares the death penalty to be abolished.
All of these antecedents confirm to the Commission the
desirability of proposing to the States parties to the American
Convention on Human Rights that they take another step forward with
respect to current Article 4 of that Convention, so that capital
punishment will be banned through a new instrument.
The American Convention provides two possible ways to amend its
provisions. Under Article 76, any State party to the Convention, the
Commission or the Court can, through the OAS Secretary General, submit
to the General Assembly proposed amendments to the Convention. Also,
Article 77 empowers any State party and the Commission to submit
“proposed protocols to this Convention for consideration by the States
Parties at the General Assembly with a view to gradually including other
rights and freedoms within its system of protection.”
Which would be best—amending Article 4 or including the
Additional Protocol to the Convention—should be carefully studied.
In the Commission’s view, while the amendment to the current
provision governing the right to life could be the best way to take a
categorical stand against the death penalty, and, from the legal
standpoint, regulate one subject under a single instrument, it might
have the disadvantage that those States that are now parties to the Pact
of San José, Costa Rica, or that in the future might become parties to
it, and that still maintain the death penalty, would have to make an
express reservation to that provision, if it is authorized, or if they
do not accept the possibility of making a reservation, they would be
prevented from participating in the Convention, which could cause even
more difficulties from the standpoint of protecting human rights. In
these circumstances, it would appear preferable to have on this topic
two coexisting rules established by two successive treaties, a
possibility allowed by the American Convention on Human Rights and
authorized by general international law, as shown in Article 30 of the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Thus the present Article 4 will remain in effect for countries
that do not become parties to the additional protocol or that ratify it
in the future or that are parties to the American Convention on Human
Rights but not to the Additional Protocol on the Abolition of the Death
Penalty.
Since the current Article 4 of the Convention coexists with the
Additional Protocol, that will make it possible for the Convention to
provide that reservations may not be made to the Protocol or that they
will have a very limited and specific scope.
Another important problem to consider is whether the obligation
the States parties to the Additional Protocol will acquire not to impose
the death penalty will be absolute, that is, that under no circumstances
may the death penalty be imposed, regardless of the offense committed,
or, whether some exceptions might be accepted, particularly those that
would make it possible to impose the death penalty for serious military
crimes committed under exceptional circumstances, such as during a
foreign war, a situation that the laws of a large number of States that
are now parties to the Pact of San José, Costa Rica, now provide for.
If what is desired is to make, as the Commission seeks,
significant progress regarding the present Article 4 of the American
Convention on Human Rights, and also, to enable the new protocol to have
the largest number of ratifications or adhesions possible, it would
appear desirable that, as established in Protocol 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms and provided for in the
draft of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on abolition of the death
penalty, the States might be authorized to impose the death penalty for
specified military offenses committed in wartime.
Because of the exceptional character of such authorization, any
statement made by a country on becoming party to the Protocol must
expressly specify how it would be an express reservation to the general
rule abolishing the death penalty.
Based on the above considerations, the Commission, under the
authority given it by Article 77 of the American Convention on Human
Rights, proposes to the States parties to the American Convention on
Human Rights meeting on the occasion of the OAS General Assembly, the
following draft additional protocol to the Convention:
Article 1
The States Parties to this Protocol shall not impose the death
penalty on any person under their jurisdiction. Accordingly, no one may
be punished by the death penalty nor executed.
Article 2
1. Reservations may not be
made to this Protocol except for the sole purpose of excluding from
application of the Protocol especially severe military offenses that
were committed during a foreign war.
2. A State making the
reservation authorized by the previous paragraph may, at the time of
deposition of its instrument of ratification or adhesion, inform the
Secretary General of the Organization of American States as to what
military offenses are subject to the death penalty under that
country’s domestic law.
Article 3
1. This Protocol shall be
open to the signature and to the ratification or adhesion of any State
Party to the American Convention on Human Rights.
2. Ratification of this
Protocol or adhesion to it shall be made through deposit of an
instrument of ratification or adhesion at the General Secretariat of the
Organization of American States. II.
INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION ON FORCED DISAPPEARANCE OF PERSONS
The second proposal that the Commission would like to make to the
governments of member countries that will meet at the seventeenth
regular session of the General Assembly is that they consider the
possibility of adopting an Inter-American Convention on Forced
Disappearance of Persons, to prevent and punish that abominable
practice.
The Commission can say on the basis of experience in recent years
that the policy on disappearances has become an important instrument for
repression and physical suppression of dissidents in many Latin American
countries, so this requires the adoption of special measures both
nationally and internationally to eliminate that policy for good.
Several military dictators have used this method in recent years,
especially starting in the seventies, although it is important to stress
that disappearances have occurred even under some legitimate
governments. The number of victims of this practice is almost impossible
to determine for certain, but, in any case, it amounts to several tens
of thousands. Because of the nature of this practice, the victims are
not only the persons that have disappeared, but also their parents,
spouses, children and other family members, who are placed in a
situation of uncertainty and anguish that goes on for many years. For
the same reason, disappearances open deep wounds in the social fabric of
the country’s community, which affects political, social and
professional circles and ruptures the country’s basic institutions.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has been dealing
extensively with this problem, and in its reports on the status of human
rights in various countries, and its annual reports to the OAS General
Assembly, it has repeatedly raised the topic of disappeared detainees.
In those reports, the Commission has expressed its view on this
very serious violation of human rights. Thus, it has pointed out that in
many cases in the various countries the government systematically denies
the detention of persons, despite convincing proof from complainants to
support their allegations that such persons have been deprived of their
liberty by police or military authorities, and in some cases, that these
persons are or have been held at particular detention facilities.4
The Commission has added that this practice is cruel and
inhumane, and that, as experience shows, disappearance not only
constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of liberty, but also a very severe
threat to the personal integrity, security, and the very life of the
victim. In the Commission’s view, disappearance seems to be a method
used to avoid enforcing legal provisions established to defend
individual freedom, physical integrity, the dignity and the very life of
the person. The Commission has pointed out that this procedure in
practice makes inoperative legal rules enacted in some countries to
avoid unlawful detention and the use of physical and psychological
coercion against detainees.5
The Commission has also indicated on a number of occasions the
need to investigate the fate of disappeared detainees and report to
their families on the status of those persons. In addition, it has
recommended that central detention registries be established, that
detentions be carried out only by duly identified competent authorities,
and that detainees be held only in places intended for that purpose.6
The OAS General Assembly has in a number of resolutions7
stressed the need for all countries where forced disappearances have
occurred to put an end to that practice immediately, and has urged the
governments to make the necessary efforts to determine the status of
those persons. Also, endorsing a proposal of the Commission, the OAS
General Assembly has declared that the forced disappearance of persons
constitutes a crime against humanity.8
Similarly, the United Nations General Assembly has dealt
repeatedly with this topic: in a resolution passed without vote on
December 20, 1978,9
urged the Human Rights Commission to consider the topic and make
recommendations on it. Later, the Human Rights Commission set up a
working group on forced or involuntary disappearances, whose mandate has
been extended and is still in force. The United Nations has returned to
the topic of forced disappearances in resolutions passed by the last two
General Assemblies.10
The Human Rights Commission and the Economic and Social Council have
expanded the working group’s mandate to make it more effective. In
recent years, the working group has made onsite observations and has
published numerous reports on disappearances in a number of countries.
Although as a result of the efforts of family members and
influential sectors in the country, as well as efforts by international
human rights organizations, the forced disappearance of persons has
declined considerably, this horrible practice still has not ceased and
continues to occur in some countries of the Hemisphere. Even in those
countries where the practice has ended, the new democratic governments
have faced serious problems in endeavoring to do justice and accede to
the demands of the family members. All of this explains the efforts of
the international community to promote the development of international
law and mechanisms for the protection of human rights, in order to adapt
them to this new and perverse phenomenon.
In that regard, an Inter-American Convention to Prevent and
Punish the Forced Disappearance of Persons would, in the Commission’s
view, make a decisive contribution to the international protection of
human rights.
The Commission will not propose at this time the text of a draft
convention on this important topic. It considers that before submitting
a detailed draft of articles, the governments of the member States
should make known their political will in order to promote this
initiative.
For these reasons, the Commission will confine itself at this
time to submitting some very general concepts on the topics and subjects
that should be included in the planned convention if the General
Assembly should decide, as the Commission hopes, to endorse that
initiative.
In the Commission’s opinion, the convention should stress,
either in its preamble or in its first article, that its purpose is to
prevent and punish the practice of forced disappearances.
The Convention, which must necessarily include the concept of
forced disappearance, should describe that practice. In this regard, it
should be recalled that the Commission, in previous reports and
resolutions, has had occasion to go more deeply into the status of
disappeared detainees, and has described them as persons who have been
apprehended by armed personnel (sometimes uniformed, who usually have
stated that they belonged to some kind of public authority), in
significant and coincident operations both in the manner of deployment
and in the form of execution, and that after detention, those persons
have disappeared, without any report whatever of their whereabouts. In
other words, forced or involuntary disappearance can be defined as the
detention of a person by agents of the State or with the acquiescence of
the State, without the order of a competent authority, where the
detention is denied, without there being any information available on
the destination or whereabouts of the detainee.
According to the above viewpoint, forced disappearance of persons
should be differentiated from other human rights violations, and from
other situations in which the whereabouts of a person is unknown.
For there to be a forced disappearance of a person, there must
first have been an arbitrary arrest. The arrest of the person, although
usually done in secret, is carried out by government agents, either
uniformed or in civilian clothing, who are members of police
organizations or the armed forces, or paramilitary forces acting under
the operational control of the police or armed forces. This is important
because such disappearances do not include kidnapping of a person by
common criminals, for example, for ransom. In some cases, the
perpetrators are members of paramilitary or parapolice groups. The
seriousness of this type of crime is that the perpetrators enjoy
immunity, because they have the tolerance or the protection of
government agencies. In these cases, the perpetrators act, for all legal
purposes, as agents of the State, in view of the acquiescence of the
government.
The initial arrest is also arbitrary, not only because it does
not satisfy the minimum legal requirements for effecting an arrest
(those requirements are, of course, a legal order stating the grounds
for it, or apprehension in the act, or in cases of suspension of
guarantees, an administrative order reasonably based on the causes of
the state of emergency); but also because the real reason for the arrest
is political persecution and not investigation or prevention of crimes.
In addition, to qualify as a case of a forced disappearance, it
is important to note that the confinement of the victim is denied by the
authorities. The disappearance of the detainee occurs when the security
forces deliberately refuse information to family members about his
whereabouts and when they state positively that he is not being held.
This is important because in some situations there may have been delays
in establishing the whereabouts of a detainee, while the authorities are
trying to locate him. In any case, this factor involves a conscious and
deliberate attitude of denying a detention that is known to have taken
place, in order to evade responsibility for the arrest, and for the
physical integrity and life of the detainee. Sometimes, this deliberate
attitude continues only for a time, and then the person “reappears,”
almost always having been officially detained. These situations may be
described as “temporary disappearances” instead of “permanent
disappearances.”
Finally, an important characteristic of the phenomenon of
disappearances is that the ultimate fate of the victims is execution and
concealment of the body. The Commission’s experience shows that a
number of methods have been used to do away with the
detainee-disappeared person, although the most common one is execution
with a fire arm, often with several persons taking part. Similarly,
various methods are used to dispose of the remains: clandestine burial;
graves marked with “N.N.” (no name) in cemeteries; sinking the
victims to the bottoms of lakes or rivers, or dumping them into the sea
from airplanes and helicopters, etc. In all cases, the purpose is to
avoid having the remains found, or if they are found, to make it
impossible to identify them positively. This aspect differentiates
forced disappearance of persons from another equally tragic form of
human rights violation, extrajudicial execution.
Until the whereabouts of the victim or the circumstances of his
death can be determined, he must be considered to be a
“disappeared-detainee,” even when his death may be presumed because
of the length of time that has elapsed or because of the similarity with
other cases of the same kind in the country. The consequences of making
this distinction are important because in the case of an extrajudicial
execution, the government admitting that such an act has occurred, has
the obligation to identify the perpetrators and try them for homicide.
In the case of forced disappearance, the government should have the
obligation to determine the whereabouts and fate of the detainee and
inform his family, and if its is determined that the detainee has died,
the government will also have the obligation to try and punish those who
planned and perpetrated the crime. In the Commission’s view, that
obligation should be expressly stipulated in the proposed Convention.
The foregoing shows that the basic characteristic of forced
disappearance of person is that each individual case is part of a
deliberate and conscious policy adopted by the government at some level
of authority having the capacity not only to give this kind of order and
have it carried out, but also to ensure the impunity of those who are to
implement it. The definition must not, therefore, include isolated cases
where the whereabouts of a detainee is unknown, particularly if it can
be shown that the government involved has made efforts to investigate
the case and inform family members of it and punish officials
responsible for the situation.
Although forced disappearance implies a flagrant violation of
basic rights and freedoms guaranteed internationally, such as the right
to personal liberty and security (Article 7 of the American Convention
on Human Rights); The right not to be arbitrarily arrested (idem); the
right to a fair trial in criminal cases (Article 8 of the Convention and
concordant articles); the right to humane treatment in detention and the
right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment (Article 5) and in general, the right to life (Article 4), it
will be important for the Convention drafted to define forced
disappearance of persons as a specific and separate crime.
This offense, because of its extreme gravity and cruelty, should
be regarded as a crime against humanity, as the OAS General Assembly
resolutions cited have described it. The Commission is not unaware of
the fact that describing the offense as a crime against humanity may
cause some difficulties; but the Commission is convinced that without
such a definition, a convention such as the one proposed would be
without meaning and effectiveness. The Commission considers that the
importance of defining forced disappearance as a crime against humanity
lies in the effects that that label would have, particularly with regard
to the failure to outlaw the crime and universal jurisdiction for
prosecuting and punishing it. That scope should be expressly set forth
in detail in the convention.
Another basic aspect to which the convention should refer is the
common nature that this crime should have. That is important to
establish in order to permit extradition of those responsible, without
their being able to argue that political motives or reasons justify
their participation in the commission of such a horrendous crime.
For that very reason, it appears desirable not to include in the
planned convention a clause like Article 15 of the Inter-American
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. In the Commission’s
judgment, leaving it up to the choice of the country granting asylum the
definition of the nature of the crime committed by the person
responsible for a forced disappearance would represent a major step
backward in international protection of human rights.
Along with establishing that forced disappearances are crimes
against humanity and regulating the international effects to which such
a definition leads, it is also important for the proposed convention to
provide for the States that become parties to it the obligation to
include in their criminal laws the offense of forced disappearance,
which should be repressed in accordance with its extreme gravity.
Likewise, the convention should establish the obligation of the
State in whose territory forced disappearances have occurred to punish
participation in all of its degrees—perpetrator, accomplice and
accessory—in this horrible crime, and should expressly stipulate that
the accused cannot plea error, duress, states of necessity or due
obedience as grounds for exemption from criminal liability.
It would also appear desirable to include in the proposed
convention a provision similar to Article 5 of the Inter-American
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, stating that the existence of
such circumstances as a state or threat of war, a state of emergency,
the suspension of individual guarantees, internal political instability
or other public emergencies or disasters may not be invoked or admitted
as justification for a forced disappearance.
In the Commission’s view, if the drafting of a convention on
forced disappearance of persons is accepted, the convention should not
be limited solely to describing this practice, punishing it or
regulating its effects. It is just as important, in view of the
experience with what has happened in several Latin American countries,
to establish legal provisions to prevent the practice of forced
disappearances. To that end, the convention could include a rule stating
the obligation of any State party to the convention to take legislative,
administrative and jurisdictional measures to prevent forced
disappearances of persons in its territory.
Within that umbrella obligation, it would be desirable to make a
specific reference to some of the preventive measures that the States
would undertake to adopt to prevent forced disappearances from taking
place, several of which have been recommended previously by the
Commission. Thus, it would be very important to establish the
prohibition of maintaining secret detention facilities; to provide that
arrests may only be made by competent authorities who have the
obligation to include a reference to the need for the States to bring
their detention systems in line with commonly accepted international
norms that are included in the United Nations “standard minimum rules
for the treatment of prisoners”; to stipulate the obligation of the
States to keep an up-to-date central record of al detention facilities,
with a list of all persons deprived of liberty for any reason, and to
notify family members when an arrest occurs. Likewise, it would be
important, as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights indicated this
year in Advisory Opinion Nº 8 to include a provision reiterating that
the habeas corpus remedy may not be suspended under any
circumstances, not even under a state of emergency.
In addition, the convention should include a provision that
stipulates the obligation of the State to act promptly and effectively
in cases where there are sufficient grounds to assume that a forced
disappearance may have occurred. On that assumption, the Commission
feels that the Convention should establish the obligation of the State
to proceed promptly to investigate such complaints, and without
prejudice to whatever role the executive and administrative authorities
and the competent courts should play in that case, either ex-officio or
at the request of one of the parties, they should initiate an
expeditious procedure to ensure the life, personal security and freedom
of the victim, and to that end, the courts should be given all of the
powers necessary, including the power to sit in any place, even if that
place is subject to military jurisdiction.
The Commission feels that the above considerations are sufficient
to show the desirability of drafting an instrument that would
effectively deal with this horrible practice of forced disappearances.
If this proposal is accepted, the Commission, after receiving any
comments and observations that the governments of the member States
might make, will continue to study this important topic and, in the
light of those comments and observations, would be in a position to
propose to the next session of the General Assembly a draft
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Forced Disappearances.
Based on the above information and considerations, the Commission
requests the OAS General Assembly to adopt the following decisions at
its seventeenth regular session:
1.
That the draft Additional Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights on the abolition of the death penalty be transmitted to the
governments of the member States to that Convention, for them to make
any comments and observations they wish, and submit them to the
Permanent Council so that it may in turn make any comments it deems
desirable in order to enable the member States to the American
Convention on Human Rights to adopt an Additional Protocol to that
Convention on the abolition of the death penalty, when the eighteenth
session of the General Assembly meets.
2.
That the governments of member States be asked to make comments
and observations on the Commission’s proposal to draft an
inter-American convention to prevent and punish forced disappearances,
and on the possible contents of that convention; these comments should
reach the Commission in time for it to be able to submit to the next
General Assembly session a draft Convention on Forced Disappearances of
Persons. [ Table of Contents | Previous ] 1
See, for example, the annual reports of the IACHR of
1980-1981, page 112; and 1982-83, page 10. 2
See, for example, the resolution adopted at its 63rd
session on October 5, 1984. (Annual Report of the IACHR 1984-85,
page 11). 3
See, for example, Nigel Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners
under International Law; Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Death Penalty
– The Moral, Ethical, and Human Rights Dimensions: The Human
Rights Perspective; Tony Mifsud, S.J., “Juicio a la Pena de
Muerte, Revista Mensaje, Nº 381, August of 1987 and Morris,
“Capital Punishment Developments 1961-1965,” United Nations,
1967. 4
Annual Report of the IACHR, 1978, page 28. 5
Annual Report of the IACHR, 1976, page 16. 6
Annual Reports of the IACHR 1980-1981, page 119, and 1981-82,
page 133. 7
See especially resolutions 443 (IX-0/79); 510 (X-0/80); 543
(XI-0/81); 618 (XII-0/82); 666 (XIII-0/83); and 742 (XIV-0/84). 8
OAS General Assembly Resolutions 666 (XIII-0/83) and 742
(XIV-0/84). 9
A/RES. 33/173. 10
Resolution 40/147 of December 13, 1985, and Resolution
41/145, of December 4, 1986. |