...continued 65.
In its annual reports for 1990-1991 and 1991, the Commission
expressed grave concern over extrajudicial executions and torture in
Guatemala and the judiciary’s inability to respond.[11]
The Commission went on to note that the judicial proceedings in
connection with such violations typically are not an “exhaustive
investigation that seeks to identify and penalize the guilty parties in
accordance with the gravity of the acts.”[12]
66.
The United Nations Independent Expert for Guatemala described the
response of the national police and the judiciary to violations of the
right to life during that period as “highly unsatisfactory.”[13]
In the case of judicial investigations, “in most cases the courts or the
security agencies did not succeed in identifying the culprits.
In the few cases in which the presumed culprits are identified, no
judicial penalty is imposed, thereby allowing the feeling of impunity to
persist.”[14]
67.
The Commission for Historical Clarification said as much when it
asserted that in the 1986-1996 period “the courts were incapable of
investigating, indicting, prosecuting and punishing even a handful of
those responsible for the most heinous human rights crimes, or of
affording the victims protection.”[15]
It said that “because of its deliberate or provoked inefficacy,
the country’s judicial system failed to guarantee compliance with the
law; it tolerated and even abetted the violence…”.[16] 68.
As this Commission has already reported, and as other reliable
sources have confirmed, during that period fear was widespread not just
among the population affected by the human rights violations but also
among judges and other officers of the court.
The result was that aggrieved parties or their agents did not have
real access to the remedies under domestic law.
In its 1989-1990 report, the Commission found that “judges of
this system simply do not conduct thorough investigations because they
have been terrorized by what has happened to others who have performed
investigations and acted bravely against terrorism.
As a result, these judges have become victims…”[17]
Similarly, the Commission for Historical Clarification found that a number
of the individuals who participated in judicial proceedings were
threatened and attacked, which precipitated an atmosphere of intimidation
and “exacerbated the courts’ inaction and impunity.”[18]
69.
With circumstances as they were, the remedies under Guatemalan
domestic law were neither adequate nor effective during the period when
the events alleged occurred. A remedy is adequate when its function within
the domestic legal system is suitable to address an infringement of a
legal right.[19]
As for the efficacy of a remedy, the Court has held that a remedy is
effective when it is “capable of producing the result for which it was
designed. Procedural
requirements can make the remedy of habeas corpus ineffective: it is
powerless to compel the authorities; if it presents a danger to those who
invoke it; or if it is not impartially applied.”[20]
The Court has also held that “[I]t is a different matter,
however, when it is shown that remedies are denied for trivial reasons or
without an examination of the merits, or if there is proof of the
existence of a practice or policy ordered or tolerated by the government,
the effect of which is to impede certain persons from invoking internal
remedies that would normally be available to others.
In such cases, resort to those remedies becomes a senseless
formality. The exceptions of
Article 46(2) would be fully applicable to those situations and would
discharge the obligations to exhaust internal remedies since they cannot
fulfill their objectives in that case.”[21] 70.
As for the State’s argument that many of the situations described
in case 11.198 were never reported to the local authorities and therefore
the remedies under domestic law had not been exhausted, the Commission has
observed that the atmosphere among the Guatemalan people at that time was
one of widespread fear.[22]
The United Nations Independent Expert for Guatemala found at the time that
“the main feature of Guatemalan society today is still the state of fear
in which everybody lives.”[23]
Victims of human rights violations, their families and friends were
often afraid to denounce the violations in court and, “in the few cases
in which an investigation was launched, many witnesses and attorneys
refused to participate in open proceedings against members of the Army or
any other State institution.”[24]
Then, too, “[m]any judges were forced to give up their
independence as the first step to avoid being killed.”[25]
71.
This widespread fear of bringing complaints in courts at the time
was all the greater in cases involving acts perpetrated by Civil Patrols
or military commissioners, given the social phenomenon that their
existence represented and the manner in which these organizations operated
and acted. As will be explained later in this report, the main purpose of
the PAC was to marshal the civil populace against the guerrilla movements
and to gain physical and psychological control over the population.[26]
The physical and psychological control that the PAC exerted over the
communities in which they operated and their link to the army created a
fear, especially in rural areas, of filing complaints with the authorities
concerning the human rights violations the PACs committed. Those who did dare to report them were immediately classified
as guerrilla sympathizers at best and hostile to the army; they were
thought of as targets of reprisals, and frequently were. 72.
With circumstances as they were, the victims of human rights
violations, their relatives and friends who did not file complaints in the
domestic courts were afraid, since it could be perilous for them.
For this reason, the Commission concludes that de
facto circumstances rendered the remedies ineffectual, thus triggering
the exception contemplated in Article 46(2) of the Convention. The interested parties are therefore discharged from their
obligation under the rule requiring exhaustion of the remedies under
domestic law. The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights has held that the rule requiring
exhaustion of domestic remedies does not demand that a remedy be invoked
when the remedy has no chance of prospering or when to do so would put the
petitioner’s life in jeopardy.[27] 73.
The Commission therefore finds that in the period during which the
events occurred, the judicial system in Guatemala was not an effective
tool for protecting the fundamental rights of the citizenry; instead, in
many cases it became a fundamental link in creating the prevailing climate
of impunity. Furthermore, at
the time there was widespread fear of denouncing human rights violations,
since complainants could face terrible consequences. One can conclude,
therefore, that de facto
circumstances were present that prevented the aggrieved and their agents
from availing themselves of the remedies under domestic law.
Hence, those remedies did not have to be exhausted.
For that reason, and because those internal remedies that were
instituted have been subject to unwarranted delay, the Commission
concludes that the exception to the rule requiring exhaustion of local
remedies established in Article 46 of the Convention does not apply. 2. Deadline
for presentation 74.
According to Article 46(1)(b) of the Convention, petitions must be
lodged within six months from the date on which the party alleging
violation of his rights was notified of the final judgment handed down at
the domestic level. This rule
guarantees legal certainty and stability once a decision is adopted.
Absent a final judgment, as in the cases covered in this report,
Article 46(2) stipulates that the six-month rule does not apply when there
is no final judgment because due process was not afforded, access to
remedies under domestic law was denied or a final judgment has been unduly
delayed. In such cases,
Article 38 of the Commission’s Regulations stipulates that the deadline
for presentation of a petition “shall be within a reasonable period of
time, in the Commission’s judgment, as from the date on which the
alleged violation of rights has occurred, considering the circumstances of
each specific case." 75.
The Commission considers that with the climate of fear prevalent
among the people at that time and because of the impunity and the
inefficacy of the judicial system for investigation of the human rights
violations and punishment of the guilty parties, the petitions in these
cases were presented on time and within a reasonable period of time.
Considering these factors, the Commission finds that the rule
requiring timely presentation was fulfilled. 3. Characterization
of the facts alleged 76.
Under Article 47 of the American Convention, a petition is
inadmissible if it does not meet the requirements stipulated in Article
46, or if it (1) does not state facts that tend to establish a violation,
or (2) is manifestly groundless. Each of the cases under study concerns, inter
alia, extrajudicial execution, unlawful detention, and an attempt
against the physical integrity of one or more persons, perpetrated by
Civil Patrolmen or military commissioners, organizations acting under the
auspices and with the tolerance of the State, as will be shown.
Because these aspects of the petitions do not appear to be without
grounds or out of order, the Commission considers them admissible in
accordance with the requirements established in Article 47(b) and (c) of
the American Convention. 4. Duplication
of proceedings and res judicata
77.
Nothing in the case file suggests that the subject of the petition
is pending in another international proceeding for settlement or that it
is substantially the same as one previously examined by the Commission or
by another international organization.
Therefore, the requirements stipulated in Articles 46(1)(c) and
47(d) of the Convention are satisfied. IV. FRIENDLY
SETTLEMENT 78.
In accordance with Article 48(1)(f) of the Convention, in each of
the cases under examination, the Commission placed itself at the disposal
of the interested parties with a view to finding a friendly settlement
based on respect for the human rights upheld in the American Convention. None of the parties expressed any interest in instituting the
procedure within the time frame given.
Therefore, since the parties were given the opportunity to avail
themselves of the procedure and effectively declined it, the Commission
will now examine the merits of the matter in this report. V. ANALYSIS
OF THE MERITS
A. Initial
considerations 79.
As previously stated, the Commission decided to combine the cases
under study in this report, since the facts alleged by the petitioners are
extrajudicial executions and attempted extrajudicial executions alleged to
have been committed by members of the so called Civil Patrols or military
commissioners, all under similar circumstances and within the same time
period. This analysis
cannot discount the overall scenario as regards the right to life during
the period in question and the social phenomenon that the Civil Patrols
represented in Guatemala. 80. Violations of the right to life in the form of extrajudicial executions and assaults perpetrated by agents of the State were common in Guatemala from 1990 to 1992. This section is a general account of the origin, objectives and functioning of the PACs, the extrajudicial executions during that period, and a brief examination of the characteristics of that practice and the types of persons selected as victims. 1. The
Civil Patrols (PAC)[28] 81.
The Civil Patrols emerged in the early 1980s as groups of civilians
organized “forcibly by the military, which wanted to isolate the
guerrilla movement and control its communities.”[29]
In April 1983, Government Agreement 222-83 legally recognized them
by creating the Office of the National Chief of Civil Defense Coordination
and Control.[30]
82.
Under that agreement, the PAC were hierarchically subordinate to
the military authorities. The first paragraph in the preamble of the
Agreement states that “to protect the honorable and hardworking people
of the country from the destruction wrought by the subversive movement,
the Guatemalan Army has organized the PAC, especially among the towns in
the country’s interior.” The second paragraph of the preamble states
that “in order to regulate the organization, operation and control of
the PAC, the proper head office must be created with nationwide
jurisdiction. The necessary
legal document so ordering must be decreed to that end.” Article 2 states that the Minister of National Defense will
issue a body of regulations and the orders he deems appropriate to
organize and operate the head office created under that decree.[31] 83.
In 1986, under Decree Law 19-86, the PAC came to be called
“Voluntary Civil Defense Committees.” As noted, “the change was in
name only, since the purpose of these organizations continued to be the
same; they continued to be part of the Army’s counterinsurgency effort
and their members remained entirely answerable to the military.”[32]
The United Nations Independent Expert for Guatemala found that
“Contrary to what is indicated by the official name of the Voluntary
Self-defense Committees, many inhabitants of the rural areas continue to
be compelled to join the ranks of what are in fact patrols, which have
become an institutionalized element of uncontrollable violence…”[33] 84.
Decree 143-96 officially disbanded the PACs in 1996, pursuant to
the “Agreement on the Strengthening of the Civil Authority and Function
of the Army in a Democratic Society.”[34]
85.
The PACs were thus a paramilitary force, established by law, and
always answerable to the Army. “Their
operations were always planned and controlled by the military.”[35] 86.
The main objectives of the PAC were to marshal the civilian
population against the guerrilla movements and to gain physical and
psychological control over the population. The PAC phenomenon thus had an
enormous impact on Guatemalan social structures, especially in rural areas
where the majority are indigenous people.[36] 87.
The Guatemalan population was heavily involved in the PAC system.
“There are no official figures on the number of men in the PAC. However, around 1982-1983 they numbered some 900,000 campesinos
between the ages of 15 and 60; this was some 80% of the male population in
indigenous rural areas. Under the administration of Vinicio Cerezo
(1986-1990) PAC membership dropped to 500,000, and was at around 375,000
by the time of their dissolution.”[37]
88.
The members of the PAC, known as “patrulleros”
[patrolmen], were answerable to the patrol officer or chief.
The vast majority of these patrol officers or chiefs were appointed
by the military commanders in their jurisdictions.
Pro-military communities nominated their own patrol chiefs.
In either case, however, “the appointment had to be cleared by
the military commander for the area.” “Patrolmen were registered by
means of an identification card issued at the military posts.” The army supplied the patrolmen with military instruction,
ideological indoctrination and arms.
The patrolmen worked with the army as informants, in pursuits, in
counterinsurgency operations, captures, interrogations, torture and
extrajudicial executions.[38] 89.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated the following
in this regard: …
the civil patrols enjoyed an institutional relationship with the Army,
performed activities in support of the armed forces’ functions, and,
moreover, received resources, weapons, training and direct orders from the
Guatemalan Army and operated under its supervision.
A number of human rights violations, including summary and
extrajudicial executions and forced disappearances of persons, have been
attributed to those patrols.[39] 90.
While on paper membership was voluntary, in practice recruitment
was often done by force; PAC membership at times became a survival
mechanism for the civilian population.[40]
“People were pressured into joining the PAC by means of coercion,
accusations and death threats, even against family members. These threats
were the most effective mechanism in enlisting men from the communities
and then using those men to put into place a system for controlling
families. The system that
controlled daily life made it very difficult for people to resist PAC
membership.”[41] 91.
The Civil Patrols gained enormous physical and psychological
control over their members and the communities as a whole.
The Commission has stated the following in this regard: Firstly,
in most cases … they [the PAC] are neither answerable to nor controlled
by the community’s democratically elected civilian authorities, which
makes them an alternative power that heightens tension and the internal
division within a community. Secondly,
when they are beyond the control of the democratic power structure, they
become alternative centers of local power and favoritism, engage in
unlawful activities and illegally usurp powers for their own personal
prestige or advantage, relying heavily on their real or purported
connection with army authorities or security forces. Rather than creating
a sense of calm, they become a cause for fear and anxiety in the
community. In remote areas
where armed irregular movements are still active, the civilian reaction
against the self-defense patrols reduces the civilian population’s
support of counter-insurgency operations and traps the people between two
opposing sides. The Army
interprets the half-hearted support it gets as evidence of collaboration
with the guerrillas and punishes the people.[42] 92.
In this same vein, the report of the Commission on Historical
Clarification states the following: “As part of a model of total
control, the Army gave discretionary authority to patrol chiefs.
The conduct and lives of the other patrolmen and of the population
as a whole depended on the military authority, whether through the
soldiers themselves or through the patrol chiefs and commissioners. The
sanctions system was part of that control model and a way for patrolmen to
learn torture techniques, which they then inflicted upon the
population.”[43]
Thus, “punishment was used repeatedly in hundreds of Guatemalan
communities, where the patrolmen themselves replicated the torture methods
learned from the military. The
intimidation, threats and cruel treatment were used in the communities as
a warning to those who refused either to do their respective patrol time
or to join the PAC…”[44]
Also, “the human rights violations were intended to instill terror in
the population and were part of the State’s counter-insurgency strategy.
The patrolmen’s activities fit into the counter-insurgency
strategy. In general, they
acted on express orders from the military or exercised the discretionary
authority that the Army delegated to them for surveillance and policing,
arrests and armed operations. Their
activities even included the killing and torture of persons, the
destruction of communities, rapes and inhumane acts targeting former
combatants, to name only some of the violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law.”[45] 93.
The Commission will briefly mention the military commissioners, as
they are closely linked to the PAC. The
institution of “military commissioners” was created in July 1938.[46]
When the PAC were created (1981) the military commissioners,
because of their close ties to the army, generally took on the functions
of Civil Patrol chiefs as well. Some of the activities performed included “collaborating in
military recruitment, the army information network, control and
surveillance of the civilian population, pursuit of criminals,
apprehension of the victims, interrogations and torture, execution of
women and children, participation in counter-insurgency operations, use of
secret graveyards, collaboration with landowners, resolution of personal
problems, and the like.”[47] 94.
We thus maintain that, as the Court held, “the acquiescence of
the Sate of Guatemala in the perpetration of such activities by the Civil
Patrols indicates that those patrols should be deemed to be agents of the
State and that the actions they perpetrated should therefore be imputable
to the State.”[48]
In that same vein, the CEH found that: Regardless
of patrolmen’s conduct and their culpability as the immediate authors of
the violations committed against the people, Guatemala is responsible for
the human rights violations committed by the Civil Patrols because it
promoted and legitimized them. By
way of the Guatemalan Army, the State established patrols in those areas
where the guerrilla presence was greatest, thus involving the civilian
population in the armed conflict. The
State is responsible for the violations committed by the PAC in that the
latter were organized by the State, acted on its orders, by the authority
it delegated to them, or with its acquiescence, knowledge or tolerance,
and were under the State’s hierarchical control and oversight.
The testimony received by the CEH indicates that PAC members’
involvement in many acts of violence was mandatory and refusal to
participate could lead to a patrolman’s death or torture. The absolute
authority that the Army gave to the patrolmen as part of the strategy of
terror led them to commit violations of all types.
The State is also to blame for the failure to investigate,
prosecute or punish the individuals responsible in each case.[49] 2. Characteristics
of extrajudicial executions in Guatemala in 1990-91 95.
Extrajudicial execution was used in Guatemala during the armed
conflict: Though
the systematic practice of arbitrary execution, agents of the State
physically wiped out its opponents. In
both rural and urban areas, its goal was to use terror to suppress,
silence and control the population as a whole.[50] 96.
As will be explained, these types of executions were a regular
occurrence in Guatemala in 1990 and 1991.
The procedures followed were similar and identifiable. 97.
Reports from this period reveal that Guatemala offered little
protection of and few guarantees for the right to life.
In its Annual Report 1989-90, the Commission underscored the fact
that the period covered in that report witnessed “the most serious
increase in violence and human rights violations during the term of
President Cerezo.”[51]
The Commission cited the many petitions it had received and the
number of reported abductions, disappearances and extrajudicial executions
recorded almost daily, in some cases involving multiple victims.[52]
In its Annual Report 1990-91, the Commission reported that the
human rights situation in Guatemala had deteriorated,[53]
and that most of the Guatemala-related cases that the Commission was
processing were petitions alleging extrajudicial executions,
disappearances and unlawful detentions.[54] At the national level,
the Human Rights Ombudsman reported that 556 petitions related to
extrajudicial executions were processed in 1990 and 432 in 1991.[55]
The figures on extrajudicial executions reported by nongovernmental
organizations either matched the Ombudsman’s figures or were
significantly higher.[56]
98.
While some executions were indiscriminate, i.e., no distinction was
made for the victim’s sex, age, ethnic origin, political opinion or any
other factor, “the trend of the late 1980s, which was selective
arbitrary executions, continued in the period from 1990 to 1996….[57]
Selective executions were those that occurred “when the victim
was predetermined or unmistakably and specifically selected … be it an
individual, a community or a sector…”.[58]
99.
The cases and reports from this period reflect a common modus operandi in the commission of violations of the right to life:
They are carried out openly at any time of day or night, in any place in Guatemala, and without any concern for eyewitnesses. The kidnappers use cars or trucks without license plates or with stolen plates. Nobody, and even less the police, does anything to prevent such acts. The investigations do not lead anywhere and the responsible organs blame each other for the failure of the investigation.[59] [T]he
corpses found were located in different parts of the country, the majority
with bullet or knife wounds, some with signs of torture…[60] 100.
Generally speaking, the arbitrary executions were carried out in
two ways. In some cases, a
group of unidentified, armed men, in civilian dress or occasionally in
uniform, approached the victim at his home, workplace or on the street,
and frequently in the presence of witnesses, and attacked the victim right
there. In other cases, the victim was abducted from these places, again
often in the presence of witnesses; the body was discovered later, within
hours or days, frequently showing signs of torture.[61]
Also, as the CEH reported, “[m]ost arbitrary executions committed
by State agents were combined with other actions and stratagems intended
to obstruct a judicial inquiry, thereby heightening the atmosphere of
impunity.”[62]
101.
The PAC carried out numerous extrajudicial executions in their own
and neighboring communities.[63] The arbitrary executions
carried out by the PAC were done, in some instances, when an individual
was either accused or suspected of being a guerrilla, while on patrol with
army soldiers or without them, when someone refused to go on patrol or to
join the PAC, when someone violated the PAC disciplinary code or simply
for personal reasons, given the enormous power and impunity that the PAC
members had within the communities.[64]
“Witnesses say that most often, those actions were carried out
even though there was nothing in the victim’s history to implicate him
in guerrilla military actions. Some victims may have been members of the guerrilla
infrastructure in many communities (FIL); all the same, the executions
were indiscriminate vis-à-vis any suspected person.
They were a show of force staged when victims were completely
defenseless and often in the presence of their families.”[65] 3. Participation
of State agents 102.
Although the judicial branch of government was derelict and did not
respond with an appropriate and effective investigation of activities
involving suspected extrajudicial executions, the participation of State
agents in the extrajudicial executions has been established because of the
characteristics of the executions and their modus
operandi, complaints and eyewitness statements, the abundant testimony
gathered and analyzed by various national and international organizations,
and reliable investigations whose reports have been made public. 103.
In ascertaining how and to what extent the State is responsible for
this practice during the conflict period, the Commission for Historical
Clarification concluded that “the State repeatedly and systematically
committed violations of the right to life … made all the worse in many
cases by terrible brutality, as happened, for example, when abandoned
bodies showed obvious signs of torture, mutilation, multiple bullet wounds
or burns.” Overall,
according to that Commission’s data, “the Army was responsible for 86%
of all arbitrary executions.”[66]
“The PAC were responsible for 21%, and the military commissioners
for 11%”. “Other State
security forces (the National Police, Treasury Guard, and others)
accounted for 4%.”[67]
(This percentage is figured on the total number of arbitrary
executions, without factoring in whether the executions were the work of
one or more than one individual). 104.
These general findings are consistent with the patterns of the
executions and the reports for the specific period under study.
For example, in July 1990 the Human Rights Ombudsman reported that
“…the majority of the complaints at the Ombudsman’s Office were
allegations against the Army, the National Police and the Civil
Patrols.”[68]
In its 1991 Annual Report, the Commission expressed concern over
the number of petitions received alleging violations of the right to life
by the Army and Civil Patrols, and the inability of the proper authorities
to control or punish members of the security forces that appeared to have
had a direct hand in a number of human rights violations.[69]
The United Nations Independent Expert for Guatemala reported that
“the perpetrators of such crimes, who allegedly belong or are linked to
the armed forces, enjoy almost total immunity from prosecution.”[70] 105.
One key enabler of this practice was the fact that the appropriate
authorities were unable or unwilling to respond to the executions as the
law required. The Commission
found that during the period the organs for the administration of justice
called upon to investigate human rights violations and punish those
responsible did nothing, revealing how ineffective they were in preventing
or responding to those violations.[71]
The judicial inquiries instituted into the repeated complaints of summary
executions “have in practice yielded no tangible results, as in most
cases the courts or security organizations have failed to identify the
perpetrators of the acts of violence.”[72]
The few people who have appeared before the courts charged with
involvement in violations of the right to life were not punished, “on
some occasions because of a lack of political will and on others because
of shortcomings in the administration of justice.”[73]
4.
Selection of victims 106. Many
of the victims of the selective extrajudicial executions committed during
1990-91 were chosen because of their participation in social and political
organizations.[74]
During that period, the Commission and other sources reported the
unrelenting campaigns of violence and intimidation targeted against human
rights activists,[75]
especially members of the Runujel Junam Ethnic Communities Council (CERJ);[76]
members of unions and organized labor;[77]
members of the university communities;[78]
the indigenous population, particularly in rural areas;[79]
the campesinos;[80]
the press;[81] members of the political
parties and persons somehow connected to the country’s political life;
[82] members of community services and religious
organizations,[83]
and judicial personnel. [784] In
many cases, those executed and/or persons close to them had been
threatened in the past. [85]
In other cases, the threats were carried out despite the
precautions taken–which in some cases even included going into
self-imposed exile for a time.[86] 107.
Selectiveness was part of a broader strategy aimed at instilling
terror in the public. As the
Commission for Historical Clarification pointed out in connection with the
country’s urban areas: One
of the preferred State terrorism tactics appears to have been killing, a
fact widely known [and]
understood … This tactic is preferred for the simple reason that it
instills more fear. The
assassination or disappearance of leaders can heighten the sense of
vulnerability, the sense that leadership and direction are lacking and, of
course, confusion.[87] 108. The
same terror tactics were used in rural areas.
“In the country’s interior, the systematic elimination of the
traditional leaders, religious and cooperative leaders, created disarray,
a sense of vulnerability and disorder within the community.”[88] 109.
In other cases, the violations were less selective, as victims
could be men, women, the elderly or children.[89]
The great majority of those executed during the course of the
conflict, approximately 86.5% of the victims, were from the Mayan
population.[90]
A large percentage of the victims were members of the rural communities,
including farm workers and campesinos.[91]
During the armed conflict, thousands of people were summarily executed
based on accusations that they had some connection to the guerrilla
movement, although the charge was never proven.[92]
Others were summarily executed because they did not want to join
the PAC patrols or had stopped participating.[93]
Victims were not always selected for their alleged activities; some were
singled out because of family members’ political or social activities or
simply because they were present when unknown armed persons appeared in
the home or work place in search of a family member.[94]
Conversely, some were selected precisely because they were
apolitical. Here again, the
purpose was to instill terror, to provoke a reaction: ‘if they’d kill
someone like that, they’ll kill anyone.’[95] B.
Facts established with regard to the six cases under study 1.
Weighing the evidence 110. In
weighing the evidence and establishing the facts, the Commission has taken
into account all the information supplied by the parties, in particular
the statements of witnesses and family members and any judicial inquiry
there might have been, as well as the information mentioned earlier
concerning the origin, functioning and modus
operandi of the PAC, military commissioners and the practice of
summary executions in Guatemala at the time the events occurred.
As the Inter-American Court held, when a governmental practice of
violations has been shown, “direct evidence, whether testimonial or
documentary, is not the only type of evidence that may be legitimately
considered … circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be
considered, so long as they lead to conclusions consistent with the
facts.”[96]
111. Thus,
in those cases where a pattern of conduct is present, circumstantial
evidence, indicia and conclusions drawn from the evidence may be
particularly significant in establishing the international responsibility
of a State for violation(s) committed by its agents.[97]
112. As
shown with the preceding analysis, the practice of extrajudicial
executions in Guatemala was compounded by the climate of impunity
prevailing during the period and the judiciary’s unwillingness to
conduct serious and effective investigations into the complaints of human
rights violations filed with the courts and to punish those responsible.[98]
In this way, if a pattern or practice can be shown to have been
carried out by the State or done with its acquiescence, and if the
violation alleged in a specific case can be linked to that practice, then
that link further defines the nature and scope of the petitions brought,[99]
and helps establish the veracity of the facts alleged.[100]
113. The
first consideration in weighing the evidence and establishing the facts in
the cases under study is that fifteen people named as victims died
violently when they were extrajudicially executed.
Another seven were the victims of attempted extrajudicial
executions and were gravely wounded. Had it not been for the prompt aid they received from the
relatives and friends who took them to the hospital, they would have died.
The State never challenged these allegations; in some cases, the
information it supplied corroborated the cause of death claimed in the
petitions. 2.
Facts presented and their connection to the practice of
extrajudicial executions 114. As
described earlier, in 1990 and 1991 hundreds of people were victims of
extrajudicial executions in Guatemala.
The pattern of the executions was similar: they were carried out
systematically, and victims were typically selected because of their
social or political activities. It was known that the executions were carried out by members
of the security forces or by persons acting in their name or with their
acquiescence, whether it was the PAC or military commissioners.
Then, too, the Guatemalan judicial system as a whole was not an
effective tool to guarantee respect for human rights, especially the right
to life. 115. The
extrajudicial executions alleged in all the cases were committed in rural
areas where the Civil Patrols had a heavy presence and wielded enormous
power. In all cases the
victims, before being killed, had received threats from members of the
PAC, either because they refused to join the patrols or had left them. Of
the fifteen victims of extrajudicial execution, at least nine were
indigenous men. Also, of the
fifteen victims of extrajudicial execution, at least seven were members of
the CERJ, consistent with the pattern at that time, which was to persecute
and intimidate members of human rights organizations, especially members
of the CERJ.[101]
Similarly, eight of the extrajudicial executions occurred in San
Pedro de Jocopilas. In almost
all the cases, the crime was perpetrated by a group of persons in civilian
dress, always heavily armed and acting with apparent impunity.
In all these cases, the modus operandi of the perpetrators of the extrajudicial executions
was to go to the place where the intended victim was and execute him
immediately, even if others were present.
[11]
See, in general, IACHR, Annual Report of the IACHR 1990-91,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.79. rev.1, Doc. 12, 22 February 1991, Chapter IV,
“Guatemala”, p. 444 et seq.,
Annual Report of the IACHR 1991, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.81, Doc. 6 rev. 1,
February 14, 1992, Chapter IV, “Guatemala”, p. 204 et seq. [12]
IACHR, Annual Report 1991, supra,
p. 210. [13]
“Report of the [United Nations’] Independent Expert, Mr. Christian
Tomuschat, on the human rights situation in Guatemala” [hereinafter
“Tomuschat Report 1992”],
E/CN.4/1992/5, January 21, 1992, para. 189. [14]
Ibid, para. 140. [15]
Commission for Historical Clarification, Guatemala, Memoria
del Silencio [“Memory of the Silence”, hereinafter referred to
as the “CEH Report”], “Las Violaciones de los Derechos Humanos y los Hechos de Violencia”
[Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence], Vol. III, p. 151.
The mandate given to the Commission for Historical
Clarification at the time it was established was “to shed as
objective, fair and impartial a light as possible on the human rights
violations and acts of violence that have caused so much suffering
among the Guatemalan people in connection with the armed conflict”,
to issue a report on its investigations and findings; and “to make
specific recommendations calculated to foster peace and national
comity in Guatemala…”. [16]
CEH Report, “Conclusions
and Recommendations”, para. 10. [17]
CIDH, Annual Report of the IACHR
1989-1990, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.77 rev. 1, Doc. 7, May 17, 1990, p. 157. [18]
CEH Report, “Las
Ejecuciones Arbitrarias” [Arbitrary Executions], Chapter II,
Vol. 2, para. 356. [19]
IACtHR, Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, paras.
56-68; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of March 15,
1989, paras. 80-88 and 90-93 92; Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of
January 20, 1989, paras. 59-70; Exceptions to the exhaustion of
domestic remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American
Convention on Human Rights) Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of August 10,
1990, Ser. A
No. 11, para 34. [20]
Ibid. [21]
Ibid. [22]
IACHR, Annual Report of the
IACHR 1989-1990, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.77 rev. 1, Doc. 7, 17 May 1990 and
CEH Report. [23]
“1992 Tomuschat Report”, para. 184. [24]
Ibid, paragraphs 356-57. [25]
Ibid, para. 357. [26]
CEH Report, p 187, para. 1282. [27]
See, IACtHR, OC-11/90, supra,
paragraphs 33-34; see, for
example, IACHR, Report 6/94, Case 10.772, El Salvador, published
in the Annual Report of the
IACHR 1993, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85, Doc. 9 rev., February 11, 1994, pp.
181, 185-186. [28]
For a more in-depth analysis of the Civil Patrols, see: Decree-Law
19-86, January 10, 1986; Guatemalan Congressional Decree 143-96 of
November 28, 1996; Peace Agreements, 1996-1998, Agreement on the
Strengthening of the Civil Authority and Function of the Army in a
Democratic Society, September 19, 1996; Persecution
by Proxy: The Civil Patrols in Guatemala.
The Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, 1993; Institutional
Violence: Civil Patrols in Guatemala, 1993-1994.
The Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, 1994; Civil Patrols in Guatemala. An
Americas Watch Report, 1988; Closing
the Space: Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices; Annual
Reports of Amnesty International, 1984, 1985 and 1986; Report of the Working
Group on Forced or Involuntary Disappearances, United Nations
Human Rights Commission, 1993; Report of the Working Group on Forced or Involuntary Disappearances, United
Nations Human Rights Commission, 1991; Commission for Historical
Clarification, Guatemala, Memoria
del Silencio, Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala,
Report Inter-diocesan Project to recover the memory of the past, Guatemala
Nunca Mas [hereinafter, “ODHAG, Guatemala Nunca Más”]
. [29]
CEH Report, “Las Patrullas de Auto Defensa Civil” [The
Civil Patrols], Volume II, p. 182. [30]
In fact, the PAC have existed since 1981 and operated in conjunction
and in coordination with the Army on the Victoria 82 and Firmeza 83
campaign. See Diario de Centro América, April 14, 1983. [31]
For its part, Decree 160-83 created the Fund for Military Protection
for Civilian Defense, “for the sole purpose of providing economic
assistance, in the event of death, to personnel of the PAC, provided
the member dies in the line of duty, as certified by the Chiefs of
Staff of National Defense.” [32]
CEH Report, “Las Patrullas de Auto Defensa Civil” [The Civil
Patrols], Volume II, p. 184. [33]
Tomuschat Report 1992, para. 193. [34]
Guatemalan Congressional Decree 143-96, November 28, 1996, rescinded
Decree Law 19-86, which legally established the Civil Defense
Committees; one paragraph of the preamble to that decree states the
following: “Some Civil Patrols, now called the voluntary civil
defense committees, have strayed from their original purpose over the
years… performing missions that properly pertain to the regular
organs of the State; in exceeding their authority, members of those
committees repeatedly perpetrated human rights violations.” [35]
CEH Report “Las Patrullas de Auto Defensa Civil” [The Civil
Patrols], Volume II, p. 200. [36]
“Furthermore, the coercive methods used to form the PAC in the Mayan
communities undermined the latters’ system of authorities and
institutions, their mechanisms for social control, the rules and
procedures they used to regulate society and to settle conflicts.
In so doing, they altered the Mayan communities’ social,
economic, religious and cultural values.
Compulsory participation in the PAC, with long shifts that cut
into the daily activities of the patrolmen and the communities,
altered social life as a whole…
As the PAC modus
operandi, patrolmen were required to make lists of alleged
'enemies', give information, hand over suspects, turn in neighbors or
family members. The
effect was to break down ties of community solidarity and create
conflict, thereby seriously affecting the integrity of indigenous and
rural communities.” See,
CEH Report. Volume II. [37]
Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala, Report
Interdiocesan Project to Recover the Memory of the Past, Guatemala
Nunca Más (hereinafter “ODHAG, Guatemala Nunca Más”),
Volume II, p 119. [38]
The PAC were also a low-cost system of surveillance and repression
since they represented little in the way of cost to either the Army or
the State: scant weaponry in many cases, no salaries, and so on.
Furthermore, in many places they were used as a form of forced labor,
especially for jobs involving provisioning, infrastructure works, and
the like. See,
“ODHAG, Guatemala Nunca Más”, Volume II, p. 119. [39]
IACtHR, Blake v. Guatemala Case, Judgment of January 24, 1998,
para.76. 40
The following has been said in this regard: “Despite the intrusion
in a daily routine that the PAC represented (lost days of work,
dangerous tracking operations, internal mistrust, and the like), in
much of the testimony compiled personal and family safety and the
chance of surviving in an environment hostile to any criticism of the
imposed military system were among the main reasons cited for
participating in the PAC.” See
“ODHAG, Guatemala Nunca Más”, Volume II, p. 126. [41]
“ODHAG, Guatemala Nunca Más”, Volume II, p. 124. [42]
IACHR, Fourth Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala,
1993, p. 60. [43]
CEH Report, “Las Patrullas de Auto Defensa Civil” [The
Civil Patrols], Volume II. [44]
Ibid. [45]
Ibid. [46]
See, Diario Oficial [Official
Gazette], Guatemala, volume XXIII, No. 19, July 20, 1938. It reports
that they are “agents of the military authority who discharge their
mission within the villages, hamlets and towns where the organization
of the militia necessitates their presence.” Article 1 states that
“They shall carry out the orders they receive from their immediate
superiors in all matters pertaining exclusively to call-ups, summons,
recruitment, apprehension of criminals, cases of persons who fail to
respond to summons, deserters and, in general, military orders.” [47]
CEH Report, “Los Comisionados Militares” [The Military
Commissioners], Chapter V, Vol II, p. 169. [48]
See, Blake v. Guatemala
Judgment, para. 78. [49]
CEH Report, “Los Comisionados Militares” [The Military
Commissioners], Chapter V, Vol. II. [50]
CEH Report, “Ejecuciones
Arbitrarias” [Arbitrary Executions], Chapter
II, Vol. 2, para. 223. [51]
IACHR, Annual Report of the
IACHR 1989-90, supra, p.
161. [52]
Ibid, p. 150-151. [53]
IACHR, Annual Report of the
IACHR 1990-91, supra, p. 452. [54]
Ibid, pp. 445-446. [55]
Human Rights Ombudsman, Los Derechos Humanos: Un Compromiso por la Justicia y la Paz [Human
Rights: a commitment to justice and peace] (1992), p. 24. [56]
See IACHR, Annual
Report of the IACHR 1990-91 supra, p. 445; Annual
Report of the IACHR 1991, p. 206. [57]
CEH Report, “Las
Ejecuciones Arbitrarias” [Arbitrary Executions], Chapter II,
Vol. 2, paras. 127,155. [58]
Ibid, para. 127. [59]
IACHR, Annual Report of the
IACHR 1989-90, supra, p. 154. [60]
IACHR, Annual Report of the
IACHR 1990-1991, supra, p. 445. [61]
“Report of the Independent Expert, Mr, Christian Tomuschat, on the
human rights situation in Guatemala” [“Tomuschat Report 1991]", E/CN.4/1991/5, January 11, 1991, para.
115. [62]
CEH Report, “Ejecuciones
Arbitrarias” [Arbitrary Executions], para. 264. [63]
CEH Report, “Las Patrullas de Auto Defensa Civil” [The
Civil Patrols], p. 347. [64]
Ibid. [65]
“ODHAG, Guatemala Nunca Más” Volume II, p. 134. [66]
CEH, “Las Ejecuciones Arbitrarias” [Arbitrary Executions],
Chapter II, Vol. 2, para. 161;
see, in general, paras.
171-191 (where the various types of executions perpetrated by the Army
are described). [67]
Ibid, paras. 161-62; see,
in general, paras. 192-210 (where the various types of executions
carried out by the PAC and the military commissioners are described);
paras. 211-16 (describing executions by the National Police and
Treasury Guard); and paras. 217-22 (where executions by the
Army-linked death squads and police are described). [68]
IACHR, Annual Report of the
IACHR 1990-91, supra, p. 445. [69]
IACHR, Annual Report of the
IACHR 1991, supra, p. 205. [70]
Tomuschat Report 1991, para.
126; see also Tomuschat Report
1992, para. 105 (noting the role torture plays in the violent
deaths denounced and, in a number of cases, the evidence of the
security forces’ involvement). [71]
Ibid. pp. 163 and 167; see,
in general, “Conclusions and Recommendations”, Conclusions,
paras. 10, 56, 94 and 95; “Denial of Justice”, para. 434. [72]
Tomuschat Report 1991, para.
122. [73]
Ibid, para. 126; see
also, Tomuschat Report, paras. 140-41. [74]
See, in general, CEH Report,
“Las Ejecuciones Arbitrarias” [Arbitrary Executions],
Chapter II, Vol. 2, para. 155; Tomuschat
Report 1991, paras. 117-20. [75]
See IACHR, Annual
Report of the IACHR 1989-90, supra, p. 150; Annual
Report of the IACHR 1990-91, supra, p. 449; Annual
Report of the IACHR 1991, supra, p. 206; Tomuschat
Report 1991, p. 120. [76]
“The first organization established to defend the rights of
Guatemala’s Mayan population, CERJ’s mandate was to disseminate
knowledge among the Indian communities of the rights specified in the
Guatemalan Constitution …” It served as a means of preserving
“ethnic culture and identity.” See
IACHR, Annual Report 1990-91,
pp. 448; Annual Report 1991,
pp. 206-208; Tomuschat Report
1992, para. 90. [77]
See IACHR, Annual
Report 1989-90, p. 150; Annual
Report 1991, pp. 206-208; CEH,
“Las Ejecuciones Arbitrarias” [Arbitrary Executions],
Chapter II, Vol. 2, para. 308; Tomuschat Report 1992, para. 91; Tomuschat Report 1991, para. 117. [78]
See IACHR, Annual
Report 1989-90, p. 150 and 151; CEH
Report, “Las Ejecuciones Arbitrarias” [Arbitrary
Executions], para. 308; Tomuschat Report 1992, para. 92; Tomuschat Report 1991, para. 117. [79]
See IACHR, Annual
Report 1991, pp.206-208. [80]
See CEH, “Las
Ejecuciones Arbitrarias” [Arbitrary Executions], para. 308;
Tomuschat Report 1992, para.
94; Tomuschat Report 1991,
para. 117. [81]
See IACHR, Annual
Report 1989-90, pp. 156-157; Annual
Report 1991, pp. 206-208. [82]
See IACHR, Annual
Report 1990-91, pp. 440-51; CEH
Report, “Las Ejecuciones Arbitrarias” [Arbitrary
Executions], para. 308; Tomuschat Report 1991, paras. 117, 119. [83]
See IACHR, Annual
Report 1991, pp. 206-208, 210; CEH
Report, “Las Ejecuciones Arbitrarias” [Arbitrary
Executions], para. 308; Tomuschat Report 1992, para. 93. [84]
See CEH Report, “Las
Ejecuciones Arbitrarias” [Arbitrary Executions], paras. 356-360. [85]
See, in general, Ibid,
paras. 224-36. [86]
See Ibid,
para. 235. [87]
Ibid, para. 236 (citing
Carlos Figueroa Ibarra, El
Recurso del Miedo: Ensayo sobre el Estado y el terror en Guatemala,
Programa Centroamericano de Investigaciones, first edition, San
José). [88]
Ibid, para. 240. [89]
See, in general, Ibid,
para. 295. [90]
See Ibid, para. 293, and
graph 19. [91]
See Ibid, para. 308; Tomuschat
Report 1992, para. 94. [92]
See CEH Report, “Las
Ejecuciones Arbitrarias” [Arbitrary Executions], paras. 173-78;
205-08. [93]
Ibid, p. 347. [94]
See, in general, Ibid,
para. 299. [95]
Ibid, para. 237. [96]
IACtHR, Velásquez Rodríguez Case (Merits), supra,
paras. 127-30; Godínez Cruz Case (Merits), Judgment of January 20,
1989, Ser. C No. 5, paras. 133-36; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales
Case (Merits), Judgment of March 15, 1989, Ser. C No. 6, paras.
130-33; Gangaram Panday Case (Merits), Judgment of January 21, 1994,
para. 49. [97]
See, in general, Velásquez
Rodríguez Case (Merits), supra,
paras. 134, 172-73. [98]
CEH Report, para. 264. [99]
See, IACHR, Report 5/97 (On
Admissibility), Case 11.227, Colombia, published in
Annual Report of the IACHR 1996, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, Doc. 7 rev.,
March 14, 1997, paras. 26-38. [100]
With respect to the crime of forced disappearance, the Inter-American
Court ruled that if it is shown that a State either carried out or
tolerated this practice and if a specific case can be linked to that
practice, the allegations in that case will have been proven, so long
as the evidence presented on both points meets the standard of proof
required in such cases. See,
in general,
Velásquez Rodríguez Case (Merits), supra,
para. 126;
Godínez Cruz Case (Merits), supra, para. 132;
Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case (Merits), supra,
para. 129. [101]
In its 1990 Annual Report, the Commission pointed out that members of
the CERJ “have been under attack since its creation in 1988, and to
the present some 13 members have been murdered or disappeared.” |