|
|
1.
International Human Rights Law 147.
Perhaps
in no other area is there greater convergence between international
human rights law and international humanitarian law than in the
standards of humane treatment and respect for human dignity. While
governed by distinct instruments, both regimes provide for many of the
same minimum and non-derogable requirements dealing with the humane
treatment of all persons held under the authority and control of the
state.[375]
148.
Moreover, violations of the prohibition of torture and other
serious breaches of humane treatment norms are regarded as sufficiently
grave under both bodies of law to give rise to not only to state
responsibility as described below, but may also constitute international
crimes entailing the individual criminal responsibility of those
participating in the violations and their superiors.[376]
Some of these violations may as such constitute crimes against humanity
or even genocide[377]
and may now fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court.[378] 149.
Within the inter-American system, the right to humane treatment
is prescribed principally in Articles I, XXV and XXVI of the American
Declaration and Article 5 of the American Convention, which provide as
follows: American
Declaration Article
I. Every human being has the right to life, liberty and
the security of his person. Article
XXV. […] Every individual
who has been deprived of his liberty […] has the right to humane
treatment during the time he is in custody. Article
XXVI. Every person accused of an offense has the right […] not to
receive cruel, infamous or unusual punishment. American
Convention Article
5.1. Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral
integrity respected. 2. No one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. All persons
deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person. 3. Punishment shall not be extended to any
person other than the criminal. 4. Accused persons shall, save in
exceptional circumstances, be segregated from convicted persons, and
shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status as
unconvicted persons. 5. Minors while subject to criminal proceedings
shall be separated from adults and brought before specialized tribunals,
as speedily as possible, so that they may be treated in accordance with
their status as minors. 6. Punishments consisting of deprivation of
liberty shall have as an essential aim the reform and social
readaptation of the prisoners. Article
7.1. Every person has the
right to personal liberty and security. 150.
These provisions mirror similar human rights guaranteed under
other regional and universal instruments,[379]
and generally encompass three broad categories of prohibited treatment
or punishment: (1) torture; (2) other cruel, inhumane, or degrading
treatment or punishment; (3) other prerequisites for respect for
physical, mental or moral integrity, including certain regulations
governing the means and objectives of detention or punishment. The
analysis below provides an overview of the meaning and content of these
humane treatment protections, followed by a consideration of several
areas of state conduct particularly pertinent to the right to humane
treatment, namely methods of interrogation, conditions of detention and
specific protections for children, women and non-nationals. 151.
Neither the American Convention on Human Rights nor the American
Declaration expressly define “torture” or “other cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment or treatment.” 152.
The United Nations Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, on the other hand, defines torture for the purposes of that
treaty as […]
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining
from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him
for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions […].[380]
153.
Article 2 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish
Torture[381]
provides a similar, though not identical, definition of torture as
follows: For the
purposes of this Convention, torture shall be understood to be any act
intentionally performed whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is
inflicted on a person for purposes of criminal investigation, as a means
of intimidation, as personal punishment, as a preventive measure, as a
penalty, or for any other purpose. Torture shall also be understood to
be the use of methods upon a person intended to obliterate the
personality of the victim or to diminish his physical or mental
capacities, even if they do not cause physical pain or mental anguish.
The concept of torture shall not include physical or mental pain or
suffering that is inherent in or solely the consequence of lawful
measures, provided that they do not include the performance of the acts
or use of the methods referred to in this Article. 154.
Under the Inter-American Torture Convention regime, torture
refers to acts committed by state agents or persons acting under the
orders or instigation of state agents.[382]
While analyzing the concept of torture for the purposes of Article 5 of
the American Convention on Human Rights, the Commission has frequently
referred to the definition provided for in the Inter-American Torture
Convention,[383]
and has also found violations of the Inter-American Torture Convention
itself as against states parties to that instrument.[384]
The Commission has considered that for torture to exist three elements
have to be combined: 1. it
must be an intentional act through which physical and mental pain and
suffering is inflicted on a person; 2.
it must be committed with a purpose (inter
alia personal punishment or intimidation) or intentionally (i.e. to
produce a certain result in the victim); 3. it must be committed by a
public official or by a private person acting at the instigation of the
former.[385]
As discussed below, torture and inhumane treatment are distinct types of
violations.[386] 155.
The American Convention prohibits the imposition of torture or
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on persons under any
circumstances.[387]
While the American Declaration does not contain a general provision on
the right to humane treatment, the Commission
has interpreted Article I of the American Declaration as containing a
prohibition similar to that under the American Convention.[388]
In fact it has specified that "[a]n essential aspect of the
right to personal security is the absolute prohibition of torture, a
peremptory norm of international law creating obligations
erga omnes."[389]
It has also qualified the prohibition of torture as a norm of jus
cogens.[390]
156.
Neither the American Convention nor the Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture establish what should be understood by "inhuman or
degrading treatment," nor how it is to be differentiated from
torture. Nevertheless, certain guiding principles may be drawn from the
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court and Commission for the purpose
of evaluating whether certain conduct may fall within these categories
of inhumane treatment. When analyzing allegations of violations of
Article 5 of the American Convention, for example, the Inter-American
Commission has taken into account decisions of the European Commission
on Human Rights, according to which "inhuman treatment is that
which deliberately causes severe mental or psychological suffering,
which, given the particular situation, is unjustifiable" and that
"treatment or punishment of an individual may be degrading if he is
severely humiliated in front of others or he is compelled to act against
his wishes or conscience."[391] 157.
The Inter-American Commission has also considered the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, according to which
a treatment must attain a minimum level of severity in order to be
considered "inhuman or degrading." The evaluation of this
"minimum" level is relative and depends on the circumstances
in each case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and
mental effects, and, in some cases, the sex, age, and health of the
victim.[392] 158.
In addition, with regard to the conceptual difference between the
term "torture" and "inhuman or degrading treatment",
the Inter-American Commission has shared the view of the European
Commission on Human Rights that the concept of "inhuman
treatment" includes that of "degrading treatment", and
that torture is an aggravated form of inhuman treatment perpetrated with
a purpose, namely to obtain information or confessions or to inflict
punishment.[393]
The Inter-American Commission has also relied upon the European Court of
Human Rights’ view that the essential criterion to distinguish between
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
"primarily results from the intensity of the suffering
inflicted".[394] 159.
The Inter-American Court has similarly relied upon the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in finding that,
even in the absence of physical injuries, psychological and moral
suffering, accompanied by psychic disturbance during questioning, may be
deemed inhuman treatment. According to the Inter-American Court, the
degrading aspect of a treatment is characterized by the fear, anxiety
and inferiority induced for the purpose of humiliating and degrading the
victim and breaking his physical and moral resistance.[395]
The Court also noted that the degrading aspect of the treatment can be
exacerbated by the vulnerability of a person who is unlawfully
detained.[396]
160.
Finally, this Commission has considered that both the American
Convention and the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish
Torture provide the Commission with certain latitude in assessing
whether, in view of its seriousness or intensity, an act or practice
constitutes torture or inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment.
According to the Commission, such classification should be done on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account the peculiarities thereof, the
duration of the suffering, the physical and mental effects on each
specific victim, and the personal circumstances of the victim.[397] 161.
While it is not possible to provide an exhaustive accounting of
the type of conduct that might constitute torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment, some guidance can be drawn
from existing inter-American jurisprudence, which has found certain acts
to amount to inhumane treatment, generally and specifically in the
context of interrogation and detention.[398]
Examples include:
162.
Guidance in this respect can also properly be drawn from other
international authorities. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Torture has listed several acts which involve the infliction of
suffering severe enough to constitute torture. These include, for
example, beating, extraction of nails, teeth, etc., burns, electric
shocks, suspension, suffocation, exposure to excessive light or noise,
sexual aggression, administration of drugs in detention or psychiatric
institutions, prolonged denial of rest or sleep, food, sufficient
hygiene, or medical assistance, total isolation and sensory deprivation,
being held in constant uncertainty in terms of space and time, threats
to torture or kill relatives, and simulated executions.[413]
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has considered similar conduct
to constitute torture or other inhumane treatment, including beatings,
electric shocks and mock executions, forcing prisoners to remain
standing for extremely long periods of time, and holding persons
incommunicado for more than three months while keeping that person
blindfolded with hands tied together, resulting in limb paralysis, leg
injuries, substantial weight loss and eye infection.[414] 163.
The European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of
Human Rights have also had occasion to evaluate conduct alleged to
constitute torture or other inhumane treatment for the purposes of the
European Convention on Human Rights. In particular, in the Greek
Case, the European Commission of Human Rights considered that the
practice of administering severe beatings to all parts of the body,
constituted torture and ill-treatment.[415]
Similarly, in Aksoy v. Turkey,
the Court considered that the victim had been subjected to torture when
he was stripped naked and suspended by his arms which had been tied
together behind his back, the treatment was deliberately inflicted, a
certain amount of preparation and exertion had been required to carry it
out, and it appeared to have been administered with the aim of obtaining
admissions or information from the victim.[416]
In Aydin v. Turkey, the
European Court considered that the rape of the victim during her
detention over a period of three days, together with the fact that she
has been blindfolded, paraded naked in humiliating circumstances,
interrogated, and kept in a constant state of physical pain and mental
anguish from her circumstances, amounted to torture.[417]
164.
The jurisprudence of the inter-American and other human rights
systems provides insights into several aspects of the right to humane
treatment that may be particularly pertinent in analyzing anti-terrorist
initiatives. These include the conduct of interrogations, conditions of
detention, and the treatment of persons in situations of particular
vulnerability or disadvantage including children, women and
non-nationals. In particular, the Inter-American Commission and the
Inter-American Court have addressed the right to human treatment
guaranteed under the Convention and the Declaration when considering
some of the above mentioned acts applied on persons during their
interrogations by state agents.[418]
In so doing, the Commission[419]
and the Court[420]
have referred to the notable discussion by the European Court of Human
Rights in the Ireland v. UK case[421]
and have suggested that techniques similar to those addressed by the
European Court are prohibited in any interrogations undertaken by state
agents. The facts in that case dealt with the "interrogation in
depth" which involved the combined application of five particular
techniques, or methods, sometimes termed "disorientation" or
"sensory deprivation" techniques, which included (a)
wall-standing (forcing the detainees to remain for periods of
some hours in a "stress position"); (b) hooding (putting a
hood over the detainees' heads and, at least initially, keeping it there
all the time except during interrogation); (c) subjection to noise
(pending their interrogations, holding the detainees in a room where
there was a continuous loud and hissing noise); (d) deprivation of
sleep: pending their interrogations, depriving the detainees of sleep;
(e) deprivation of food and drink: subjecting the detainees to a reduced
diet during their stay at the detention centre and pending
interrogations.[422] 165.
The European Court of Human Rights considered that these
interrogation techniques constituted inhumane treatment but not torture
as prohibited by Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.[423]
In its analysis the Court specified:
166.
Moreover, the Inter-American Court has specified that any use of
force that is not strictly necessary to ensure proper behavior on the
part of the detainee constitutes an assault on the dignity of the person
in violation of Article 5 of the American Convention. According to the
Court, the exigencies of the investigation and the undeniable
difficulties encountered in the anti-terrorist struggle must not be
allowed to restrict the protection of a person's right to physical
integrity.[429] 167.
The Inter-American Commission and the Court have also dealt with
the right to human treatment guaranteed under the Convention and the
Declaration when considering the issue of detention conditions in
individual cases and in country reports. In this context, the Commission
has made specific reference[430]
to the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners[431]
as prescribing basic benchmarks against which to evaluate whether the
treatment of prisoners satisfies the standards of humanity under the
inter-American instruments in such areas as accommodation,[432]
hygiene,[433]
clothing and bedding,[434]
food,[435]
recreation,[436]
exercise and medical treatment,[437]
discipline, punishment and use of instruments of restraint,[438]
and the separation of convicted from unconvicted prisoners and minors
from adults.[439] 168.
The Court and the Commission have been particularly critical of
circumstances in which individuals are held incommunicado for
long periods of time in poor conditions,[440]
and have identified other considerations that must regulate the
obligations of states in this area:
169.
In addition to the above-mentioned provisions, in particular
Article 5(5) of the American Convention,[445]
the inter-American instruments also provide for specific guarantees for
children that relate in certain respects to their humane treatment: American
Declaration Article
VII. All women, during pregnancy and the nursing period, and all
children have the right to special protection, care and aid. American
Convention Article 19.
Every minor child has the right to the measures of protection required
by his condition as a minor on the part of his family, society, and the
state. 170.
When considering cases dealing with allegations of torture or
inhumane treatment of children, both the Commission and the Court have
considered as particularly grave the status of human rights victims as
minors[446]
and have applied or referred to the above provisions,[447]
as well as other pertinent international human rights treaties. These
include provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,[448]
relating to such matters as the protection of children against all forms
of discrimination or discriminatory punishment,[449]
and the physical and psychological recovery of children from, inter
alia, any form of neglect, exploitation or abuses, and all of which
are grounded by the general principal of the best interest of the child.[450]
171.
Of particular relevance in this connection is Article 37 of the
Children’s Convention addressing the treatment of children during
detention: Article
37. States Parties shall ensure that: (a) No child shall be subjected to
torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of
release shall be imposed for offences committed by persons below
eighteen years of age; (b) No child shall be deprived of his or her
liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, detention or imprisonment
of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as
a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of
time; (c) Every child deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity
and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, and in a
manner which takes into account the needs of persons of his or her age.
In particular, every child deprived of liberty shall be separated from
adults unless it is considered in the child's best interest not to do so
and shall have the right to maintain contact with his or her family
through correspondence and visits, save in exceptional circumstances;
(d) Every child deprived of his or her liberty shall have the right to
prompt access to legal and other appropriate assistance, as well as the
right to challenge the legality of the deprivation of his or her liberty
before a court or other competent, independent and impartial authority,
and to a prompt decision on any such action. 172.
Consistent with these provisions, the Commission has considered
that imprisonment of children must only be used as a last recourse and
for the shortest time, and that children must never be kept incommunicado
or incarcerated with adults.[451] 173.
The inter-American human rights instruments also provide for
particular guarantees concerning the rights of women that are
relevant to the issue of humane treatment. In addition to the general
prohibition of inhumane treatment under Article 5, these provisions
include: American
Declaration Article
VII. All women, during pregnancy and the nursing period, and all
children have the right to special protection, care and aid. American
Convention Article
11.1. Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity
recognized. 174.
In assessing cases dealing with the humane treatment of women
during detention, the Commission has taken these provisions into
consideration. In its May 1977 final Resolution in Case 2029, for
example, the Commission found Paraguay responsible for violations of
Article I and Article VII of the American Declaration in connection with
the detention and mistreatment of several women, including a pregnant
woman who delivered and spent three years with her child in jail, as
well as a victim who lost her unborn child under torture, did not
receive medical attention, and was only released when she was near
death.[452] 175.
Foremost among the relevant inter-American human rights
instruments in this regard is the Inter-American Convention on the
Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women,[453]
which defines and prohibits violence against women[454]
and reaffirms the right of every woman to have her physical, mental and
moral integrity respected, the right to personal liberty and security,
and the right not to be subjected to torture.[455]
It also places positive obligations on state parties to, inter
alia, prevent, investigate and impose penalties for violence against
women[456]
and to promote the education and training of relevant state agents in
this regard. [457]
Of particular relevance in the irregular circumstances often created by
terrorist violence and the responding measures by states is Article 9 of
that Convention which provides that “the State parties shall take
special account of the vulnerability of women to violence by reason of,
among others, their race or ethnic background or their status as
migrants, refugees or displaced persons. Similar consideration shall be
given to women subjected to violence while pregnant or who are disabled,
of minor age, elderly, socioeconomically disadvantaged, affected by
armed conflict or deprived of their freedom.” 176.
As with the particular provisions of the American Convention and
the American Declaration, the Commission has taken these provisions of
the Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of
Violence Against Women into consideration in cases involving female
victims,[458]
including those raising allegations of inhumane treatment.[459]
Of particular pertinence in this regard is the Commission's final
report on the case of Raquel Martín de Mejía,[460]
adopted in March of 1996, in which the Commission found the rape of the
victim to constitute torture under the American Convention and under the
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture.[461]
177.
Further, in the case of X and Y v. Argentina, the Commission had
occasion to address the integrity and privacy interests of both women
and children. The complaint in this case concerned a practice in
Argentina of routinely requiring that female family members wishing to
have personal contact visits with an inmate undergo vaginal inspections.[462]
A petition had been filed with the Commission in December of 1989,
alleging that the wife of an inmate and their thirteen year old daughter
had been subjected to such inspections without regard for whether there
were special circumstances to warrant extraordinary measures. 178.
In balancing the interests of those subject to such searches
against the state's interest in maintaining security within its prisons,
the Commission characterized "a vaginal search [as] more than a
restrictive measure as it involves the invasion of a woman's body."
"Consequently, the balancing of interests involved"
must hold the government "to a higher standard."
In its report, the Commission set out a four part test to
determine the lawfulness of a vaginal inspection or search: "1) it
must be absolutely necessary to achieve the security objective in the
particular case; 2) there must not exist an alternative option; 3) it
should be determined by judicial order; and 4) it must be carried out by
an appropriate health professional."
With respect to Ms. Y, who was thirteen years old at the time in
question, the Commission found "it is evident that the vaginal
inspection was an absolutely inadequate and unreasonable method."
The Commission determined that the facts denounced gave rise to
State responsibility for violations of Articles 5 and 11, 25 and 8, and
1(1) of the American Convention.[463] 179. Another category of persons in respect of whom particular humane treatment protections apply are aliens in the territory of a state. The pertinent principles and jurisprudence in this respect are discussed in Part III(H) below concerning the situation of migrant workers, asylum seekers, refugees and other non-nationals.
180.
Finally, the Commission emphasized that the right to humane
treatment is a non-derogable right, regardless of the existence or
gravity of an emergency, as specifically provided for in Article 27(2)
of the American Convention and reinforced through Article 5 of the
Inter-American Torture Convention,[464]
which provides: The
existence of circumstances such as a state of war, threat of war, state
of siege or of emergency, domestic disturbance or strife, suspension of
constitutional guarantees, domestic political instability, or other
public emergencies or disasters shall not be invoked or admitted as
justification for the crime of torture. Neither the dangerous character
of the detainee or prisoner, nor the lack of security of the prison
establishment or penitentiary shall justify torture.
[ TABLE OF CONTENTS | PREVIOUS | NEXT ]
[375]
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has
observed in this connection that the “essence of the whole corpus of
international humanitarian law as well as human rights law lies in the
protection of the human dignity of every person, whatever his or her
gender. The general principle of respect for human dignity is […]
the very raison d’etre of international humanitarian law and
human rights law; indeed in modern times it has become of such
paramount importance as to permeate the whole body of international
law.” ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Nº IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment
of December 19, 1998 (Trial Chamber II), para. 183, appealed to the
ICTY Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor
v. Anto Furundžija, Case Nº IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment of July 21, 2000
(ICTY Appeals Chamber).
[376]
See, e.g. Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 10 December 1984, GA Res. 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. [377]
Rome Statute, supra note
31, Articles 6, 7; Genocide Convention, supra
note 189, Article 2. As described below, in situations of armed
conflicts, such acts may also constitute war crimes (see, e.g.,
Rome Statute, supra note
31, Article 8) and in situations of international armed conflicts may
also constitute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions (see Third
Geneva Convention, supra note
67, Article 130, Fourth Geneva Convention, supra
note 36, Article 147) or of the Additional Protocol I(see
Additional Protocol I, supra
note 68, Articles 11, 85 and following). [378]
Rome Statute, supra note
31. [379]
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra
note 65, Articles 3, 5; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 66,
Articles 7, 9. See also
European Convention on Human Rights, supra
note 137, Article 3. See also UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child, supra note 122, Article 37, discussed infra,
para. 171. [380]
UN Torture Convention, supra
note 376, Article 1. See also
Rome Statute, supra [381]
Inter-American Torture Convention, supra
note 105. For OAS member states that are parties to this instrument,
see Annex II. [382]
Inter-American Torture Convention, supra
note 105, Article 3 (“The following shall be held guilty of
the crime of torture: a. A public servant or employee who acting in
that capacity orders, instigates or induces the use of torture, or who
directly commits it or who, being able to prevent it, fails to do so.
b. A person who at the instigation of a public servant or employee
mentioned in subparagraph (a) orders, instigates or induces the use of
torture, directly commits it or is an accomplice thereto”). [383]
Concerning Article 5 of the American Convention, see for example, Case
10.970, Report Nº 5/96, Raquel Martín de Mejía (Peru), Annual
Report of the IACHR (1995), at 185. See
also Case 9.853, Report Nº
4/98, Ceferino Ul Musicue et
al. (Colombia), Annual Report of the IACHR (1997). See
also Abella Case, supra
note 73, para. 233. [384]
Case 11.565, Report Nº 53/01, Ana, Beatriz and Celia Gonzalez Perez
(Mexico), Annual Report of the IACHR 2001, para 94. [385]
Martín de Mejía Case, supra
note 383, at 185. [386]
See infra Part III(C),
paras. 158, 165. See also
Eur. Court H.R., Ireland v. United Kingdom, Judgment of October 9,
1979, Series A Nº 25. [387]
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 61, Article 5. [388]
See, e.g., Case 9437,
Report Nº 5/85, Juan Antonio Aguirre Ballesteros (Chile), Annual
Report of the IACHR 1984-1985. [389]
IACHR, Report on Canada (2000), supra
note 338, para. 118. [390]
IACHR, Report on Canada (2000), supra
note 338, para. 154. [391]
Case 10.832, Report Nº 35/96, Luis Lizardo Cabrera (Dominican
Republic), Annual Report of the IACHR 1997, para. 77, citing Eur.
Com.. H.R., The Greek Case,
1969, 12 Y. B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 12 [hereinafter The Greek Case], at
186. [392]
Luis Lizardo Cabrera Case, supra
note 391, para. 78, citing Ireland v. United Kingdom, supra
note 386, paras. 162-163. [393]
Luis Lizardo Cabrera Case, supra
note 391, para 79, citing The Greek Case, supra note 391,
at 186. [394]
Luis Lizardo Cabrera Case, supra
note 391, para. 80, citing Ireland v. United Kingdom, supra
note 386, para. 167 For further discussion of the concept of
inhumane treatment by the European Court of Human Rights, see Tyrer
Case, supra note 129, paras. 28 and following. [395]
I/A Court H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case,
September 19, 1997, Series C Nº 33, at [396]
Loayza Tamayo Case, supra
note 395, citing Eur. Court HR, Ribitsch v. Austria judgment of 4
December 1995, Series A Nº 336, para. 36. [397]
Luis Lizardo Cabrera Case, supra
note 391, paras. 82-83. [398]
For a general discussion of the Inter-American jurisprudence in this
area, see Scott Davidson, The
Civil and Political Rights Protected in the Inter-American Human
Rights System, in The
Inter-American Human Rights System (David Harris and Stephen
Livingstone eds. 1998), at 226 and following. [399]
See, e.g., Velásquez Rodríguez
Case, supra note 249, para.
156. See also Godínez Cruz
Case, supra note 249, para.
164; Villagran Morales Case,
supra note 130,
paras. 162-164. [400]
IACHR, Report on El Salvador (1978), supra
note 27, Ch. III, paras. 7, 8, in particular the case of Lil Ramírez. [401]
IACHR, Report on El Salvador (1978), supra
note 27, Ch. III, paras. 7, 8, in particular the cases of Lil Ramírez,
Sergio Vladimir Arriaza and Carlos A. Madrid. [402]
See, e.g., Case
10.202, Report Nº
76/90,
Muñoz (Peru), Annual Report of the IACHR (1990-91); Case
10.574, Report Nº 5/94, Lovato Rivera (El Salvador), Annual Report of
the IACHR (1993), at 174, 179. [403]
Case 9274, Resolution Nº 11/84, Roslik (Uruguay), Annual Report of
the IACHR (1984-85), at 122, 127. [404]
See, e.g., Lovato Rivera
Case, supra note 402, at
174, 179; Case 7481, Resolution Nº 30/82, Hechos ocurridos en
Caracoles (Bolivia), Annual Report of the IACHR (1981/82), at 36,
39, 40. [405]
See, e.g., Caracoles Case, supra
note 404, at 36, 39, 40; Lovato Rivera Case, supra
note 402, at 174, 179. [406]
See, e.g., Caracoles Case, supra
note 404, at 36, 39, 40. [407]
See, e.g., Lovato Rivera
Case, supra note 402, at
174, 179. [408]
See, e.g., Martín de Mejía
Case, supra note 383, at
182 and following. See also
Case 10.772, Report Nº 6/94, Rivas (El Salvador), Annual Report of
the IACHR (1994); Caracoles Case, supra
note 404. See also
Gonzalez Perez Case, supra
note 384. [409]
See, e.g., Case 7823,
Report Nº 32/82, Solano (Bolivia), Annual Report of the IACHR
(1981-82), at 42, 44. [410]
Villagran Morales Case, supra
note 130, para. 165. [411]
See, e.g., Case 7824,
Resolution Nº 33/82, Barrera (Bolivia) Annual Report of the IACHR
(1981-82), at 45, 46. [412]
See, e.g., Case 10.508,
Report Nº 25/94, Lissardi & Rossi (Guatemala), Annual Report of
the IACHR (1994), at 51, 54. [413]
See "Torture and other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment", Report of
the Special Rapporteur, Mr. P. Kooijmans, appointed pursuant to
Commission on Human Rights res. 1985/33 E/CN.4/1986/15, 19 Feb. 1986,
[hereafter UN Special Rapporteur Report on Torture], para. 119,
referred to in Celibici TC Judgment, supra
note 193, para 467. [414]
Muteba v. Zaire,
(124/1982) Report of the Human Rights Committee, UN Official Records
of the General Assembly, 22nd Session, Supplement Nº 40,
(1984), Communication
Nº
124/1982,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 24/07/84. CCPR/C/22/D/124/1982,
para.10.2 [hereinafter Muteba, HRC Case], Setelich
v. Uruguay, (63/1979) Report of Human Rights Committee, UN
Official Records of the General Assembly, 14th Session, Communication [415]
The Greek Case, supra
note 391. [416]
Aksoy Case,
supra note 346,
para. 64. [417]
Eur. Court. H.R., Aydin v.
Turkey, 25 Sept. 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions-1997
VI, Nº 50, paras. 83-84. [418]
See, e.g., Solano Case, supra
note 409, at 42, 44. See also
Barrera Case, supra note
411, at 44, 46. See also
IACHR, Report on El Salvador (1978), supra
note 27. With respect to
the right against self-incrimination, see 8(3) of the American
Convention; see also infra Part III(D), para. 237. [419]
See, e.g.,
Case 11.427, Report Nº 63/99, Victor Rosario Congo (Ecuador), Annual
Report of the IACHR (1999), para. 82. [420]
Loayza Tamayo Case, supra
note 395, para. 57. [421]
Ireland v. United Kingdom, supra
note 386. [422]
Ireland vs. United Kingdom, supra
note 386, para. 96. [423]
European Convention on Human Rights, supra
note 137. [424]
Ireland vs. United Kingdom, supra
note 386, para. 162. [425]
Ireland vs. United Kingdom, supra
note 386, para. 167. [426]
Ireland vs. United Kingdom, supra
note 386, para. 167. [427]
Ireland vs. United Kingdom, supra
note 386, para. 167. [428]
Ireland vs. United Kingdom, supra
note 386, para. 167. [429]
Loayza Tamayo Case, supra
note 395, para. 57, citing Ribitsch Case, supra
note 396, para. 38. [430]
See, e.g., Desmond McKenzie
Case, supra note 272, para.
289. See also
Case 11.743, Report Nº 38/00, Rudolph Baptiste (Grenada),
Annual Report of the IACHR (2000), paras. 136 and following; Hilaire,
Constantine and Benjamin et al. Case, supra
note 272, Separate Concurring Opinion of Judge Sergio García Ramírez,
para. 19. [431]
UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra
note 335. [432]
UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra
note 335, [433]
UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra
note 335, [434]
UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra
note 335, [435]
UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra
note 335, Rule 20. [436]
UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra
note 335, Rule 21. [437]
UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra
note 335, [438]
UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra
note 335, [439]
UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra
note 335, Rule 8. [440]
The case of Victor Rosario Congo, for example, involved the pre-trial
detention of a person who, after showing signs of mental illness, was
placed in solitary confinement for approximately 40 days, was severely
beaten, wounded by a prison guard, was not given medical attention and
who died of malnutrition and dehydration two hours after he was
submitted to the hospital. In evaluating these circumstances under
Article 5 of the Convention, the Commission noted that: “ […]
isolation can in itself constitute inhumane treatment. Moreover, when
the person kept in isolation in a penitentiary institution has a
mental disability, this could involve an even more serious violation
of the State’s obligation to protect the physical, mental and moral
integrity of persons held under its custody.” The Commission went on
to conclude that this type of solitary confinement constituted inhuman
and degrading treatment in violation of Article 5 of the Convention,
and was aggravated by the fact that the detainee was left in isolation
and unable to satisfy his basic needs. See
Congo Case, supra note 419,
paras 58-59. See similarly
Suárez Rosero Case, supra note 330, para. 91 (considering that
a 36-day detention and deprivation of any communication with the
outside world constituted cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment,
considering in particular the fact that it had been proven that the
incommunicado detention was arbitrary and carried out in violation of
the State’s domestic laws. The detainee had been held in a damp
poorly ventilated underground cell measuring approximately 15 square
meters with 16 other prisoners, without the necessary hygiene
facilities, and had been obliged to sleep on a newspaper). The
Inter-American Court and Commission have likewise considered violative
of Article 5 of the American Convention circumstances in which persons
were held for a prolonged period of time in solitary confinement on
death row, in prison conditions similar to those described above,
where they were in confined conditions with inadequate hygiene,
ventilation and natural light, were allowed out of their cells
infrequently, were abused by police and prison staff, and in some
instances were provided inadequate medical care. Hilaire, Constantine
and Benjamin et al. Case, supra
note 272, paras. 84(m), (o), 168-169; Desmond McKenzie Case, supra
note 272, para. 288. See
similarly Baptiste Case, supra
note 430, paras. 133-138. [441]
Desmond McKenzie Case, supra
note 272, para. 288. [442]
See Villagran Morales Case,
supra note 130, paras. 169,
170, citing jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. [443]
Damion Thomas Case, supra
note 332, para. 38. [444]
Id. [445]
Article 5(5) of the American Convention on Human rights provides as
follows: “Minors while subject to criminal proceedings shall be
separated from adults and brought before specialized tribunals, as
speedily as possible, so that they may be treated in accordance with
their status as minors.” [446]
Villagran Morales Case, supra
note 130. In that case, the Inter-American Court specified that it
wished “to indicate the particular gravity of the instant case since
the victims were youths, three of them children, and because the
conduct of the State not only violated the express provision of
Article 4 of the American Convention, but also numerous international
instruments, that devolve to the State the obligation to adopt special
measures of protection and assistance for the children within its
jurisdiction” (para. 146, see also para. 196). See
also Case 10.911, Report Nº
7/94, Hernández (El Salvador), Annual Report of the IACHR (1993), at
191 and following; Cases 10.227 and 10.333, Report Nº 8/92, Julio
Ernesto Fuentes Perez, William Fernandez Rivera, and Raquel Fernandez
Rivera (El Salvador), Annual Report of the IACHR (1991) at 119. [447]
See, e.g. X & Y Case, supra
note 152, paras. 101 et seq;
Rivas Case, supra note 408,
at 183, 186; Hernández Case, supra
note 446, at 194; Case 2029 (Paraguay), Annual Report of the IACHR
(1977), at 44; IACHR, Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
Paraguay, 9 March 2001, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.110 Doc. 52 [hereinafter IACHR
Report on Paraguay (2001), Ch. VII, para. 6; IACHR Report on Peru
(2000), supra note 27, Ch.
VIII, para. 4. [448]
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra
note 122. See, e.g.,
Villagran Morales Case, supra
note 130, para. 146 (noting with respect to the relationship between
Article 19 of the American Convention and the provisions of the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child that "[b]oth the American
Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child form part of
a very comprehensive international corpus juris for the
protection of the child that should help this Court establish the
content and scope of the general provision established in Article 19
of the American Convention." (para 194) […] "These
provisions allow us to define the scope of the 'measures of
protection' referred to in Article 19 of the American Convention, from
different angles. Among them, we should emphasize those that refer to
non-discrimination, special assistance for children deprived of their
family environment, the guarantee of survival and development of the
child, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the social
rehabilitation of all children who are abandoned or exploited"
(para 196). See also
X & Y Case, supra note
152, para 102; Hernández Case, supra
note 446, at 191; IACHR Report on Paraguay (2001), supra
note 447, Ch. VII, para.
9; IACHR Report on Peru (2000), supra
note 27, Ch. VIII, para. 5; Annual Report of the IACHR (1991) OEA/Ser.L/V/II.79
rev.1,
doc. 12, February 22, 1991, Ch. VI, Section IV, Subsections II and
III-2, at paras. 305 and following) [hereinafter IACHR Annual Report
(1991)]. See generally
Rome Statute, supra note
31. [449]
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 122,
Article 2. [450]
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 122,
Article 3. [451] UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 122, Article 37. IACHR Report on Peru (2000), supra note 27, paras. 23, 24; IACHR Annual Report (1991), supra note 448, Ch. VI, Section IV, Subsection III-2, at 308; Case 2029, supra note 447; Case 11.491, Report Nº 41/99, Minors in Detention (Honduras), Annual Report of the IACHR 1998. [452]
Case 2029, supra note 447. [453]
Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, supra
note 107. See
similarly the following
universal instruments: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, 18 December 1979, GA Res. 34/180, 34 UN
GAOR Supp. (Nº 46) at 193, UN Doc. A/34/46, 1249 UNTS 455;
Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and
Armed Conflict, 14 December 1974, GA Res. 3318 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (Nº 31) at 146, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974). [454]
Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, supra
note 107, Articles 2-3. [455]
Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, supra
note 107, Article 4. [456]
Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, supra
note 107, Article 7. [457]
Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, supra
note 107, Article 8. [458]
Case 12.051, Report Nº 54/01, Maria Da Penha Maia Fernandes, Annual
Report of the IACHR 2000, paras. 51 and following, para. 60. [459]
See, e.g., Gonzalez Perez
Case, supra note 384, paras.
46 and following. See also
Martín de Mejía Case, supra
note 383; Case 2029, supra
note 447; X & Y Case, supra
note 152, paras. 87-89. For a general discussion of the right to
personal integrity and protection from violence against women in the
Hemisphere see IACHR, Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights on the Status of Women in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.100 Doc.
17, October 13, 1998, Chapter III(C), at 24 and following. See
also Annual Report of the
IACHR (1997), 13 April 1998, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.97, doc. 7 rev., Chapter
VI. Section I, at 995 and following [hereinafter IACHR, Annual Report
(1997)]. [460]
Martín de Mejía Case, supra
note 383. [461]
Martín de Mejía Case, supra
note 383, at 182 and following. In addressing the rape itself, the
Commission determined that each of the three elements set forth in the
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture had been met:
(1) "an intentional act through which physical and mental pain
and suffering is inflicted on a person;" (2) "committed with
a purpose;" (3) “by a public official or by a private person
acting at the instigation of the former."
The analysis relative to the first element takes into account
both the physical and psychological suffering caused by rape.
The Commission also noted the short and long term consequences
for the victim, as well as the reluctance of many victims to denounce
this violation. (See IACHR,
Annual Report (1997), supra
note 459, at 1002). In
addition to determining that the rapes inflicted against Raquel Mejía
constituted torture, the Commission found that they violated her right
to have her honor respected and her dignity recognized under Article
11 of the American Convention. Recalling
the words of the UN Special Rapporteur against Torture, that rape
affects women "in the most sensitive part of their
personality" with the effects aggravated by the fact that
"in the majority of cases the necessary psychological treatment
and care will not ... be provided," the Commission characterized
sexual abuse generally as "a deliberate outrage" to the
dignity of women. (See
Martín de Mejía Case, supra
note 383, at 186-187; IACHR, Annual Report (1997), supra
note 459, at 1002). The Commission reached similar conclusions in the
Gonzalez Perez Case, supra
note 384, paras. 28-54. See
also Rivas Case, supra
note 408; Rome Statute, supra note
31, Articles 7, 8; Furundzija TC Judgment, supra
note 375. [462]
See X & Y Case, supra
note 152. See also
IACHR, Annual Report (1997), supra
note 459, at 1003. [463]
See X & Y Case, supra
note 152, at 71 and following. See
also IACHR, Annual Report
(1997), supra note 459, at
1003. [464]
American Convention on Human Rights, supra
note 61, Article 27(2); Inter-American Torture Convention, supra
note 105, Article 5. See also
Asencios Lindo et al. Case,
supra note 6, para. 75.
|