Report Nº 57/02 [1]

MERITS

CASE 11.382

Finca “La Exacta”

Guatemala

October 21, 2002

 

1.       The petitioners in the instant case (the Center for Human Rights Action) allege that the State of Guatemala violated the human rights of the workers on the Finca “La Exacta” (also referred to in the case file as the Finca “El Ceibal” or the Finca “San Juan del Horizonte”), in Coatepeque, Quetzaltenago, when the Guatemalan police, using extreme force, entered the estate on August 24, 1994, in an incident that left three workers dead and 11 seriously injured.  The petitioners allege that the State committed other violations by failing to provide access to justice and to judicial protection for the workers of Finca “La Exacta”, in connection with the events of August 24, 1994 and other claims of the workers, based on Guatemalan law.  After careful examination of these claims, the Commission concludes that the State of Guatemala violated Articles 1, 4, 5, 8, 16, 19 and 25 of the American Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Convention”).

 

I.     BACKGROUND INFORMATION

 

A.      Allegations of the petitioners

 

2.       According to the petitioners, in early 1994 with the help of the leaders of the Federation of Guatemalan Workers Unions (“UNSITRAGUA”), the workers on the Finca “La Exacta” began to organize and protest against their working conditions. Neither the Guatemalan labor courts nor the estate management took any action, and on July 17, 1994 the workers occupied the estate.

 

3.       On August 24, 1994, agents of the Guatemalan security forces invaded the estate and used excessive force against the occupiers.  According to the petitioners, the agents forced their way into the estate with a tractor and began to fire their weapons and to throw teargas bombs without any provocation.  Three persons were killed and 11 injured in the clash.

 

4.       The petitioners allege that the Government of Guatemala subsequently failed to properly investigate these acts and to punish the perpetrators.  They also allege that the Government of Guatemala was guilty of the denial of justice when it failed to give the workers due process, an opportunity to be heard, and adequate judicial remedies with respect to their labor demands.

B.       Position of the Government

 

5.       The Government of Guatemala has argued that the petitioners’ complaint is inadmissible, because all domestic remedies have not been exhausted.  It alleges that a proper investigation is being carried out and that it has not yet been completed.

 

6.       The Government has put forward arguments in which it seeks to refute the allegations of the petitioners regarding the use of excessive force by police officers on August 24, 1994.   For its part, it claims that the police team entered the estate with a court order and that the occupants were in possession of weapons. 

 

C.      Processing of the case

 

7.       On September 8, 1994 the petitioners submitted to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the “Commission”) a request for precautionary measures and requested that a case be opened based on the events of August 24, 1994 on the Finca “La Exacta”. On September 9, 1994, in accordance with Article 34 of the Regulations of the Commission, case 11.382 was opened and the Commission transmitted to the Government of Guatemala the pertinent parts of the complaint it had received.  The Government was requested to submit such information as it considered pertinent within a period of 90 days.

 

8.       On September 19, 1994, the Commission requested the Government of Guatemala to take provisional measures, in accordance with Article 29 of its Regulations, to protect the life and security of the 12 persons involved in the incident on the Finca “La Exacta”.  It also convened a hearing on the case, on September 23, 1994.

 

9.       A hearing was held at the Commission’s 87^th period of sessions, at which both parties to the case were present.  On that occasion the petitioners filed a formal complaint in which they repeated the information contained in the original request for precautionary measures to be taken. 

 

10.     The Commission also announced at the hearing that it was placing itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to reaching a friendly settlement.  The petitioners indicated their acceptance of the Commission’s offer.  After the hearing, the Commission sent a letter to the Government reiterating its offer to place itself at the disposal of the parties to negotiate a friendly settlement.  The Government did not reply to this communication.

 

11.     On September 28, 1994 the Government communicated its reply to the Commission’s request for the adoption of precautionary measures.  This reply was transmitted to the petitioners on October 5, 1994.

 

 

12.     On November 17, 1994 the Commission received the reply of the Government in the central case.  The Commission transmitted the Government’s reply to the petitioners on November 21, 1994.

 

13.     On September 6, 1995 a second hearing was held on the case at the Commission’s 90^th period of sessions.  At the hearing, the petitioners submitted a number of documents, which were transmitted to the Government on September 7, 1995.  On September 27, 1995, the Commission received a statement amicus curiae in connection with the case.

 

14.     On December 4, 1995 the Commission transmitted communications to the Government and to the petitioners, placing itself once more at the disposal of the parties to begin negotiations aimed at reaching a friendly settlement.  The Commission requested the parties to respond within 30 days.

 

15.     The petitioners submitted their reply in English on December 14, 1994.  On December 22, 1995 the petitioners submitted their reply in Spanish, including the arguments put forward in their original reply in English, as well as updated information on the case.  The petitioners’ reply was transmitted to the Government on December 29, 1995.

 

16.     On January 23, 1996 the Government replied to the Commission’s communication regarding a friendly settlement.  The Government informed the Commission that it did not believe that it was appropriate to discuss a friendly settlement, because the investigations and internal proceedings in the case had not been completed.  The Government also provided the Commission with updated information on the status of the investigation.  The Commission transmitted the Government’s report to the petitioners on January 24, 1996

 

17.     On February 16, 1996 the Commission received the Government’s reply to the reply of the petitioners.  This reply was transmitted to the petitioners on February 29, 1996.

 

18.     By letter dated August 21, 1996 the Commission, pursuant to Article 48(1) of the Convention, requested the Government to furnish documents that it considered necessary to conduct a proper examination of the case.  On October 10, the Government sent the Commission a communication enclosing all of the requested documents.

 

II.     ANALYSIS  

A.      Admissibility

 

1.       Formal requirements for admissibility

 

19.     The complaint meets the formal requirements for admissibility set out in the American Convention on Human Rights and in the Regulations of the Commission.  In accordance with Article 47(b) of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “the Convention”), the Commission is competent to consider the case since the petition states facts that tend to establish a violation of the rights guaranteed by the Convention.  With regard to Articles 46(1)(c) and 47(d) of the Convention, respectively, the Commission has received no information to indicate that the subject of the petition is pending in another international proceeding for settlement or that it is substantially the same as one previously studied by the Commission.

 

2.       Friendly settlement

 

20.     In accordance with Article 48(1)(f) of the Convention, the Commission offered to place itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to reaching a friendly settlement of the matter.  The Government of Guatemala communicated to the Commission its decision not to participate in negotiations aimed at reaching a friendly settlement.

 

3.       Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies

 

21.     In accordance with Article 46(2) of the Convention, the requirement for the exhaustion of remedies under domestic law, which is contained in Article 46(1)(a), is not applicable in this case.  Article 46(1)(a) requires that “the remedies under domestic law should have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law”.

 

22.     Nonetheless, the Convention provides in Article 46(2)(b) that requirement of exhaustion of the remedies under domestic law shall not be applicable when “the party alleging violation of his rights has been denied access to the remedies under domestic law or has been prevented from exhausting them”.  In accordance with Article 46(2)(c), the requirement for exhaustion of remedies under domestic law shall not be applicable when “there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under the aforementioned remedies".  The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Court”) has ruled on these principles, making it clear that in order to invoke the requirement of exhaustion of remedies under domestic law with a view to rejecting the jurisdiction of the inter-American system, the Government must demonstrate not only that an adequate remedy is available under domestic law, but that such remedy is “effective”. [2]  

 

a.       Exhaustion of domestic remedies with regard to the complaint of lack of judicial protection for the employment claims of the workers

 

23.     The Commission notes that the fundamental aspect of the complaint of failure to provide judicial protection for the employment claims of the workers on the Finca “La Exacta” is based on the contention that the workers were not afforded the right to due process nor the opportunity to be heard for the settlement of their claims, and that the labor courts of Guatemala were guilty of excessive and unwarranted delays in taking action on these claims.  These allegations constitute not only a denunciation of violations of the Convention but also an argument that the requirement for exhaustion of the remedies available under domestic law was not applicable to the petitioners in this case. [3]

 

24.     The Government has limited to one sentence its argument on the question of the exhaustion of domestic remedies for the denial of justice in the case of the workers’ claims. It merely states that the workers and their union leaders are putting forward their claims before the labor courts.  The Government has not assumed its legal burden of demonstrating that the remedies that were pursued to settle the workers’ claims are effective and are being applied, without unwarranted delays, or that further effective remedies have not as yet been pursued and exhausted. [4] The Commission therefore considered that the petitioners are excused from the requirement for the exhaustion of domestic remedies with respect to their complaints about the lack of judicial protection for the employment claims of the workers.  The Commission will examine the grounds for the complaints about the lack of judicial protection for these claims in the section on the substance of the petition.

 

b.       Exhaustion of remedies under domestic law with respect to the violations that allegedly resulted from the events of August 24, 1994

 

25.     As regards the violations that allegedly resulted from the acts committed on August 24, 1994 the Commission considers that the petitioners are also excused from having to fulfill the requirement for exhaustion of the remedies available under domestic law.  The Government has argued that the existence of the criminal proceedings now underway with respect to these acts means that the Commission does not have competence in the case.

 

26.     The Commission nevertheless concludes that there has been an unwarranted delay in the criminal proceeding that was instituted as a result of the acts of violence of August 24, 1994.  This proceeding should have been the appropriate mechanism for investigating the incidents, assigning responsibilities and, where appropriate, imposing punishment.

 

27.     Nevertheless, more than two years have elapsed since the acts of violence without any formal accusation being made in the case.  The case is still in the phase of the preliminary proceeding or investigation.  The Criminal Code of Procedure of Guatemala provides that, once the defendants have been identified, the preliminary proceeding should normally last six months. [5]   In the present case, however, the Office of the Public Prosecutor has requested extensions of the preliminary phase on four separate occasions.

28.     The Commission is also of the view that it has not been demonstrated that the criminal proceedings in connection with the events of August 24, 1994 constitute an effective remedy that has been adequately applied.  On the contrary, it has been demonstrated that the proceeding was inadequate and ineffective.  As a practical matter therefore, the victims of the acts of August 24, 1994 have been denied access to the remedies provided under the domestic legislation. 

 

29.     It became clear immediately after the police action of August 24, 1994 that no impartial investigation and prosecution of the case would take place.  Senior officials immediately excused the action of the Guatemalan police units before it was possible to fully determine what had happened and without first requiring an investigation of the matter.

 

30.     Barely two days after the incident, the then President Ramiro de León Carpio declared that the forcible eviction of the workers was a legal measure justified by the need to protect the right to property under the rule of law. [6] .The following day, the Attorney General, Ramses Cuestas Gómez, declared that the police did not enter the estate “acting in a repressive or illegal manner”.  He said that it was likely that private security forces and not the Government police were responsible for any violence that might have taken place [7] .

 

31.     The unwillingness of the police to collaborate in a serious investigation that might lead to the judicial determination of responsibilities for the acts of violence was made even clearer.  Shortly after the confrontation, the Director of the National Police, Salvador Figueroa, rejected out of hand all accusations of irregularities or police responsibility.  He argued that critics of the action taken by the police on Finca “La Exacta” belonged to “destabilizing groups” in Guatemala. [8] Later, he specifically said that the police would not carry out an investigation of the action by the police at Finca “La Exacta”. [9]

 

32.     As a result of the position openly taken by senior Government officials, it became clear shortly after the occurrence of the events in question and even before the Commission opened case 11.382, on September 9, 1994, that the victims were unlikely to gain access to an effective domestic remedy.  The subsequent investigations and processing under domestic law of the criminal case arising from the acts of August 24, 1994 demonstrated even more clearly the ineffectiveness of the domestic remedies. 

 

33.     The Office of the Public Prosecutor and the courts have delayed considerably or have simply neglected to take statements from key witnesses and have not gathered crucial evidence.  The United Nation Mission for the Verification of Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA) highlighted the problems related to the proceeding in various reports.  In its second report, the Director of MINUGUA stated that “after eight months, the investigation has made no progress whatsoever because of the inaction of the Public Prosecutor’s Office which, without any justification, has neglected to carry out basic inquiries”. [10]   The third report of MINUGUA states that the case had not gone forward due to the inaction of the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the dilatory approach by the Court responsible for the case. [11]

 

34.     The Government has argued that these reports of MINUGUA are outdated and do not reflect the most recent initiatives of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to move forward the investigation of the case.  According to the Government and the petitioners, after November 1995 the investigations were reactivated and important witnesses summoned to testify. [12] Nevertheless, these new investigative measures were recently adopted more than one year after the original acts of August 24, 1994 and many important investigative procedures have still not been completed.  There is no evidence that a complete and adequate judicial investigation will be carried out in the near future.

 

B.      The substance of the case – Proven acts and conclusions of law

 

1.       Right to life and right to respect of personal integrity

             

a.       Excessive use of force

35.     The record shows that on August 24, 1994 no less than 215 agents of the National Police, supported by at least two helicopters, invaded the Finca “La Exacta” using teargas and firearms against the workers who had occupied the estate.  The use of such force resulted in the death of Efraín Recinos Gómez, Basilio Guzmán Juárez and Diego Orozco.  It also endangered the entire group of workers and their families who were occupying the estate and who suffered from the attack. Serious injuries were sustained by 11 persons: Pedro Carreto Loayes, Efraín Guzmán Lucero, Ignacio Carreto Loayes, Daniel Pérez Guzmán, Marcelino López, José Juárez Quinil, Hugo René Jiménez López, Luciano Lorenzo Pérez, Feliz Orozco Huinil, Pedro García Guzmán and Genaro López Rodas.  The Commission will examine whether the force used was excessive and therefore a violation of the Convention.

 

36.     Several observers in Guatemala concluded immediately after the events that the force used by the security forces was excessive.  The Bishops of Quezaltenango issued a statement shortly after the invasion indicating that the incursion “was characterized by an irrational use of force that bordered on brutality and savagery”. [13] The Counsel for Human Rights of Guatemala, Dr. Jorge Mario García La Guardia, after conducting a careful investigation of the incident, reached a similar conclusion.  Officials of the Office of the Counsel for Human Rights visited Finca “La Exacta” and the hospital to which a number of wounded persons had been taken on the same day of the events to gather evidence.  They also interviewed witnesses and examined relevant documents.  The final conclusion of the report of the Counsel for Human Rights, which was issued after these extensive investigations, was that the police agents had used “excessive and unnecessary force." [14]

 

37.     The Government has maintained that the police agents conducted the raid on the Finca “La Exacta” carrying with them various arrest warrants issued against 111 workers.  The Government has placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the workers occupying the estate had been accused in court for crimes of illegal occupation and coercion.  It has argued that police action was necessary to protect the private property of the estate owners.

 

38.     The Commission has no reason to ascertain–nor does it propose to do
so–whether the occupiers of the estate committed one or more crimes that justified the issuance of the arrest warrants. [15]   Even if a crime might have been committed and private property endangered, the law enforcement officials would be required to effect the arrests and punishment in accordance with the law and due process and with respect for the human rights guaranteed in the Convention.  Police agents cannot act in a wholly discretional manner when carrying out their functions to enforce the law.

 

39.     The Court’s jurisprudence clearly demonstrates that agents of the State have the right and responsibility to enforce the law and to maintain public order even though death or bodily injury may take place in some cases. [16]

 

Nevertheless, the Court clearly stated also that the force used should not be excessive. [17] When excessive force is used, personal integrity is not respected and any resulting deprivation of life is arbitrary. [18]   The question before the Commission is therefore to determine whether the police agents who invaded the estate to enforce the arrest warrants used excessive force, thereby violating the Convention.  The Commission concludes that excessive force was used in this case.

 

40.     In accordance with the international norms developed to govern the use of force by law enforcement officials in the performance of their duty, the use of force should be necessary and proportionate to the needs of the situation and the objective to be achieved. [19]   The United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials expressly provides that “the use of firearms is considered an extreme measure”. [20]

 

41.     The possibility that the workers occupying the estate might have committed a crime against property and the existence of arrest warrants against them could not in themselves justify the use of lethal force, including the use of firearms.  The crimes for which orders of arrest were issued did not even necessarily include an element of violence. [21]   Nor does the criminal complaint that gave rise to the judicial proceeding, based on which the arrest warrants were issued, allege facts involving acts of violence. [22]   The use of lethal force merely to carry out orders of arrest was unnecessary and disproportionate.

 

42.     The Commission notes once again the content of the international norms which provide that firearms should not be used against persons, except where there is danger to life: 

 

Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting  their authority, or to prevent his or her escape. [23]

 

43.     The Government has offered no evidence to show that the police agents had reason to believe that their lives or the lives of third parties, were in danger.  The lethal force that was used, including the use of firearms was therefore disproportionate to the danger that existed.

 

44.     The Government has maintained that the persons who occupied the estate were in possession of lethal weapons.  As proof of this, it cites the fact that certain weapons, including firearms and bombs, which were allegedly under the control of the occupants of the estate, were handed over to the courts on the day of the incursion.

 

45.     The Commission concludes that, despite this evidence, the record does not show that the occupants possessed these types of weapons.  First, none of the more than 40 persons arrested after the raid had weapons in their possession.

 

46.     Second, several of the persons who were arrested after the raid of August 24, 1994 declared that the occupants had no weapons other than sticks and stones. [24]   One of these eyewitnesses stated that he had seen police agents opening an office on the estate and taking out the weapons that were then handed over to the courts. [25]   Another witness also stated that the arms had been clandestinely brought in by the police. [26]

 

47.     The testimony of these witnesses about the absence of weapons is corroborated by observers from outside the area who arrived on the scene immediately after the raid.  The Bishops of Quetzaltenango issued a statement in which they asserted that the occupants did not have weapons. [27]

48.  Moreover, the President of Guatemala, Ramiro de León Carpio, publicly acknowledged that he had erred in his original statement, made after the incident, in which he had said that the occupants were in possession of weapons and explosives. [28]

 

49.     The version of the incident that appeared in the original police report on the events of August 24, 1994 indicates that those occupying the estate attacked the police with lethal weapons.  According to that version, a group of occupiers, comprised exclusively of men, attacked the police units with heavy caliber weapons and bombs, thus posing considerable danger to the lives of the police agents.

 

50.     Since the Commission rejected the argument that the occupiers possessed lethal weapons, such as heavy caliber guns and bombs, it must also reject this first official version of the events.  This version of the events was also rejected almost unanimously by Government and non-government sources. [29]   Further evidence of the improbability of this version is the fact that the newspaper reports of the incidents indicate that, although some three policemen were injured during the events of August 24, 1994, none of the injuries was due to firearms or explosives. [30]   The Government has never attempted to present to the Commission as fact the account that appears in the police reports.

 

51.     The Government has offered no other evidence to show that there was danger to life that merited a reaction by the police forces, which included the use of firearms and other lethal force.  The Government has indicated that the Counsel for Human Rights of Guatemala received several complaints in early August 1994 alleging that several workers on the estate were being held captive by the workers occupying the estate.  However, these complaints do not show and the Government has never claimed that the lives of these persons were in danger or that the extreme force used by the police was used to prevent harm to these persons. [31]

 

52.     The Commission considers that the most credible version of the events is that on August 24, 1994, police forces arrived at the estate with arrest warrants and attempted to negotiate at one of the gates of the estate with the occupiers for a approximately one or two hours.  When the workers occupying the estate refused to abandon it, the police forces penetrated inside using a Caterpillar tractor to force their way into the interior areas.  Once they had penetrated into the part in which most of the occupiers were concentrated, they surrounded and began to attack them with firearms and with air support from no less than two helicopters.  The report of the Counsel for Human Rights of Guatemala, the testimony of eyewitnesses and the reports of the Government itself confirm this version of the events. [32]

 

53.     This sequence of events shows that the law enforcement officials who participated in the raid of August 24, 1994 did not ascertain, prior to attacking the workers occupying the estate, that it was necessary to use extreme force.  According to the international norms governing the excessive use of force, law enforcement officials “may use force and firearms only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result”. [33]

 

54.   In the case of the court orders, the police forces negotiated with the occupants for only a few hours before launching a violent incursion.  During this period, the police agents could not have known if it would be impossible to execute the arrest warrants without recourse to the use of extreme force, including the use of firearms.  The police agents could have waited some time more to see whether the persons named in the arrest warrants would surrender or leave the estate so that they could be arrested.  This failure proves that the police agents did not postpone the use of force until it was clear that other means of achieving their objective would be ineffective.

 

55.     The way in which the police agents entered the estate and attacked the occupants also proves that the force used was not proportionate or strictly necessary to achieve the objective of executing the arrest warrants.  The use by the law enforcement officials of a tractor and air support together with heavy weapons to surround the occupants and then open fire against them proves that the operation was much more like an attack and an effort aimed at the forcible eviction of the families occupying the estate than the arrest of the persons named in the arrest warrants.  The record does not show that the judicial authorities authorized a forcible eviction.  On the contrary, the orders which the police had when they carried out the raid provided, specifically and exclusively, for the “detention” of certain persons. [34]   Since the eviction was not a legitimate objective of the law enforcement officials, the force used to achieve that aim was not strictly necessary.

 

56.     The Commission considers it important to also point out, with regard to its conclusion that the police units used excessive force, that the group of workers occupying the estate who were attacked included children.  The United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials expressly provides that every effort must be made to exclude the use of firearms against children. [35]   With reference to the court orders, the police forces attacked the occupants using firearms and other weapons without taking any special precautions so as not to fire on children.

 

57.     Lastly, the Commission points out that the record in this case includes the plan of action which the police forces prepared prior to the events of August 24, 1994 (the “Montaña plan”). [36]   The European Court of Human Rights has determined that a plan for a law enforcement operation may not provide adequate protection against the use of excessive force and consequently may create a situation in which the use of excessive force is likely.  Consequently, the plan represents an important indicator of whether excessive force was used when the law enforcement activity was carried out. [37]   The Commission is of the view that these considerations are also applicable to the case of court orders in the inter-American system.

 

58.     The police plan prepared in this case provides for the use of extreme force and sufficient safeguards were not provided to ensure proportionality and the necessity for the force used.  The Montaña plan was subsequently executed, with the consequent use of excessive force.

 

59.     The plan provides for the “eviction” of the “invaders”.  It begins by explaining that the occupiers would provoke a confrontation with law enforcement officials.  The plan then describes as “enemy forces” the organized workers on the estate.  The plan also mentions “destabilizing political leaders” and “subversive groups” as other possible “enemy forces” that may turn up to support the occupiers.

 

60.     The plan then presents a list of “assumptions”.  These include a scenario in which the occupiers possessed weapons, threw bombs upon the arrival of the police and planted land mines in the occupied area.

 

61.     The extremely strong text used in the plan and the assumptions made envisaged a scenario that required the police units to use extreme force.  Nevertheless, neither the plan nor any other court order indicates that any police investigation or other information concerning the situation at Finca “La Exacta” supported the assumptions made by the police forces.  Consequently, the plan contained incitement to use unnecessary and disproportionate force.

 

62.     In its reply of February 16, 1996 in the case now before the Commission, the Government acknowledged that the basis for the assumptions made in the plan lay in the experience which the police had acquired in carrying out evictions in other estates in similar circumstances.  However, police forces cannot act on the basis of general information to establish a plan that requires the use of extreme force in an individual case.  The study carried out by law enforcement officials of the need for and type of force that should be used must be closely linked to specific facts in order to respect the principles of proportionality and necessity in the present case.

 

63.     The Commission once again wishes to point out that the record does not show that eviction by force was a legitimate law enforcement objective in this case.  Consequently, a plan based on previous experiences of compulsory evictions would necessarily lead to a type and degree of force that was more extreme than necessary in this case, which concerned only the execution of arrest warrants.

 

64.     The degree of force envisaged under the plan was excessive.  The plan provided for the use of agents from various police units, including the Quick Reaction Squads and the Fifth Police Corps (anti-riot police).  More than 200 police agents were assigned to the operation.  The figure should be compared with the 111 arrest warrants that were required to be executed, bearing in mind that the record does not show that all of these 111 persons were actually on the estate.  The police agents had to be transported in six buses and four trucks.  The plan also provided for the use of a helicopter and a tractor.  The police agents were required to carry with them long truncheons, teargas, pistols and guns.  The Commission considers that this degree of force was disproportionate and unnecessary to achieve the objective of executing the pending arrest warrants.

 

65.     The Commission concludes that the plan in no way provided adequate guarantees for the avoidance of excessive use of force. In a 16-page plan for an operation with heavy weapons, only a brief mention is made on page 14 of the need to limit the force to be applied. Instruction Nº 11 provides that “the use of firearms is expressly prohibited, except in self-defense”. Although the plan recognizes that children could be present at the time of the raid, no protection is provided for them in the event that the use of force became necessary. The Commission considers that the type of force to be used, together with the failure to clearly indicate to the police units that they should limit the use of the force applied, made it inevitable that excessive force would be used.

 

66.     The Government provided the Commission with a copy of the Montaña plan, which differs from the plan examined by the Commission. [38] This second version of the plan, which was sent to the Office of the Public Prosecutor by the National Police on January 5, 1995, does not use the same language of the plan examined by the Commission. For example, this version says “possible opposition figures” instead of “enemy forces” and does not include in this category trade union leaders and subversive groups. Nor does it mention an eviction and it places greater emphasis on control by the police officers of the use of weapons.

 

67.     However, the document that contains the original Montaña plan examined by the Commission, which is in the file, clearly indicates that this plan was indeed sent to the police units that participated in the raid and that these units received the plan before the operation took place. Consequently, the copy of the Montaña plan provided by the Government does not lead the Commission to conclude that the second and more acceptable version was distributed and implemented. On the contrary, the Commission must conclude that the agents of the Government recognized the compromising nature of the original plan and therefore provided a modified version of it for use in the criminal investigation of the case.

 

68.     Based on these considerations, the Commission concludes that the Guatemalan police forces used excessive force on August 24, 1994 and therefore arbitrarily deprived Efraín Recinos Gómez, Basilio Guzmán Juárez and Diego Orozco of their lives, thereby violating Article 4(1) of the Convention. The Government agents responsible for the excessive use of force also violated Article 5(1), which protects the right to physical, mental and moral integrity for the group of occupants of the estate who were attacked and, in particular, for the 11 persons who were seriously injured.

 

b.      Torture of Diego Orozco García

 

69.     The information available to the Commission shows that Diego Orozco García received a bullet wound to the chest during the police raid on Finca “La Exacta” and that this wound was at least in part the cause of his death. [39]   The record also shows, however, that Diego Orozco García was taken alive from the estate in one of the helicopters used in the police operation and that his body was found days later some 60 kilometers from the estate. [40] The forensic report that was prepared concluded that Mr. Orozco died from a bullet would and severe bruises and lacerations on his face, chest and upper body. The report also indicated that the corpse showed signs of having been tied by the hands and chest and dragged over a rough surface. [41]

 

70.     The Commission concludes that, in addition to being a victim of the excessive force used by the police units, Mr. Orozco was tortured before his death. The forensic report establishes that his hands and chest were tied. He must have undergone this treatment while still alive and suffering from the bullet wound to his chest. When he was taken from Finca “La Exacta”, Mr. Orozco already had a bullet wound and there would have been no reason to tie him after his death. The forensic report also establishes that Mr. Orozco suffered other violent treatment that caused bruises and lacerations. The Commission concludes that the acts committed against Mr. Orozco constituted torture, in direct violation of Article 5(2) of the Convention, which expressly prohibits the use of torture.

 

71.             The torture to which Mr. Orozco was subjected also constitutes a violation of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (“Convention against Torture”), which was ratified by the Government of Guatemala on 29 January 1987. [42]

 

Article 2 of the Convention against Torture defines torture as follows:

 

….. any act intentionally performed whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is inflicted on a person for purposes of criminal investigation, as a means of intimidation, as personal punishment, as a preventive measure, as a penalty, or for any other purpose.

 

The treatment suffered by Diego Orozco at the hands of Government agents, as emerges from the type of bodily injuries described in the forensic report, is consistent with this definition of torture.

 

2.      Right to freedom of association

 

72.     The Commission proceeded to examine the claim that the Government agents who carried out the raid of August 24, 1994 also violated Article 16 of the Convention, which protects the right to freedom of association. Article 16(1) provides that “everyone has the right to associate freely for …… labor  …..  or other purposes”.

 

73.     In February 1994, the workers on Finca “La Exacta” organized themselves into a union with the assistance of UNSITRAGUA. [43] On February 18, 1994 the workers on Finca “La Exacta” petitioned the labor courts of Guatemala to institute proceedings in connection with a labor dispute of an economic and social nature arising from a conflict with the owners of Finca “La Exacta”. [44] The filing included a set of petitions by the workers against the owners and administrators of the estate.

 

74.     In early March 1994, the owners and administrators of Finca “La Exacta” began to dismiss workers who had signed the petition to initiate the process related to the collective bargaining dispute. According to undisputed information submitted by the petitioners, during the first week of March, more than 60 workers were dismissed. [45] The workers immediately instituted proceedings for their reinstatement with the Second Labour Court. [46] The owners of the estate continued to refuse to reinstate the workers or to discuss their claims, and the courts also failed to take action. The workers subsequently occupied Finca “La Exacta” on July 17, 1994.

 

75.     This background to the raid of August 24, 1994 and the way in which the raid was planned and executed show that the purpose was to suppress the labor movement and its activities on Finca “La Exacta”. As stated in the section above, the raid was executed using excessive force for the sole purpose of fulfilling the legitimate police obligation to execute warrants of arrest. Moreover, as already pointed out, the “organized peasant groups” and “union leaders” were identified as “enemy forces”. [47]

 

76.     The Commission also notes that the owners of the estate and the owners of other neighboring estates collaborated with the police in execution of the operation of August 24, 1994. The plan of operation provided for the “interested parties” to give logistical support to the operation, including air support, buses and trucks, as well as food for the participating police agents. [48] The testimony of the helicopter pilot Carlos Alberto Enríquez Santizo was that he transported in his helicopter Alvaro Blanco, one of the owners of the company and estate known as La Exacta, during the raid. [49] According to uncontested information provided by the petitioners, private security agents attached to Finca “La Exacta” wore police uniforms and participated in the raid. The testimony of the National Police agent who prepared the plan of operation was that the owner of a neighboring estate provided another helicopter for use in the raid. [50]

 

77.     On the day of the raid, the owners and administrators of Finca “La Exacta” had already shown an interest in suppressing the union activity and punishing participants. As mentioned before, in reaction to the formation and organization of a union movement on the estate and the presentation of a labor dispute petition, Finca “La Exacta” terminated the contracts. The owners and administrators, moreover, refused to agree to initiate the proceedings that govern labor disputes or to engage in any negotiations with the organized workers on the estate.

 

78.     The desire of the estate owners to suppress the union movement was also evident from the evidence found after the raid of August 24, 1994. After the raid, angry workers from neighboring estates rushed to Finca “La Exacta” and disarmed and detained the private security agents working for Finca “La Exacta”. Hugo René Murga Izguirre, a retired army colonel who headed the private security team, was searched while under detention. According to uncontested information provided by the petitioners, a document was found on his person that contained the names of representatives of UNSITRAGUA, the union organization that had advised the workers on Finca “La Exacta”. The document contained the names of Luis Mérida and Guillermo Monzón and the license plate numbers of their cars. It may be assumed that the private security agent was in possession of this document because he had been asked to subdue the persons listed by violent means.

 

79.    The Commission considers that the examination of the plan and of the police operation of August 24, 1994, together with the collaboration of the owners of the estate and other neighboring estate owners, show that the police units did not act with objectivity as law enforcement officials on August 24, 1994 but acted instead to achieve the objective of the estate owners, which was to take reprisals against the activity of the movement of rural workers that arose on Finca “La Exacta”, and to suppress it.

 

80.     In coming together in a trade union to carry out union activities, the workers had embarked on an initiative protected by Article 16 of the Convention. The Government agents, who worked with the owners of the estate, punished with the severest sanction possible, the decision of the workers of Finca “La Exacta” to form a trade union organization, by killing three men, seriously wounding 11 others and endangering the lives and security of an entire group of persons. The reprisals taken against the union activities and the suppression of the trade union movement constitute a violation of Article 16.

 

3.      Rights of the child

 

81.     Article 19 of the Convention provides that “every minor child has the right to the measures of protection required by his condition as a minor”. In the raid of August 24, 1994 the Guatemalan police agents used excessive force against a group of persons that included minors. As noted above, the Guatemalan security forces recognized in the plan prepared before August 24, 1994 that minors would be present during the raid on the estate. Since minors are particularly vulnerable, the international norms and Article 19 of the Convention require that special measures be taken to prevent them from being victims of violence. [51] Despite this, in this case, the plan of the security forces for the raid did not provide for any protective measure whatsoever to be taken for the children who would be present. The Government therefore violated Article 19 of the Convention.

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