By means of a submission presented to the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (hereafter “the IACHR”, “the Commission”, or
“the Inter-American Commission”), on August 28, 1997, the
nongovernmental organization Asociación
Pro Derechos Humanos [Association for Human Rights], APRODEH, charged
that the Republic of Peru (hereafter "Peru", "the
State" or "the Peruvian State") violated the right to
effective judicial protection enshrined in Article 25 of the American
Convention on Human Rights (hereafter "the Convention" or
"the American Convention"), to the prejudice of Mr. César
Cabrejos Bernuy, by failing to carry out rulings of the Supreme Court of
Justice and the Second Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court Justice of Lima,
which on two occasions had ordered his reinstatement to the position of
Colonel of the National Police of Peru, and with respect to which the
authorities twice reinstated the petitioner in his position, but then
immediately forced him into retirement, reproducing in each case the
respective administrative order. The
IACHR concludes that Peru has violated Article 25 and 1(1) of the
Convention, and makes the pertinent recommendations to the Peruvian State.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
On September 2, 1997, the Commission opened the case, transmitted
the pertinent portions of the complaint to the Peruvian State, and
requested information within a period of 90 days.
Peru responded in December 3, 1997.
The Commission sent the petitioner the pertinent portions of the
State's response on Dec. 17, 1997. The
petitioner did not submit any observations to the State's response.
On May 4, 1999, during its 103rd regular session, the IACHR adopted
Admissibility Report Nº 75/99 on the present case.
The Commission sent the Admissibility Report to the parties on May
12, 1999, and placed itself at their disposal in order to seek a friendly
settlement to the case.
On July 23, 1999, the State denied any responsibility in the case
and rejected the offer of friendly settlement.
The Commission advised the petitioner of this response on August
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
Position of the petitioner
The petitioner maintains that Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy had 22
years of service in the National Police of Peru, when, on July 31, 1990,
he was sent into retirement, because of a presumed replacement of
personnel, together with 94 other colonels of the National Police.
The petitioner declares that this retirement took place in the
context of a widespread publicity campaign in the mass media, in which the
retirement of these officers was presented as a moral instruction thereby
affecting the right of Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy to his honor and good
Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy appealed the decision to remove him from
his post, by means of an administrative appeal, followed by a judicial
appeal, filling an amparo suit
which was accepted by the Constitutional and Social Chamber of the Supreme
Court of Justice in a ruling handed down on June 5, 1992.
This decision ordered the reinstatement of Mr. César Cabrejos
The petitioner maintains that, despite repeated requests to the
judicial branch to enforce the sentence, efforts that included intervening
with the Congress, the judicial order was not carried out.
It indicates that on December 28, 1995, by means of Supreme
Resolution Nº 1389-95-IN/PNP, the National Police ordered the
reinstatement of Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy on active duty, effective
December 27 of that year.
The petitioner alleges that, nevertheless, by Supreme Resolution Nº
1445-95-IN/PNP of December 29, 1995, the National Police once again placed
Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy in retirement, as of December 27, 1995, with
the same excuse, i.e. replacement of personnel.
In the face of this situation, Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy turned
first to the Fifth Civil Court of Lima and later to the Second Civil
Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Lima, which on May 7, 1996,
issued a ruling declaring inapplicable the second administrative
resolution that had once again placed him in retirement.
petitioner declares that, subsequently, Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy was
reinstated by Supreme Resolution Nº 0227-97-IN/PNP of March 19, 1997.
Nevertheless, by Supreme Resolution Nº 0234-97-IN/PNP of March 26
of that same year, he was once again placed in retirement, for the reason
of replacement of personnel.
petitioner charges that the situation constitutes a clear and reiterated
failure to abide by judicial decisions, thereby violating Mr. César
Cabrejos Bernuy's right to effective judicial protection, as enshrined in
Article 25 of the American Convention.
Position of the State
State maintains that it has not violated the right to effective judicial
protection in the case of Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy.
It declares that it has not failed to enforce the ruling of the
Constitutional and Social Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of June
5, 1992. According to the State, "Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy was
reinstated in active service by means of Supreme Resolution Nº
0227-97-IN/PNP of March 19, 1997, pursuant to the judicial order
suspending the effects of the administrative order that had placed him in
for the Peruvian State this judicial ruling was not considered as
preventing the respective authority from issuing another order of
State indicates that retirement as a result of replacement of officers, as
in the present case, is expressly permitted in Article 53 of Legislative
Decree Nº 745 of 1999, which provides that "in order to ensure the
constant renewal of senior personnel, officers may be placed in retirement
status, in accordance with needs as determined by the National
State alleges that the last decision to place Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy
in retirement, Supreme Resolution Nº 0234/97 of March 26, 1997, has not
been challenged, and that therefore he must present a new writ amparo
against that third resolution, as he did against the previous two, in
order to exhaust domestic remedies.
Competence and Admissibility
competence of the Commission to hear this case and the admissibility of
the petition under analysis have already been established in Admissibility
Report Nº 75/99, which the Commission approved during its 103rd regular
Facts of the Case
Commission notes that the parties do not dispute the facts of the present
case. Consequently, the IACHR
considers it established that Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy, a colonel in the
National Police of Peru, was placed in retirement on July 31, 1990. He
challenged the retirement order, through the administrative route and
subsequently through the judicial route, by bringing an amparo
suit before the Constitutional and Social Chamber of the Supreme Court of
Justice, which was accepted on June 5, 1992 in a ruling that ordered the
reinstatement of Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy in his position as an officer
of the National Police of Peru.
December 28, 1995, i.e. more than three years after the reinstatement
ruling issued by the Supreme Court of Justice, the National Police of
Peru, by means of Supreme Resolution Nº 1389-95-IN/PNP, ordered the
reinstatement of Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy in active service as of
December 27 of that year. Immediately,
however, by means of Supreme Resolution Nº 1445-95-IN/PNP of December 29,
1995, the National Police once again placed Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy in
retirement status, as of December 27 1995, for the same grounds, i.e.
replacement of personnel.
the situation, Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy appealed first to the Fifth
Civil Court of Lima and subsequently to a Superior Court.
The latter court declared the second administrative decision of
December 29, 1995, placing him once again in retirement, to be
inapplicable, and by virtue of this decision the National Police again
reinstated Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy, by means of Supreme Resolution Nº
0227-97-IN/PNP of March 19, 1997. A
few days later, however, by means of Supreme Resolution Nº 0234-97-IN/PNP
of March 26 of that year, the National Police of Peru once more placed Mr.
César Cabrejos Bernuy in retirement status, for the same grounds, i.e.
replacement of personnel.
Considerations of Law
there is no dispute over the facts of the case, the Commission will now
declare its position on the substance of the matter, which is to determine
whether the alleged failure to carry out the ruling of the Supreme Court
of Justice of Peru, of June 5, 1992, ordering the reinstatement of Mr. César
Cabrejos Bernuy in his position as a colonel in the National Police of
Peru, constituted a violation by the Peruvian State of the right to effect
of judicial protection enshrined in Article 25 of the American Convention.
enforceability of rights and liberties in a democratic system requires a
juridical and institutional order in which laws override the discretion of
governments and in which there is control of some institutions by others,
i.e., in which the rule of law exists.
"Declaration of Santiago," adopted in 1959 by the Fifth Meeting
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of member States of the
OAS, noted that "the principal of the prevalence of law must be
ensured through the independence of the branches of government and
surveillance over the legality of acts of government by jurisdictional
organs of the State."
the inter-American system of human rights, the proper functioning of the
judicial branch is an essential element for preventing the abuse of power
by other State organs, and therefore, for the protection of human rights.
The fundamental corollary of human rights is the possibility to
turn to judicial bodies for the enforcement of rights.
The judicial branch is undeniably the fundamental organ for the
protection of human rights.
the judicial branch is to serve effectively as an organ for the control,
guarantee and protection of human rights, it must not only be constituted
formally, but it also has to be independent and impartial, and its rulings
must be carried out. This
constitutes a right that member states of the OAS, and in particular
States Parties to the American Convention, have the obligation to respect
and to guarantee for all persons under their jurisdiction.
execution of sentences of the judicial branch is intimately linked,
therefore, with the very concept of the judicial function of the State.
The principle of that function is to ensure social peace
and harmony by seeing
to the enforcement of law and guaranteeing judicial order and individual
liberty in concrete cases, by means of decisions that are binding on the
parties to the proceedings. The
corollary of the jurisdictional function is that judicial decisions must
be carried out, in either a voluntary or coercive manner, with the
assistance of the forces of public order if necessary.
Failure to carry out judicial rulings not only affects juridical
security but also threatens the essential principles of the rule of law.
Ensuring the execution of judicial judgments thus constitutes a
fundamental aspect that is the very essence of the rule of law.
American Convention establishes the following:
25. Judicial Protection
Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other
effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection
against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the
Constitution or laws of the State concerned or by this Convention, even
though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the
course of their official duties.
The States Parties undertake:
To ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his
rights determined by the competent authority provided for by the legal
system of the State;
To develop the possibilities of judicial remedies; and
ensure that the competent authority shall enforce such remedies when
importance of the right to judicial protection has been reiterated by the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights on various occasions. It
has ruled, for example, that this right "constitutes one of the basic
pillars, not only of the American Convention, but of the rule of law
itself in a democratic society in the sense of the Convention."
Inter-American Court has also indicated, with respect to compliance by
States with the obligation assumed under Article 25 of the Convention,
remedy that proves illusory because of the general conditions prevailing
in the country, or even the particular circumstances of a given case,
cannot be considered effective. This
could be the case, for example, when practice has shown its
ineffectiveness: when the judicial power lacks the necessary independence
to render impartial decisions or the means to carry out its judgments; or
any other situation that constitutes a denial of justice, as when there is
an unjustified delay in the decision, or when, for any reason, the alleged
victim is denied access to a judicial remedy.
25 of the Convention refers directly to the criterion of effectiveness of
the judicial remedy, which is not exhausted by the ruling on the substance
of the case, but by the enforcement of such ruling.
In this respect, Juan Manuel Campo Cabal has noted, with respect to
the criterion of effectiveness of judicial remedy, that
effectiveness of the sentence must be seen as a guarantee for persons
subject to the administration of the State.
The State must, by all the means available to it, not only provide
a jurisdictional forum for its citizens to hear any complaints that they
wish to bring before a court, but must also guarantee in some manner that
the effects of the ruling will be implemented, since otherwise we would be
faced with the clear ineffectiveness of the right to jurisdictional
effectiveness of the remedy, as a right, is precisely what is enshrined in
the final clause of Article 25 of the Convention, which establishes the
obligation of the State to guarantee the enforcement of decisions when
such remedies are granted. This
obligation is the culmination of the fundamental right to judicial
obligation of the State to guarantee the enforcement of judicial rulings
takes on special importance when it is the State itself that must carry
out the ruling, whether this is to be done through the executive,
legislative or judicial branch, at the provincial or municipal level,
through the central administration or the decentralized structure, through
public enterprises or institutes, or any similar body, since such bodies
are part of the State and generally enjoy procedural privileges, such as
freedom from embargo for their assets.
These bodies may be inclined to use their power and their
privileges in an effort to ignore judicial rulings that go against them.
Public Defender of Peru, who prepared a report on non-enforcement of
rulings by the State administration and Peru, noted in that report that:
it is left to the discretion of the administration to carry out sentences,
the very notion of the rule of law is at risk, and conditions are created
for a regime that is arbitrary and unpredictable, contrary to
constitutional principles such as the separation of powers or the autonomy
of the judicial branch. In
turn, this violates the right to equality that all parties to the
proceedings must enjoy, by subordinating the execution of the ruling to
the will of one of the parties, paradoxically the losing party.
an organ of the State does not wish to carry out a judicial ruling that
has gone against it, it may try to ignore the ruling by simply failing to
observe it, or it may opt for more or less elaborate methods that will
lead to the same objective of rendering the ruling ineffective, while
trying to maintain a certain appearance of formal validity in its
such method is known as the "reproduction or reissue of
administrative acts," which consists of "formal reproduction by
the administration of administrative acts identical to those that were set
aside or provisionally suspended by the administrative judge."
The IACHR considers it relevant, by way of illustration, to analyze
this notion in comparative law.
interesting example with respect to the legislative treatment of this
notion is found in Colombian legislation, where the Código
Contencioso Administrativo [Administrative Disputes Code] establishes
act that has been annulled or suspended may be reproduced by the person
who issued it if it retains the same essential features as the one
annulled or suspended, unless, subsequent to the ruling, the legal
foundations for the annulment or suspension have disappeared.
effects of any such act taken in violation of the foregoing precepts must
be suspended provisionally. The suspension order, in this case, must be communicated and
respected immediately, even if an appeal is brought
other legislation, such as that of Spain, the law does not regulate the
matter expressly, but does so indirectly through general standards
applicable to cases of reissue of administrative acts.
Thus, law 29 of 1998, Regulations Governing the Administrative
Disputes Jurisdiction, declares that "acts and provisions contrary to
court rulings are automatically null and void, if they are issued for the
purpose of avoiding compliance."
That is to say, administrative acts that reproduce acts set aside
by a judicial ruling are considered null and void from the outset, by the
simple fact that they are contrary to a ruling and their ultimate purpose
is to avoid complying with a ruling.
the other hand, there are countries where the issue of the reproduction of
administrative acts is not regulated expressly by legislation, but has
been the object of study by doctrine and jurisprudence.
Venezuela, for example, is one of the countries with interesting
jurisprudence in this area. The
Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela has explained that the reproduction
or reissue of administrative acts occurs when:
new act is issued by a public authority that is identical in its content
and purpose to one previously issued by the same authority, or by another
within its own sphere of competence, the objective of which reflects the
presumed intent of the body issuing the act to reaffirm the contents of
its original decision, when the mechanisms for exercising control over
legitimacy before the competent body have already produced a decision.
Venezuelan Supreme Court Justice has indicated, with respect to this
the administration is faced with a ruling against it by a court, and
attempts to ignore its duty by issuing a new act that, while different to
the one rejected, reproduces the same effect and has the same purpose, the
court, at the request of the affected party, may and must, as an extension
of its original decision, declare the suspension or annulment of the new
act and order the public entity to fulfill the ruling in its entirety.
(…) If the following
assumptions pertain, the effects of a ruling may extend to a distinct, but
essentially similar, act from that originally challenged: a) if the act
reproduced contains the essence of the provision or provisions suspended;
b) if the reasons underlying the judicial decision have not disappeared;
c) if the act reproduced has been issued by the same authority; and d) if
the applicant has been party to the initial proceedings.
IACHR must stress that the study of the doctrine and jurisprudence on the
institution of reproduction or reissue of administrative acts appears to
indicate that, in principle, extension of the suspension or nullity of the
act reproduced requires a judicial declaration, since administrative acts
enjoy the presumption of legality. The
presumption of legality requires that all administrative acts be
considered legal and valid unless declared otherwise by a court.
Therefore, if an administrative act is to be deemed null, it must
have been declared as such by the administrative disputes jurisdiction or
its equivalent, and this requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the
entire act, even if such act is a reproduction of an act already declared
null and void.
the Commission notes that the appeal for nullity is only meaningful to the
extent that the administration does not continuously avoid fulfillment of
the ruling, since if the administration fails repeatedly to respect the
judicial decision, by constantly issuing new administrative acts, and if
the interested party must enter a new objection every time, this would
tend toward an interminable cycle of ineffective appeals that, far from
protecting rights, would place the right to effective protection in
jeopardy. Therefore, in terms
of Article 25 of the American Convention, the IACHR considers that when
administrative acts, once annulled, are repeatedly reissued, the
presumption of legality of such acts disappears in favor of the
individual's right to effective judicial protection.
writer José María del Castillo Velasco notes, with respect to the limits
on administrative authority, that these
indicated by the laws, by the indisputable principles of justice and by
the needs that the public power must satisfy with respect to its
administration, and above all by a profound respect for liberty and the
rights of the individual and of the people.
light of the foregoing, the reissue of administrative acts clearly
represents a failure to comply with a ruling that the State wishes to
reissue of administrative acts has to do with the abuse of power, which
has already been analyzed by the IACHR in previous cases, including one
related to the persecution of an individual though successive inspections,
the bringing of nine criminal charges, and the issuing of seven detention
orders against him.
In this respect, the Commission pointed to the concept of abuse of
power described by the French author Alibert, as:
deed of an administrative agent who, acting within his competence and
respecting the requirements of legislation, uses his power in cases, for
reasons and purposes other than those for which that power was conferred
upon him,… or to retain the form of jurisprudence, or for a purpose
other than the public interest or the good of the service.
Violation of the right to judicial protection
25 of the American Convention, quoted above, establishes the right of any
person to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to
a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his
fundamental rights recognized by the Constitution or laws of the State
concerned or by this Convention, and also requires that States must
"insure that the competent authority shall enforce such remedies when
Commission considers the facts of the present case to constitute a clear
violation by the Peruvian State, to the prejudice of Mr. César Cabrejos
Bernuy, of the right to judicial protection enshrined in Article 25(c) of
the American Convention, whereby Peru undertook to "ensure that the
competent authority shall enforce such remedies when granted".
In fact, although Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy had access to a remedy
that resulted in a ruling by the Supreme Court of Justice on June 5, 1992,
ordering his reinstatement as a colonel in the National Police of Peru,
the State failed to guarantee the enforcement of the decision.
repetitions produced on December 29, 1995, and March 19, 1997, of the
administrative act of July 31, 1990, whereby Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy
was sent into retirement, have prevented real execution of the judicial
order for reinstatement, of June 5, 1992.
Such actions imply a clear situation of repetition or reissue of an
administrative act, explained above, whereby the Peruvian State, through
the National Police of Peru, has evaded its duty to carry out the ruling
of the Supreme Court of Justice of June 5, 1992, ordering the
reinstatement of Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy in his position as a colonel
of the National Police of Peru.
subsequent to the ruling of the Supreme Court Justice the National Police
of Peru issued two supreme resolutions reinstating Mr. César Cabrejos
Bernuy, that reinstatement never materialized in practice, because he
never returned to his position. The
continued reproduction of resolutions of removal issued by the
administration have constituted continuous evasion of the judicial ruling.
Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy has been obliged to take action against
two identical retirement orders, and although he was successful in both
cases, the State organ proceeded to issue a third resolution identical to
the previous ones. The IACHR
considers that it would be useless for Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy to
continue appealing this latest decision, when the administration has shown
in its actions that if he did so, it would simply issue a new resolution
of identical content. This
attitude on the part of the National Police of Peru constitutes an affront
to the judicial branch and makes it absolutely unnecessary to insist that
the victim continue with judicial proceedings that, as already
demonstrated, have failed to remedy his situation.
this respect, it should be noted that it was precisely because of the
ineffectiveness of domestic remedies that the IACHR stated in its report
on the admissibility of the case that:
the case under study, the State maintains that in order to exhaust
domestic remedies the victim must attempt bring a new appeal for
protection against the third retirement order. The IACHR considers this argument to be groundless.
In fact, the petitioner's complaint does not refer to the third
retirement order against Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy, issued on March 26,
1997, but against the continued failure of the State to carry out the
ruling of the Constitutional and Social Chamber of the Supreme Court of
Justice dated June 5, 1992, which ordered his reinstatement.
The Commission considers that the present case is consistent with the
exception contemplated in Article 46(2)(a) of the Convention, whereby the
requirement of exhaustion of local remedies called for in Article 46(1)(a)
of the Convention is not applicable when "the domestic legislation of
the State concerned does not afford due process of law for the protection
of the right or rights that have allegedly been violated."
IACHR notes that the report entitled "Noncompliance with rulings on
the part of the State administration" prepared by the Public Defender
more than 50 percent of complaints (58 percent) relate to the disregard of
judicial orders of a labor nature. Of
this number, more than half refer to the failure to enforce judicial
rulings ordering the reinstatement of claimants in their respective jobs.
Violation of the duty to respect and guarantee rights
Commission also concludes that the violation by the Peruvian State of the
right to judicial protection enshrined in the American Convention, to the
prejudice of Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy, implies violation of Article 1(1)
of the American Convention, because it implies failure of the State to
fulfill its obligation to respect the rights and liberties recognized in
the Convention and to guarantee their full and free exercise to all
persons within its jurisdiction, as established in Article 1(1) of the
V. ACTION SUBSEQUENT TO REPORT Nº 4/00
51. On March 7, 2000, at its 106th regular session, the Commission adopted Report Nº 4/00 (Article 50) on this case. On March 9, 2000, that report, together with the Commission's recommendations, was transmitted to the Peruvian State, which was given a period of two months from the date of transmittal of the report to comply with the recommendations thereof. The State did not report to the Commission by the established deadline on compliance with the report's recommendations.
Under Article 51(1) of the Convention, what the Commission must
determine at this stage of the proceedings is whether the State has
settled the matter. In that
connection, the IACHR observes that the Peruvian State has not shown
evidence of compliance with any of the recommendations made by the
Commission in the aforementioned Report Nº 4/00.
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission concludes that the
Peruvian State has continually failed to comply with the ruling of the
Supreme Court of Justice of Peru, dated July 5, 1992, which ordered the
reinstatement of Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy to his post as a colonel in
the National Police of Peru, and thereby has violated Mr. Cabrejos
Bernuy's right to judicial protection, enshrined in Article 25 of the
American Convention, and failed to fulfill its general duty to respect
and ensure the rights of all
persons subject to its jurisdiction, enshrined in Article 1(1) of the
the basis of the foregoing analysis and the conclusions of this report,
THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS RECOMMENDS TO THE
PERUVIAN STATE THE FOLLOWING:
To offer adequate compensation to Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy,
pursuant to Article 63 of the American Convention, including the moral
aspect as well as the material one, for the violation of his human rights,
and in particular,
To carry out the Judicial Order issued by the Constitutional and
Social Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice on June 5, 1992,
reinstating Mr. César Cabrejos Bernuy in his position as Colonel in the
National Police, paying him his salary and other remuneration owing to him
but not paid since the date of his enforced retirement, and granting him
all other benefits to which he is entitled as a Colonel of the Police,
including, as appropriate, those relating to his pension; or, as a second
resort, to pay him the salary and other remuneration to which he would be
entitled as a Colonel of the National Police, until he is of legal
retirement age, paying also in this case his retroactive salary from the
date of his forced retirement, and granting him all the other economic
benefits to which, as a Colonel of the National Police, he is entitled,
including, as appropriate, those relating to his pension.
To conduct a full, impartial, and effective investigation of the
facts, in order to establish responsibilities for the failure to carry out
the ruling of the Supreme Court of Justice of June 5, 1992, and to pursue
such criminal, administrative, and other procedures as necessary to apply
the appropriate punishment to those responsible, as befits the gravity of
the violations in question.
October 3, 2000 the Commission transmitted Report 60/00--the text of which
precedes--to the Peruvian State and to petitioners, in accordance to
Article 51(2) of the Convention, and granted Peru an additional period to
comply with the recommendations set out above.
On November 16, 2000, Peru forwarded the Commission a note in which
did not state that it had taken any action towards compliance with the
recommendations made by the Commission.
to the above considerations, and Articles 51(3) of the American Convention
and 48 of the Commission’s Regulations, the Commission decides to
reiterate the conclusion and recommendations set forth in chapters VI and
VII above; to make public the present report and include it in its Annual
Report to the OAS General Assembly. The Commission, according to the norms
contained in the instruments which govern its mandate, will continue
evaluating the measures adopted by the Peruvian State with respect to the
above recommendations until they have been complied with by the Peruvian
and signed in the city of Washington, D.C., on the 7th day of the month of
March, 2001 (Signed): Claudio Grossman, Chairman; Juan Méndez, First
Vice-Chairman; : Marta Altolaguirre, Second Vice-Chair; Commissioners,
Robert K. Goldman, Peter Laurie, and Julio Prado Vallejo.
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 IACHR, Annual Report, Report on Paraguay, paragraphs
50 and 51.
 Vescovi, Enrique, Teoria
General del Proceso, Editorial Temis, Bogota, 1984, page. 120.
 Emphasis added.
 See for example, I-A Court, Judicial guaranties in states of emergency, Advisory Opinion OC-9/87
of October 6, 1987, Series A Nº 9, para. 24; Suarez Rosero case, judgment of November 12, 1997, Series C Nº 35,
paras 61-66; Loayza Tamayo case,
judgment of September 17, 1997, Series C Nº 33, paras. 52-55; and Habeas
Corpus under suspension of guarantees, Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of
October 6, 1987, Series A Nº 8, para.32.
 I-A Court, Suarez
Rosero case, Judgment of November 12, 1997, Series C Nº 35, paras
 I-A Court, Judicial
guaranties in states of emergency, Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of
October 6, 1987, Series A Nº 9, para. 24.
 Campo Cabal, Juan Manuel, Medidas Cautelares en el Contencioso Administrativo, Editorial Temis,
Bogota, 1989, pp 1-4.
 Public Defender, Incumplimiento
de Sentencias por parte da la Administracion Estatal, Lima,
October 1998, page 5.
 Ortiz-Alvarez, Luis A., La Proteccion Cautelar en el Contencioso Administrativo, Editorial
Sherwood, Caracas, 1999, page 605.
 Colombian Administrative
Disputes Code, Article 15.
 Law 29 of 1998, Regulations governing the Spanish
Administrative Disputes Jurisdiction, Article 103.
 Supreme Court of Justice, Political-Administrative
Chamber, Judgment Nº 572 of 16 August 1997.
 Supreme Court of Justice, Political-Administrative
Chamber, Judgment Nº 648 of 10 October 1996.
 Del Castillo Velasco, José Maria, Ensayo
sobre el Derecho Administrativo Mexicano, UNAM, Mexico City, 1994,
 IACHR, Annual Report 1996, Report Nº 43/96 – Jose
Francisco Gallardo, Case 11.430 (Mexico).
 Alibert, Le
controle jurisdictionnel de l’Administration, Paris, 1926, p.
236, quoted in IACHR, Annual Report 1996, Report Nº 43/96, op. cit.
 IACHR, Report Nº 75/99 – Cesar Cabrejos Bernuy,
Case 11.800 (Peru)
 Public Defender, Incumplimiento
de Sentencias por parte da la Administracion Estatal, Lima,
October 1998, pages 1 and 6.