IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 2008

 

CHAPTER IV

 

HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGION

 

 

          INTRODUCTION

 

1.                  The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights continues its practice of including in its Annual Report to the General Assembly of the Organization of American States a chapter on the situation of human rights in member countries of the Organization, based on the competence assigned to it by the OAS Charter, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Commission's Statute and Rules of Procedure.  This practice has served the purpose of providing the OAS updated information on the human rights situation in those countries that had been the subject of the Commission's special attention; and in some cases, to report on a particular event that had taken place or was emerging or developing at the close of its reporting cycle. 

 

CRITERIA

 

2.                  The Annual Report of the IACHR for 1997 set forth five criteria pre-established by the Commission to identify the member states of the OAS whose human rights practices merited special attention and which consequently should be included in its Chapter IV. 

 

3.                  The first criterion encompasses those states ruled by governments that have not come to power through popular elections, by secret, genuine, periodic, and free suffrage, according to internationally accepted standards and principles.  The Commission has repeatedly pointed out that representative democracy and its mechanisms are essential for achieving the rule of law and respect for human rights.  As for those states that do not observe the political rights enshrined in the American Declaration and the American Convention, the Commission fulfills its duty to inform the other OAS members states as to the human rights situation of the population.

 

4.                  The second criterion concerns states where the free exercise of the rights set forth in the American Convention or American Declaration have been, in effect, suspended totally or in part, by virtue of the imposition of exceptional measures, such as state of emergency, state of siege, suspension of guarantees, or exceptional security measures, and the like. 

 

5.                  The third criterion to justify the inclusion in this chapter of a particular state is when there is clear and convincing evidence that a state commits massive and grave violations of the human rights guaranteed in the American Convention, the American Declaration, and all other applicable human rights instruments.  In so doing, the Commission highlights the fundamental rights that cannot be suspended; thus it is especially concerned about violations such as extrajudicial executions, torture, and forced disappearances.  Thus, when the Commission receives credible communications denouncing such violations by a particular state which are attested to or corroborated by the reports or findings of other governmental or intergovernmental bodies and/or of respected national and international human rights organizations, the Commission believes that it has a duty to bring such situations to the attention of the Organization and its member states.

 

6.                  The fourth criterion concerns those states that are in a process of transition from any of the above three situations.

 

7.                  The fifth criterion regards temporary or structural situations that may appear in member states confronted, for various reasons, with situations that seriously affect the enjoyment of fundamental rights enshrined in the American Convention or the American Declaration.  This criterion includes, for example:  grave situations of violations that prevent the proper application of the rule of law; serious institutional crises; processes of institutional change which have negative consequences for human rights; or grave omissions in the adoption of the provisions necessary for the effective exercise of fundamental rights.

 

8.                  On the basis of the criteria set forth above, the Commission has decided to include four member states: Colombia, Cuba, Haiti, and Venezuela.

 

COLOMBIA

 

9.                  As in previous years, the situation in the Republic of Colombia in 2008 falls within the framework of the criteria set forth in the introduction of Chapter IV of the Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). In the case of Colombia this framework is relevant in particular as regards to the continued existence of circumstantial or structural situations that, for various reasons, seriously and gravely affect the enjoyment and exercise of the basic rights enshrined in the American Convention on Human Rights. Consequently, the Commission has adopted the following considerations on the matter, in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 57(1)(h) of its Rules of Procedure,[1] for their inclusion in its Annual Report.  The preliminary version of this report was transmitted to the Republic of Colombia on January 6, 2009, for its observations.  On February 6, 2009, the State submitted its observations, the pertinent parts of which have been included in this report.[2]

 

10.              The IACHR is keenly aware of the complex situation in Colombia after five decades of violence and its impact on the civilian population.  It is also aware of the effect of drug trafficking on the use of violence and of the State’s endeavors to combat that problem.  In spite of these challenges, the Colombian State has made commendable efforts to move forward with pacification through the demobilization of armed actors, investigate crimes perpetrated during the conflict, and protect its citizens.

 

11.              Inter alia, attention should be drawn to the continued efforts under the “Protection Program for Human Rights Defenders, Trade-Unionists, Journalists, and Social Leaders”[3] whose coverage in 2008 extended to almost 9000 persons belonging to 16 vulnerable groups and 13 communities at risk,[4] and whose importance the IACHR has underscored in previous reports.  The IACHR has also become aware of the institutionalization of mechanisms specifically devoted to agreeing upon protective measures for beneficiaries of precautionary measures extended by the Commission and provisional measures ordered by the Inter-American Court.  The IACHR reiterates the need to continue strengthening the protection mechanisms created by such programs.

 

12.              It is also relevant to highlight the engagement of civil society in the important debate on the public policies for the reparation to the victims of the armed conflict and the scope of the mechanisms under discussion.  The Commission will dedicate a section below to this issue.

 

13.              The Commission notes, however, that alongside initiatives to promote and protect human rights, such as the one cited above, the effects of the armed conflict are still being felt and continue to affect the most vulnerable sectors of the civilian population. Manifestations of violence persist alongside efforts to demobilize outlawed armed groups and to administer justice, which need to show results in terms of effectiveness, comprehensive redress, and elimination of factors of violence.

 

14.              Consequently, based on information received from the State and civil society both in Colombia,[5] and at its headquarters,[6] the IACHR has drawn up a list of comments on the human rights situation in Colombia in 2008.  Particular reference is made to progress made and obstacles encountered in the process of demobilizing armed participants and the development and enforcement of the applicable legal framework, the persistence of systematic violations of the right to life and humane treatment, the situation of ethnic groups, and the situation of human rights defenders, social leaders, and justice sector operators.

 

I.          THE DEMOBILIZATION OF ARMED GROUPS AND JUDICIAL INVESTIGATION AND REPARATION OF CRIMES PERPETRATED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONFLICT

 

15.              The agreements reached by the government of President Álvaro Uribe Vélez and the leaders of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (hereinafter “the AUC”) led to the collective demobilization of 31,664[7] individuals identified as members of 34 units of the AUC, with international verification by the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (hereinafter the “MAPP/OAS”).  The government has also engaged in dialogue with other armed guerrilla groups, some of which have joined the collective demobilization process.[8]  The legal framework of the process, established, inter alia, by Law 975 of 2005 (“Justice and Peace” Law),[9] provides a series of procedural benefits and reduced penalties for those who, having been involved in the commission of crimes, participate in the demobilization process.[10]

 

16.              Since 2004, the IACHR has followed the dismantling of illegal arms structures and, in particular, the enforcement of the legal framework designed to ensure the truth, justice, and reparation for victims of the conflict as a fundamental part of its advisory role for the OAS member states, the General Secretariat of the Organization, and the MAPP/OAS.[11]  Following, the IACHR describes the challenges pending with respect to dismantling armed structures, administration of justice, and reparation of damages caused to the victims of the conflict.

 

A.         Dismantling of armed structures and reintegration

 

17.              Official figures indicate that, 49,176 members of illegal armed groups (AUC, FARC, ELN) were demobilized between 2002 and 2008.  This figure includes both those who demobilized collectively and the approximately 17,500 persons connected with paramilitary or guerrilla groups who individually handed over their weapons.[12]  In spite of these figures and based on information released by the armed forces on captures and deaths in action of members of paramilitary and guerrilla groups, illegal armed groups remain active in Colombia.

 

18.              Indeed, despite efforts to disband the armed structure of the AUC, illegal armed groups continue to be involved in acts of intimidation and violence committed against vulnerable populations, community leaders, and human rights defenders.  In 2008, the IACHR has received complaints about groups that operate under the names of Nueva Generación, in the northern zone; Autodefensas Gaitanistas  and Renacer in the banana-growing region; and Águilas Negras  in various parts of the country.  In his reports to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, the Secretary General of the Organization has identified the existence of acts of violence subsequent to the demobilizations, according to information obtained in the field by the MAPP/OEA.  According to these reports, this situation involves a variety of processes: (1) Regrouping of demobilized combatants into criminal gangs that exert control over specific communities and illegal economic activities; (2) holdouts who have not demobilized; and (3) the emergence of new armed players and/or the strengthening of those that already existed in areas abandoned by demobilized groups.[13]

 

19.              In its last report in 2008, the MAPP/OAS identified instances of rearming in 153 municipalities along a corridor that extends eastward from Urabá through south Córdoba, Bajo Cauca, south Bolívar, Barrancabermeja and a number of outlying municipalities, and south Cesar, before reaching Ocaña, in Norte de Santander.[14]  These are areas where the United Self-Defense Forces of Córdoba and Urabá originally emerged and consolidated as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia a little over a decade ago.  It is also where the Bloques Minero and Central Bolívar operated.  The MAPP/OAS Mission also recorded activities by illegal groups in the departments of Caquetá, Casanare, Guajira, Magdalena, Meta, Nariño and Vichada.

 

20.              In its reports, the MAPP/OAS Mission highlights to the Department of Cordoba as one of the areas where violations of the right to life have increased most notably in 2008.  The Mission also notes that of the 125 municipalities in the Department of Antioquia, 62 saw an increase in the number of homicides in the first half of 2008. The MAPP/OAS reported a reshuffling of middle-echelon commanders and local leaders of illegal groups (the so-called Oficina de Envigado and its armed wing, Los Paisas) in the city of Medellin, which coincided with a 31.9% increase in murders between January and June 2008 in that city compared to the previous year.[15]  Another factor mentioned was the activities of the armed group commanded by Daniel Rendón Herrera, alias Don Mario (brother of Freddy Rendón, alias El Alemán, the leader of the demobilized Bloque Élmer Cárdenas), which is troubling the Urabá communities in Antioquia with acts of intimidation, violence, recruitment, extortion, and drug trafficking. The MAPP/OAS Mission has also expressed particular concern at the situation in Ocaña, Catatumbo, Sur de Bolívar and Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (in the Departments of Cesar and Guajira) where the presence of armed groups operating outside the law continues to trouble the population.[16]

 

21.              In its reply, the State refers to actions taken by the Office of the Prosecutor, including 74 investigations involving 573 people.  It mentioned 43 cases in the trial phase with 225 defendants and convictions against 93 people making up these groups.  It also states that the National Unit for Human Rights and IHL had tried 74 people for their alleged ties to the Águilas Negras, 49 of whom were part of Oficina de Envigado.  It also indicated that 27 members of the Los Machos group and 12 from Los Rastrojos group had been tried, among other people.[17]

21.

22.              For its part, the Office of the Procurator General of the Nation (Procuraduría General de la Nación) has identified the Departments of Antioquia, Cesar, Córdoba, Magdalena and Santander as regions where the undertaking given by demobilized combatants not to reoffend on pain of exclusion from benefit programs has not been met in full.”[18]

 

23.              As regards reintegration in civilian life of those who have relinquished their arms, the MAPP/OAS has noted that of the 31,651 persons who had collectively demobilized as of August 2008, 23,008 have participated actively in the psychosocial activities that are part of the reintegration programs.  There are reports, however, that in a number of departments, including Cauca, Córdoba, Santander, and Norte de Santander, groups of demobilized fighters continue to offend while participating in said programs. Around 7,000 demobilized AUC combatants, including captured reoffenders and those who have not been located following demobilization, are not taking part in the reintegration programs.[19]

 

24.              The MAPP/OAS has also reported that between the start of the collective mobilization process in 2004 and September 2008, 1,658 demobilized combatants have died, most of them as homicide victims.[20]  As officially recorded by the Office of the Procurator General of the Nation (Procuraduría General de la Nación), demobilized combatants had been used in military and intelligence operations classified as activities of cooperation with the security forces, for which they receive payment.  In this connection, the Office of the Procurator General of the Nation (Procuraduría General de la Nación) has noted that these operations “expose them and their families to greater danger and that, therefore, the authorities responsible are not legally justified in recognizing and paying these persons for their participation in the aforementioned operations as activities of cooperation with the security forces, even if they have agreed and are willing to do so, as it runs contrary to the purposes of reintegration in civilian life and the obligation of the State to ensure their safety, life, and well-being as well as their reintegration for the good of peace.”[21]  Accordingly, the Office of the Procurator General of the Nation (Procuraduría General de la Nación) has urged the Ministry of Defense to ensure that all measures connected with payment of financial benefits for cooperation with the security forces exclude payments to demobilized combatants for their direct and active participation in military and intelligence operations.[22]  The IACHR will be on the alert for any information on the review of the Ministry of Defense’s policies in this regard, in response to the directives of the Office of the Procurator General of the Nation (Procuraduría General de la Nación).

 

25.              In its observations, the State reported that, in response to the recommendation of the Office of the Procurator General of the Nation (Procuraduría General de la Nación), the Ministry of Defense had said that, in its view, the norms of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols thereto did not “… bar the right of a person to provide voluntary assistance to public officials …, his freedom to benefit economically … and to collaborate in the dismantling of an illegal armed group that may undermine sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and constitutional order.”  Consequently, this body does not consider that the participation of demobilized persons as field scouts is a violation of international humanitarian law[23].

 

B.         Enforcement of the legal framework: Situation of demobilized combatants who seek to benefit from the Justice and Peace Law

 

26.              Of the 31,664 persons who demobilized between November 2003 and mid 2006, 3,431 declared their interest in applying for the benefits of the Justice and Peace Law.  However, 1,189 applicants decided not to go through with the process because the Prosecutor's Office had no record of complaints against them.[24]  In these cases the opportunity has been lost to collect information that could lead to the clarification of thousands of crimes which have gone unreported for reasons such as fear and destruction of evidence.

 

27.              Of the more than 2,000 applicants who continue with the process, 1,142 have given voluntary statements to the Unit for Justice and Peace of the Office of the Prosecutor General.[25]  During the voluntary statements, demobilized applicants for the benefits of the Law must declare under oath their commitment to fulfill the eligibility requirements established in the Law.[26]  Approximately 500 applicants[27] are still rendering voluntary statements, prior to establishing the criminal conduct, issuing charges and the formal accusation that precedes the trial phase.[28]

 

28.              Although measures have been adopted to increase the number of available staff[29], this has not lessened the institutional challenge facing the Office of the Prosecutor as regards taking voluntary statements, verifying compliance with eligibility requirements, and bringing charges consistent with the alleged responsibility of the accused ahead of the trial stage.  The extent of the task is reflected in the fact that the information collected in the voluntary statements taken in 2007 and 2008 has led to the exhumation of approximately 1,700 bodies, one third of which have been identified.

 

29.              One of the strategies employed by the Prosecutor’s Office in order to expedite the referral of the matter to the trial stage consists on issuing partial charges only, on the basis of facts already verified, while the rest of the confession is under verification[30].  This was the strategy in the proceedings against William Salazar Carrascal alias “El Loro”, the only applicant that up to this date is in the trial phase.  However, for the time being no sentences have been handed down in accordance with the Justice and Peace Law.

 

30.              The process has faced other tangible obstacles during 2008.  In particular, the decision to extradite an important number of well known paramilitary leaders, some of whom were linked to the investigations of the so called “para-politics”.

 

31.              In April, 2008, the Supreme Court issued a decision on the impact of extradition upon the enforcement of the Law of Justice and Peace.  In that opportunity the Court indicated that members of illegal armed groups should not be extradited before the process of reparation of victims has been completed.  Specifically, it said that “[…] there are higher reasons for examining the legitimacy of an extradition which may ultimately abridge the rights of victims, inasmuch as it would prevent fulfillment of the constitutional purposes of the criminal proceeding, in that it affects the legitimate expectations that propel the victims of punishable conduct to seek to uphold their right to the truth, justice, and reparation, whereas the extradition of a demobilized combatant to face charges abroad for less serious offenses than those to which they are confessing before the Colombian courts, ends up being a form of impunity.”[31]

 

32.              However, on May 7, 2008, Carlos Mario Jiménez, alias “Macaco”, an AUC leader who had invoked the benefits of the Justice and Peace Law, was extradited to the United States.  His extradition proceeding was reactivated on the grounds that he had continued to offend after his demobilization.[32]  Although initially, in response to an action for protection filed by one of the victims, the Sectional Council of the Judicature of Cundinamarca postponed Macaco’s extradition until his part in the proceeding had been completed and reparation to the victims made, the Disciplinary Chamber of the Superior Council of the Judicature decided to overturn said decision with the argument that “extradition and the Justice and Peace Law are not mutually exclusive institutions because the former in some measure, as the ruling of the lower court states, prevents realization of the rights enshrined in Article 4 of Law 975 of 2005 (truth, justice, and reparation); on the contrary, it could in a given situation become an important means for attaining those rights.”[33]

 

33.              Subsequently, on May 12, 2008, the President issued a series of resolutions (137-149) which ordered the reactivation of the extraditions of a number of AUC  leaders: Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano, alias “Don Berna”; Francisco Javier Zuluaga Lindo, alias “Gordo Lindo”; Manuel Enrique Torregrosa Castro; Salvatore Mancuso Gómez, alias “El Mono” or “Triple Cero”; Diego Alberto Ruiz Arroyave; Guillermo Pérez Alzate, alias “Pablo Sevillano”; Ramiro Vanoy Murillo, alias “Cuco Vanoy”; Juan Carlos Sierra Ramírez, alias “El Tuso”; Martín Peñaranda Osorio, alias “El Burro”; Edwin Mauricio Gómez Luna; Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, alias “Jorge 40”; Hernán Giraldo Serna, alias “El Patrón”; Nodier Giraldo Giraldo, and Eduardo Enrique Vengoechea Mola.  These leaders had also invoked the benefits of the Justice and Peace Law.  Likewise, the grounds cited for reactivating the extradition proceedings was that they had continued to offend after their demobilization.  On May 14, 2008, President Uribe announced that “no crime committed in Colombia by the 13 (sic) demobilized combatants of the Self-Defense groups extradited last Tuesday to the United States will remain unpunished […]  [w]e have agreed with the United States that all assets surrendered by the extradited individuals as a result of the decisions of the North American courts will be used to provide compensation to the victims in Colombia.  It has also been agreed that the Colombian state and people will be afforded every opportunity to access the evidence in these trials in the United States, in order to carry out the necessary investigations and so obtain the evidence needed for the trials in Colombia.”[34]

 

34.              On May 14, 2008, the IACHR made public its concern about the impact of the extradition of the AUC leaders on the clarification of serious crimes perpetrated during the armed conflict in Colombia.[35]  The Commission noted that the extradition affects the Colombian State’s obligation to guarantee victims’ rights to truth, justice, and reparations for the crimes committed by the paramilitary groups; impedes the investigation and prosecution of such grave crimes through the avenues established by the Justice and Peace Law in Colombia and through the Colombian justice system’s regular criminal procedures; and closes the door to the possibility that victims can participate directly in the search for truth about crimes committed during the conflict, and limits access to reparations for damages that were caused.  Finally, the Commission observed that this action also interferes with efforts to determine links between agents of the State and these paramilitary leaders in the perpetration of human rights violations.  The Colombian Government made explicit its rejection of the IACHR’s press communiqué arguing that “it failed to reveal the truth … as far it was issued without consideration of the Colombian State’s arguments or the recurring statement by both the Governments of Colombia and the United States” on their commitment towards cooperation in the area of judicial proceedings, plea bargaining and seizures.[36]

 

35.              On October 23, 2008, in the framework of its 133rd Regular Session, the Commission held a public hearing in order to receive information on the impact of these extraditions on clarification of crimes perpetrated in the conflict and reparation of the damages caused to victims.[37]  At the hearing, the Colombian State disclosed the text of a note from the US State Department which expressed willingness to facilitate the continuous participation of the 15 extradited persons in the Justice and Peace proceedings, in keeping with the domestic law of the United States and the procedures provided in international treaties on judicial cooperation.[38]  The note also invited the Colombian judicial authorities to formulate the appropriate requests for cooperation through those channels.  For their part, the representatives of civil society organizations said at the hearing that although the Colombian government has underscored the existence of special agreements with the government of the United States to ensure the continuity of the proceedings for human rights violations perpetrated by the extradited persons, the Ministry of the Interior and Justice reportedly confirmed that the cooperation provided for between the two countries is only based on the general mechanisms contained in the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.[39]

 

36.              As to the continued progress of the Justice and Peace proceedings in practice, the voluntary statement hearings of Salvatore Mancuso resumed by teleconference in November 2008 – six months after the extraditions.  Other hearings by this means have reportedly been scheduled.  Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed to the IACHR the existence of agreements with the United States Government whereby the extradited persons would be returned to face Colombian justice once they had served their drug trafficking convictions in that country. The Colombian State has referred to the good will of the Government of the United States to return the extradited paramilitaries once they serve in full their conviction for drug trafficking in that country.[40]  However, up until now there is no news regarding any specific agreements conditioning plea bargaining in the United States to collaboration with the process of Justice and Peace.

 

37.              In point of fact, the measures the State refers to in its observations are the appointment of a judicial attaché to the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá and exchanges of notes between the ministries in July 2008 “to facilitate mechanisms for information exchange so that judicial action and proceedings may continue.”[41]

 

38.              Quite apart from any additional obstacles that victims might face in accessing the mechanisms under the Justice and Peace Law, the reasoning behind the extradition decision adopted by the executive branch raises questions about the conditions for accessing the benefits established by that law.[42]  The natural consequence of failure to honor the pledge not to reoffend after demobilization ought to be exclusion from the reduced penalty benefits provided in the Justice and peace Law and attendant prosecution in the regular jurisdiction.  In the case of the 15 paramilitary leaders extradited on account of their post-demobilization conduct, however, the decision to accord precedence to proceedings to clarify drug-related crimes in a foreign jurisdiction, with a promise of the future enforcement of the Justice and Peace Law once the penalties in the USA had been served, is out of step with the logic of gaining access to procedural benefits in exchange for putting aside weapons and collaborating with justice.

 

C.        Participation of witnesses and victims in judicial proceedings under the Justice and Peace Law

 

39.              Towards the end of 2008, close to 180,000 victims[43] had registered in the Justice and Peace process and almost 11,000 had taken part in voluntary statement hearings,[44] following the publication of more than 3,000 notices to attend.[45]  In its observations, the State refers to the publication of 3,265 edicts; the strategy for the dissemination of posters, flyers, and information via the Internet and a free call line; and contact with victims through 183 workshops at which 37,983 people were given appropriate guidance and attention.[46]  In spite of progress in terms of victims' involvement in the process, a large percentage of victims have not received proper guidance, particularly in areas where the National Commission for Reparations and Reconciliation has no regional offices or has not carried out activities for security reasons, such as the Departments of Caquetá, Guaviare, Vichada, Casanare, and Arauca.[47]  Also of concern is the institutional capacity of public defenders to provide adequate advisory services to the thousands of victims who have already registered.

 

40.              The victims have encountered a number of obstacles to their participation.  First, the impossibility of questioning, either directly or through their representatives, those who hope to benefit from Law 975, on the facts of interest to them during the different phases of the open hearings.  The questioning of the victims is reserved for the second phase of the oral hearings, but takes place through an indirect mechanism, since the proposed questions are included in a questionnaire that is given to members of the CTI, who in turn transmit it to the Prosecutor.  This indirect mechanism seriously restricts the possibility of using questioning of the victim as an appropriate means of ascertaining the truth of the facts.  Moreover, the Office of the Prosecutor loses a valuable opportunity to compare the different accounts and to move toward verification of compliance with the legal requirements for access to benefits.  Second, difficulties in access to legal advice and representation during court proceedings.  Also of concern is the institutional capacity of public defenders to provide suitable advice to the thousands of victims already registered. In its observations, the State confirms that legal guidance and psychosocial support had probably been provided to 38,000 of the 180,000 victims.[48]

 

41.              In the case of victims actively involved in the process, their security has been seriously compromised or directly affected by the actions of illegal armed groups.  The IACHR continues to receive information about acts of violence and intimidation against victims of the conflict who reside in theaters of operations of armed groups designed to prevent them from participating in the justice and peace process,[49] or to silence their grievances regarding lands seized by paramilitary groups.[50]

 

42.              The MAPP/OAS Mission has drawn attention to the negative effects of the paramilitary presence and the absence of control of the security forces in certain parts of the country, such as small towns and villages in Bajo Cauca and the Department of Córdoba.[51]  The situation would appear to be similar in south Cesar, where fear inspired by the presence of illegal armed groups with links to powerful families in the area impairs the ability of victims to participate in the Justice and Peace process.[52]

 

43.              The IACHR has been informed that the “Victim and Witness Protection Program under Law 925 of 2005” has received more than 400 requests for protection,[53] 108 of which have been accepted.[54]  It should be mentioned that the Constitutional Court ordered the Ministry of the Interior and Justice and the Office of the Prosecutor General to adapt the program in line with “a comprehensive protection strategy for victims and witnesses in trials concerning serious or systemic criminality.”[55]

 

D.        Creation of reparation mechanisms for damages to victims of the armed conflict

 

44.              In previous reports, the IACHR has expressed its concern that the Justice and Peace Law places upon the perpetrators and, in some cases, the units to which they belonged, sole responsibility for paying reparations.[56]  In that regard, it considered that, beyond the available criminal justice machinery, the State should define a policy on reparations designed to resolve injury caused by paramilitary violence, consistent with its budgetary possibilities, and based on the standards of international human rights law, by providing streamlined and low-cost administrative mechanisms for accessing economic reparations programs. This should be without prejudice to other forms of intangible reparations, collective reparations, and social programs and services that might be established for the population affected during the conflict.[57]

 

45.              In December 2007, the government of Colombia sent the IACHR a request for advice on the implementation of an administrative reparations program in Colombia.[58]  In response, the IACHR provided the advisory services requested in the form of a document entitled Principal Guidelines for a Reparations Policy, which was published in February 2008.[59]  In its Guidelines the IACHR notes, inter alia, that a reparations policy ought to ensure the right of victims to comprehensive reparation for damages caused both by illegal armed groups and by the acts or omissions of state agents, based on measures that offer restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction. The IACHR also mentioned that said policies should be guided by the principle of comprehensiveness and conform to the parameters established by the inter-American system in reparations awarded in similar situations, which have been partially adopted in the recent case law of Colombian contentious-administrative tribunals.

 

46.              The Commission also said that the administrative reparations proceeding ought not to preclude a contentious-administrative legal action that seeks to establish the legal responsibility of the State, nor should it involve abandonment of the action for reparations. Victims’ right to bring legal action in the contentious-administrative forum to determine the responsibility of the State for gross violations committed by paramilitary elements ought to be preserved, as has been the finding in precedents of the Council of State. The State could always include in the award the compensation it would pay under the administrative reparations program.[60]

 

47.              On April 22, 2008, the Colombian government adopted Decree 1290/08 “which creates the program on individual reparation through administrative proceedings for victims of organized armed groups operating outside the law.”  The purpose of the Decree was to “grant a set of individual reparation measures for any persons who prior to [its] enactment might have had their fundamental rights violated by the actions of organized armed groups operating outside the law” which have demobilized in accordance with the legal framework contained in the Justice and Peace Law.[61]

 

48.              The IACHR deems it positive that the State has launched, through Decree 1290, an administrative program for reparations, which would involve a budgetary outlay of about 4 billion dollars.  In the view of the IACHR, this program is an improvement over the reparation mechanisms established in the Justice and Peace Law and enables the victims to avoid the inconveniences and obstacles of court proceedings, even though that alternative path is open to them if they prefer to take it.

 

49.              The mechanism proposed by the Decree only covers victims of demobilized armed groups and it is essentially based on a compensation plan with fixed parameters measured in minimum wages.  The Decree creates an Administrative Reparations Committee.[62]  As of November 2008, the Committee had received 147,500 victim accreditation application forms.[63] 

 

50.              In 2007 a bill was submitted to Congress with the aim of comprehensively addressing the right of victims of the armed conflict to reparation.  The proposed law “introducing protection measures for victims of the violence” was passed by the Senate of the Republic after a lengthy debate, which included discussions on issues such as the universe of victims, the responsibility of the State, and fiscal restrictions.[64]  On September 30, 2008, the IACHR received a communication from the Coordinator of Presenters of this bill, Representative Guillermo Rivera, in which he requested the IACHR to issue an opinion on the matter.

 

51.              The IACHR responded to this request with a communication dated October 20, 2008, in which it stated that the reparations bill ought to ensure the right of victims to comprehensive reparation for damages caused both by illegal armed groups and by the acts or omissions of state agents, based on measures that offer restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction. It further indicated that a bill of this type should take into account the effects of the conflict on the ownership and possession of individual and collective lands, and aim to create expeditious and effective mechanisms to ensure the restitution of lands to victims of dispossession.  The IACHR also noted that use of the mechanism provided in the law should not preclude the administrative channels established by Decree 1290 of 2008 or those contemplated in the Justice and Peace Law.  Finally, the Commission noted that the adoption by legislative means of reparation mechanisms at the disposal of victims could strengthen the legitimacy of the administrative reparation programs created by the State.[65] 

 

52.              Some days later, following a debate, the First Committee of the Chamber of Representatives approved the bill with a series of substantive modifications that were fiercely criticized by Colombian civil society organizations and the international community.[66]

 

53.              The IACHR takes a positive view of the discussions on public policies on reparations for victims of the armed conflict.  However, with respect to the parliamentary debate on the bill on reparation for victims, it should be noted that the bill excludes administrative reparation programs for victims of human rights violations committed by agents of the State by requiring them first to exhaust judicial remedies and setting a ceiling on compensation for this reparation mechanism.  The IACHR, through its Rapporteur for Colombia, expressed its concern to the authorities regarding the difference in treatment between victims of illegal conduct perpetrated by groups operating outside the law and those perpetrated by agents of the State, a difference that could end up being discriminatory. Apart from this, the Rapporteur indicated that the ceiling foreseen under the draft legislation adversely affects the principle of comprehensive reparations, which constitutes a step backwards in terms of the rights such victims can exercise today. In the meeting with the Minister of Interior and Justice,[67] this official expressed the government’s intention to put forward before Congress an amendment to the bill designed to eliminate compensation ceilings and to institute abbreviated judicial procedures for cases of this type.[68]

 

54.              Be that as it may, implementation of a legally established reparations program should be accompanied by a commitment on the part of Colombian society to the victims of the conflict, the kind of commitment that would be facilitated by broad and in-depth preliminary consultations, follow-up and evaluation to give it stability and to enable it to sustain itself over the course of time. 



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[1] Article 57 of the IACHR’s Rules of Procedure provides that: “1. The Annual Report presented by the Commission to the OAS General Assembly shall include the following: [...] h. any general or special report the Commission considers necessary with regard to the situation of human rights in the Member States, and, as the case may be, follow-up reports noting the progress achieved and the difficulties that have existed with respect to the effective observance of human rights; [...] 2. For the preparation and adoption of the reports provided for in paragraph 1(h) of this article, the Commission shall gather information from all the sources it deems necessary for the protection of human rights. Prior to its publication in the Annual Report, the Commission shall provide a copy of said report to the interested State. That State may send the Commission the views it deems pertinent within a maximum time period of one month from the date of transmission. The contents of the report and the decision to publish it shall be within the exclusive discretion of the Commission.” Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (approved by the Commission at its 109th special session, held from December 4 to 8, 2000; amended at its 116th regular session, held from October 7 to 25, 2002, and at its 118th regular session, held from October 6 to 24, 2003).

[2] Note DDH No. 5717/0223 from the Office of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia, February 5, 2009.

[3] Created in 1997, this Protection Program was a partnership of government and civil society, to protect certain sectors of the population at particular risk from the actions of the armed outlaw groups as regards their rights to life, integrity, freedom, and personal security. The objectives of the Program are: (1) To strengthen government agencies at the national, regional, and local levels so as to enable them to undertake joint, coordinated, integrated and permanent measures to prevent human rights violations and to protect the rights of inhabitants of targeted at-risk communities; (2) To strengthen the traditional organizational structures, traditional authorities, and social organizations of the targeted at-risk communities so that they can develop initiatives, make proposals, coordinate with public authorities, and become involved in the implementation, follow-up, and oversight of measures aimed at preventing violations and protecting human rights and international humanitarian law; and (3) To re-establish or improve the relationship between the State and the community for the purpose of coordinating, developing, monitoring, and evaluating the preventive and protective measures proposed in the action plans.

[4] The budget for the program in 2008 was US$ 4 million. Figures provided by the Minister of Interior and Justice at the meeting at his office in Bogotá on November 19, 2008.

[5] The IACHR Rapporteur for Colombia, Víctor E. Abramovich, accompanied by members of the Executive Secretariat, conducted a visit to Bogotá and the department of Chocó from November 17 to 22, 2008, where he received information from agencies of the State, community representatives and civil society organizations.  See Press Release 54/08 at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Comunicados/English/2008/54.08eng.htm.

[6] The IACHR received information from the State as well as from civil society organizations in the framework of the hearing held in the course of its 131st and 133rd sessions.  The audio and video recording of the hearings are available at http://www.cidh.org/Audiencias/seleccionar.aspx.  The IACHR also requested and received information in writing, in keeping with its authority under Article 41 of the American Convention.

[7] The State has reported that this figure is the result of an updating of the records of demobilized persons by the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace. Note DDH No. 5717/0223 from the Office of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia, February 5, 2009, p. 3.

[8] The Colombian State has continued its efforts to reach agreements on the demobilization of other illegal armed groups.  In 2008, the MAPP/OAS Mission noted the demobilization of various adult members of the Ejército Revolucionario Guevarista, a dissident faction of the National Revolutionary Army (ELN) that was operating in the Municipality of Carmen de Atrato, Department of Chocó.  The Office of the High Commissioner for Peace notes that there are a total of 36 demobilized persons in this group.  The dismantling of this insurgent group has come in the framework of a new strategy of the national government designed to engage regional structures –bloques and frentes– in dialogue, in view of the difficulty of initiating talks with top commanders at the national level.

[9] For more than a year and a half, the demobilization, surrender of weapons and re-assimilation into civilian life proceeded under the system for individual and collective demobilization instituted by Decree 128 of 2003, which contained regulations for implementing Law 418 of 1997, extended and amended by Law 584 of 1999 and Law 782 of 2002 on reincorporation into civil society.  On June 22, 2005, the Congress of the Republic passed Law 975 (2005), which entered into force once the president signed it on July 22, 2005.  On December 30, 2005, Decree No. 4760 of the Ministry of the Interior and Justice was issued, which regulates certain aspects of Law 975 related to the deadlines for investigating those seeking to avail themselves of the benefits of the law –Article 4- and introducing the principle of timeliness for third parties involved with the possession, holding, transfer, and, in general, ownership of illicit goods handed over to make redress to victims –Article 13.  On September 29, 2006, Decree No. 3391 was published, which partially regulated Law 975 (2005), Ministry of the Interior and Justice, Decree No. 3391 (2006), September 29, 2006, “Partially regulating Law 975 (2005).”

[10] When the constitutionality of Law 975 was challenged in a case before the Constitutional Court, the latter ruled that Law 975 was in general terms constitutional and spelled out conditions for making certain that its provisions were compatible with the Constitution. Among the parameters for interpretation established by the Constitutional Court were rules to protect victims' participation in the process and to give them access to full reparations. The judgment also clarifies the obligation to enforce the reduced prison sentence stipulated therein and to introduce legal consequences, such as loss of benefits, if demobilized personnel claiming benefits under the law should withhold information from the judicial authorities. The judgment also made clear that paramilitary activity is a common crime. In short, demobilized personnel who committed crimes during the armed conflict and who apply for the benefits of Law 975 will have to cooperate with justice so that the victims’ rights to the truth, to justice, to reparations, and to non-repetition can be realized. Constitutional Court, Case D-6032, Judgment C-370/06, made public on July 13, 2006.

[11] OAS Permanent Council, Resolution CP/859 (1397/04) “Support to the Peace Process in Colombia”, operative paragraph 3. OEA/Ser. G CP/RES. 859 (1397/04) of February 6, 2004.  See IACHR, Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102 Doc. 9 rev. 1, of February 26, 1999; Report on the Demobilization Process in Colombia OEA/Ser.L/V/II.120 Doc. 60, of December 13, 2004; Statement of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on the Application and Scope of the Justice and Peace Law in Colombia, 2006. OEA/Ser/L/V/II. 125 Doc. 15, August 1, 2006. IACHR, “Report on the Implementation of the Justice and Peace Law: Initial Stages in the Demobilization of the AUC and First Judicial Proceedings. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.129 Doc. 6, October 2, 2007. See also Chapter IV of the IACHR annual reports for the years 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007.

[12] Figures received at the meeting with officials of the Office of the High Commissioner for the Social and Economic Reintegration of Armed People and Irregular Groups in Bogotá on November 19, 2008.

[13] See Sixth Quarterly Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS), OEA/Ser.G/CP/doc.4075/06, February 16, 2006. See also Seventh Quarterly Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS), OEA/Ser.G/CP/doc.4148/06, August 30, 2006; Eighth Quarterly Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS), OEA/Ser.G/CP/doc.4176/07, February 14, 2007; Ninth Quarterly Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS), July 3, 2007; Tenth Quarterly Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS), October 31, 2007; Eleventh Quarterly Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS), June 25, 2008; Twelfth Quarterly Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS), February 9, 2009.

[14] Twelfth Quarterly Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS), February 9, 2009.

[15] Twelfth Quarterly Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS), February 9, 2009.

[16]  Twelfth Quarterly Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS), February 9, 2009.

[17] Note DDH No. 5717/0223 from the Office of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia, February 5, 2009, page 5.

[18] Office of the Procurator General of the Nation (Procuraduría General de la Nación), Directive 0013 of June 16, 2008, pp. 5 and 6. http://www.procuraduria.gov.co/descargas/documentoshome/home2008/directiva_0013.pdf.

[19] Twelfth Quarterly Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS), February 9, 2009.

[20] Twelfth Quarterly Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS), February 9, 2009.

[21] Office of the Procurator General of the Nation (Procuraduría General de la Nación), Directive 0013 of June 16, 2008, pp. 5 and 6. http://www.procuraduria.gov.co/descargas/documentoshome/home2008/directiva_0013.pdf.

[22] Office of the Procurator General of the Nation (Procuraduría General de la Nación), Directive 0013 of June 16, 2008, pp. 5 and 6. http://www.procuraduria.gov.co/descargas/documentoshome/home2008/directiva_0013.pdf.

[23] Note DDH No. 5717/0223 from the Office of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia, February 5, 2009, pages 6 and 7.

[24] National Prosecutors’ Unit for Justice and Peace, Information in process of consolidation and verification, as of July 14, 2008). See also, International Crisis Group “Correcting Course: Victims and the Justice and Peace Law in Colombia”, Latin America Report No. 29, 30 October, 2008. In its observations, the State gives the figure of 1,195 applicants who had not expressed their willingness to go through with the process.  It does not clarify its source. Note DDH No. 5717/0223 from the Office of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia, February 5, 2009, page 7.

[25] National Prosecutors’ Unit for Justice and Peace, Information in process of consolidation and verification, as of November 27, 2008).  See also, International Crisis Group, “Correcting Course: Victims and the Justice and Peace Law in Colombia”, Latin America Report No. 29, 30 October 2008.

[26] In any case, this declaration must be considered in light of the obligation of the judicial authorities and other State agencies to reliably verify compliance with the requirements in order to be eligible for the reduced penalty benefits contained in Law 975Ministry of the Interior and Justice, Decree 423 of February 16, 2007 “Which introduces rules governing Articles 10 and 11 of Law 975 of 2005 (Justice and Peace Law)”.  See Article 6.  Oath of compliance with the eligibility requirements.

[27] National Prosecutors’ Unit for Justice and Peace, Information in process of consolidation and verification, as of July 1, 2008). See also, International Crisis Group “Correcting Course: Victims and the Justice and Peace Law in Colombia”, Latin America Report No. 29, 30 October, 2008.

[28] See Procuraduría Delegada para la Prevención en Materia de Derechos Humanos y Asuntos Étnicos Basic Concepts on the Justice and Peace Law and the Victim’s Rights, February, 2008, page 18.

[29] In its observations, the State says that, beginning in January 2008, 2,166 new posts had been created in the Prosecutor’s Office (418 prosecutors, 545 investigators, and 1,203 posts for support and administrative staff) to conduct investigations on justice and peace, human rights violations, breaches of IHL, and property seizures, and to reinforce the victim and witness protection program. Note DDH No. 5717/0223 from the Office of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia, February 5, 2009, pages 7 and 8.

[30] Supreme Court, Criminal Cassation Chamber, Process 29560, May 28, 2008 (Case of William Salazar Carrascal, alias “El Loro”).

[32] Presidency of the Republic of Colombia. Beneficiarios de Justicia y Paz que reincidan serán extraditados. May 7, 2008, http://web.presidencia.gov.co/sp/2008/mayo/07/10072008.html

[33]  Superior Council of the Judicature, Tribunal of Judicial Discipline, Judgment of May 6, 2008, Reporting Judge, Angelino Lizcano Rivera.

[34] Presidency of the Republic of Colombia. Remarks of President Uribe at a graduation ceremony for second lieutenants of the National Police, May 14, 2008, http://web.presidencia.gov.co/sp/2008/mayo/14/10142008.html.

[35] IACHR, Press Release 21/08, “IACHR expresses concern about extradition of Colombian paramilitaries”, Washington, D.C., May 14, 2008.

[36] Communication without number from the Permanent Mission of Colombia to the OAS, of May 14, 2008, signed by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Fernando Araújo Perdomo, in which the Government explains the reasons behind its rejection of the IACHR press communiqué.  In this communication the State “regrets that the IACHR ignore the rights of the citizens vis-a-vis the criminals” and urges the Commission “to understand these measures … and refrain from following the designs (hacerle el juego) of those men who wish to avoid their responsibilities before justice by seeking protection under the benefits of the Law of Justice and Peace”.

[37] Hearing on Extraditions of paramilitaries and the rights of victims in Colombia, held on October 23, 2008 in the framework of the 133rd Regular Session of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. http://cidh.org:81/Audiencias/seleccionar.aspx.

[38]  Communication of the US State Department of October 23, 2008, to the Permanent Mission of Colombia to the Organization of American States.

[39]  Official Letter OFI8-29763-ACI-0120 from the Ministry of the Interior and Justice in response to the right of petition of the Comisión Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz. October 1, 2008 in a document presented by civil society organizations at the hearing on Extraditions of paramilitaries and the rights of victims in Colombia, October 23, 2008, p. 3.

[40] Information supplied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs during the meeting at his office in Bogotá on November 19, 2008. See also, Communication without number from the Permanent Mission of Colombia to the OAS, of May 14, 2008, signed by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Fernando Araújo Perdomo, in which the Government mentions that “any plea bargaining in the United States shall be conditional upon cooperation with the victims’ rights to truth, justice and reparation.”

[41] Note DDH No. 5717/0223 from the Office of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia, February 5, 2009, page 10.

[42] The State has described the extradited paramilitary leaders as “..criminals that after taking advantage of a peace negotiation continued to commit crimes and to risk the lives and security of the Colombian people [..] and they intended to avoid their responsibilities before justice by using their application to benefit from the Justice and Peace Law”.  The Government also confirmed that “the decision to extradite these individuals was taken after evaluating their conduct after the demobilization”. Communication without number from the Permanent Mission of Colombia to the OAS, of May 14, 2008, signed by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Fernando Araújo Perdomo.

[43] Figure provided by the State in its observations.  Note DDH No. 5717/0223 from the Office of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia, February 5, 2009, page 13.

[44] Decree 315 of 2007 provides that victims have the right of access, both personally and directly, or through their attorney, to the taking of statements, formulation of indictments and charges and other procedural steps in the context of Law 975, relating to the events that caused the damage. Ministry of the Interior and Justice, Decree 315 of February 7, 2007, governing the intervention of victims in the investigation stage of Justice and Peace proceedings under Law 975 of 2005”.  19. The victims, however, have encountered a series of obstacles to their participation.  First, the impossibility of questioning those seeking to benefit from Law 975, whether directly or through their representatives, about matters of interest to them in the different phases of the voluntary statement hearing. Questioning by victims is confined to the second phase of the hearing, but it takes place through an indirect mechanism, where the questions are incorporated into a form that is delivered to members of the CTI, who in turn deliver it to the prosecutor. This indirect mechanism severely restricts the possibility of the victim to use questioning as a suitable means of obtaining the truth of the facts. Moreover, the prosecution thereby loses a valuable strategy for comparing the voluntary depositions and verifying compliance with the legal requirements for access to benefits.  Second, the victims encounter difficulties in securing legal counsel and representation in judicial proceedings.

[45] National Prosecutors’ Unit for Justice and Peace, Information in process of consolidation and verification, as of July 14, 2008).

[46] Note DDH No. 5717/0223 from the Office of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia, February 5, 2009, page 12.

[47] See Twelfth Quarterly Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS), February 9, 2009.

[48] Note DDH No. 5717/0223 from the Office of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia, February 5, 2009, page 13.

[49] On September 24, 2008, the IACHR granted precautionary measures on behalf of Hugo Antonio Combariza Rodríguez. The request for precautionary measures alleged that Mr. Combariza Rodríguez had received threats as a result of his involvement in criminal trials taking place in the framework of the Justice and Peace Law, and that on April 25, 2008, he was the target of an attack with a firearm.  The Commission requested the State of Colombia to adopt the measures necessary to protect the life and safety of the beneficiary and to provide information on judicial steps taken to get to the bottom of the facts that gave rise to the adoption of precautionary measures.  IACHR, Annual Report 2008, Chapter III, Precautionary Measures.

[50] Benigno Gil was murdered on November 22, 2008, in Chigorodó, Antioquia.  Officials of the National Commission for Reparations and Reconciliation of Antioquia suggested that the motive was to put an end to several land claim proceedings initiated by 1,200 peasant farmers in Urabá.  http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/antioquia/ARTICULO-WEB-PLANTILLA_
NOTA_INTERIOR-4684874.html

[51] Twelfth Quarterly Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS), February 9, 2009.

[52] The MAPP/OAS Mission reports that in the Municipality of San Martín, Cesar Department, municipal officials refuse to write in forms dealing with complaints reported by victims the names of possible perpetrators with blood or marriage ties to certain families whose members hold public office.  Twelfth Quarterly Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS), February 9, 2009.

[53] Ministry of the Interior and Justice, Decree 3570 of September 18, 2007, the purpose of which is “to protect the lives, well-being, freedom, and security of those under threat or at risk as a direct result of their involvement as victims or witnesses in the Justice and Peace process.”

[54] Twelfth Quarterly Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS), February 9, 2009.

[55] Constitutional Court, Judgment T-496 of 2008, Reporting Judge Jaime Córdoba Triviño, para. 10.8.2.

[56] Payment of reparations will be effected via the Reparations Fund administered by the Presidential Agency for Social Action and Cooperation and the State will take on the obligation to make reparation jointly and severally pursuant to Law 975 of 2005 and its enabling regulations issued in decrees. 

[57] Statement of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on the Application and Scope of the Justice and Peace Law in Colombia.  OEA/Ser/L/V/II. 125 Doc. 15, August 1, 2006, para. 99.

[58] Note DM/VAM/DDH 63682/3408 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia of December 7, 2007.

[59] IACHR Principal Guidelines for a Reparations Policy, OEA/Ser/L/V/II.131 Doc. 1, February 19, 2008,http://cidh.org:81/pdf%20files/Lineamientos%20principales%20para%20una%20política%20integral
%20de%20reparaciones.pdf
.

[60] IACHR Principal Guidelines for a Reparations Policy, OEA/Ser/L/V/II.131 Doc. 1, February 19, 2008, numeral 7. http://cidh.org:81/pdf%20files/Lineamientos%20principales%20para%20una%20política%20integral%20de%
20reparaciones.pdf
.

[61] Article 1 of Decree 1290/08, “which creates the program on individual reparation through administrative proceedings for victims of organized armed groups operating outside the law”.

[62] The Administrative Reparations Committee was created on July 10, 2008, and composed of the Ministry of the Interior, National Commission for Reparations and Reconciliation, Acción Social, victims’ representatives, the Office of the Procurator General of the Nation (Procuraduría General de la Nación), the Ombudsman, and representatives of the International Organization for Migration. Information provided at the meeting with the Minister of the Interior and Justice, Fabio Valencia Cossio on November 19, 2008, during the working visit of the Rapporteur for Colombia, Víctor E. Abramovich, from November 18 to 21, 2008 in Colombia.

[63] Meeting with the Minister of the Interior and Justice, Fabio Valencia Cossio on November 19, 2008, during the working visit of the Rapporteur for Colombia, Víctor E. Abramovich, from November 18 to 21, 2008 in Colombia.

[64] Law 044 of 2008 Chamber 157 of 2007 Senate.

[65] Communication of October 20, 2008, from the IACHR to Representative Guillermo Rivera, Coordinator of Presenters of the draft Reparations Law under consideration in the Congress of Colombia.

[66] Press release of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia of November 14, 2008, ‘ONU Derechos Humanos en Colombia deplora un proyecto de “ley de víctimas” discriminatorio’; Press release of the Working Group on the Draft Victims Law, “El proyecto de Ley de Víctimas empeoró su situación legal”; Press release of Corporación REINICIAR of November 14, 2008 “El Gobierno descuartizó el proyecto de Ley de Víctimas”; Press release of the National Committee for Victims Belonging to Community-Based Organizations of November 12, 2008 “Denuncia que Uribe y su bancada desnaturalizaron el Proyecto de Ley de Víctimas”; Press release of the Centre for Justice and International Law of November 14, 2008 “CEJIL lamenta oposición del Gobierno colombiano al reconocimiento del derecho de las víctimas”.  See also, Ciurlizza, Javier “El riesgo de aprobar una mala ley de víctimas”, article published in Revista Semana.com on November 14, 2008.

[67] Meeting with the Minister of the Interior and Justice, Fabio Valencia Cossio on November 19, 2008, during the working visit of the Rapporteur for Colombia, Víctor E. Abramovich, from November 18 to 21, 2008 in Colombia.