REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE
49. To date, no official information has been available on the contents of those secret articles; there are well-founded presumptions, however, for believing that they granted DINA agents’ powers to make arrests. Notwithstanding this peculiar legislative arrangement of the Government Junta of Chile, it must be concluded that DINA lacked legal authority to detain or arrest.
50. The National Intelligence Agency (CNI), the successor of DINA, is governed by Decree Law No. 1,878, published in the Official Gazette of August 13, 1977, a legal text that does not grant it the power to detain or arrest except in the case of offenses defined in the law on the control of weapons and after the issuance of an order by the military court that takes cognizance of them.
51. However, even this power must be understood to be tacitly repealed by the Constitution of 1980, Article 73 of which stipulates that to have its resolutions executed and to carry out or cause the investigations they order to be carried out, the ordinary courts of justice and the special courts of justice that make up the Judiciary can issue orders directly to the police force or use the appropriate means of action available to them.
52. According to Article 90 of the Constitution, the Police and Public Security Forces comprise solely the Corp of Carabineros and the Plain Clothes Police (Investigaciones), which “constitute the police force and exist for enforcement of the law, guaranteeing public order and internal public security as determined by their respective organic laws”. Consequently, when they take cognizance of offenses defined in the law on the control of weapons, the military courts may only request the Carabineros and personnel of Investigaciones to execute arrest orders.
53. Notwithstanding the clear legal limitations mentioned, the CNI is in practice an agency that routinely carries out a large number of arrests. Law No. 18,314, which defines terrorist’s acts and establishes the penalties for them, published in the Official Gazette of May 17, 1984, has been formally eliminating some of these irregularities. This law stipulates that when they try cases that concern terrorist crimes, the military courts may instruct the CNI to take certain steps.
54. With respect to the right to personal liberty, this law permits the police and public security forces and the CNI to arrest the alleged offenders without a judicial order (Article 13). The extreme seriousness of this provision is evident.
55. Law No. 18,315, also published in the Official Gazette of May 17, 1984, provided that, during the time transitory provision 24 of the Constitution is in force (up to March 11, 1989), arrests ordered pursuant thereto may be carried out by the National Intelligence Agency in its own premises, which for all legal purposes are considered places of detention. In this regard it should be recalled that the period authorized by the above-mentioned transitory provision for detaining a person is 20 days, when terrorists acts may have occurred.
Methods of arrest
56. Many testimonies of persons who have been detained for reasons connected with political activities are in the possession of the Commission, and have been reported to the Chilean judicial authorities and the organizations for the defense of human rights, both Chilean and international. They make it possible to identify a common pattern in the methods of arrest.
57. Individuals are usually arrested by persons in civilian clothes, organized in groups of four to eight, who travel in automobiles without license plates. The arresting officers identify themselves orally and do not show an arrest warrant. The arrest is carried out with considerable violence and, as soon as the person arrested is put into the vehicle, he is hooded or his eyes are covered with adhesive tape, in which case they put dark glasses on him. In the journey to the place of detention, the automobile follows a winding route in order to prevent identification of the destination.
58. When the arrest takes place in the home of the person affected, a search warrant is frequently not shown and considerable violence is used against the other residents, who are interrogated, as well as against domestic appliances, which are sometimes destroyed and on some occasions their removal has been reported. In addition, the persons affected very frequently alleged that during those searches compromising elements, such as explosive materials and subversive printed matter, are introduced into the homes.
59. The anonymity of the arresting officers is a highly negative element in the arrest procedure. Again, the intelligence agencies would appear to. enjoy special authority to commit this irregularity, as follows from the following case: on October 20, 1975, Jaime Ignacio Ossa Galdámez was arrested by DINA agents. A complaint for kidnapping was submitted to the Fourth Criminal Court of the Presidente Aguirre Cerda Department, case 10,262. On October 25, Ossa Galdámez died when he was run over by an automobile belonging to DINA, as reported by that agency. The judge sent an official letter to the Minister of the Interior requesting the identification of the driver of that automobile. On 15 November 1976, the Deputy Secretary of the Interior replied:.
In this regard, it is my duty to inform you that, having requested the pertinent report from the respective security agency, it is concluded that the National Intelligence Directorate cannot reveal the identity of the officials of that agency to Judge Patricio Villarroel Valdivia since it would violate the secrecy of their work as intelligence agents, which is the fundamental principle of investigation activities. 
60. To these individual arrest procedures must be added those that characterize mass arrests on the occasion of public meetings convoked by the political opposition in Chile or of demonstrations in poor neighborhoods of Santiago. These mass arrests have taken on particular importance on the occasion of the days of peaceful protest that became large scale in 1982-1984. On these occasions the arrests were made by the Carabineros and were characterized by the considerable violence with which they were made. These operations culminated in November 1984 in mass raids, with the participation of Carabineros, who searched entire neighborhoods and took all the adult male population to sports stadiums.
61. The public nature of the place of detention or arrest is expressly provided for in Article 19, (7) (b) (1) of the 1980 Constitution.  During the state of siege, arrests ordered by the authority can only be made in the home of the person affected itself or in public places that are not jails or other places intended for the imprisonment or detention of common criminals. Under the state of emergency, the home of the person affected or places that are not prisons are appropriate places for arrest. During the state of danger of disturbance of internal peace (Transitory Provision 24 of the Constitution), persons may only be arrested in their homes or in places that are not jails.
62. For its part, the Code of Penal Procedure stipulates in Article 317 that:
Any person who learns that a person is detained in a place that is not a place intended to be used as a place of detention or imprisonment shall be required to report the fact, under the penal liability that may affect him, to any of the officials indicated in Article 83 (Judges, Public Prosecutors and members of the civil police force), who must immediately transmit the complaint to the court they deem competent.
In virtue of the advice or notification received in any other way, the judge shall immediately go to the place in which the person arrested or kidnapped is held and have him set free. If any legal grounds for detention are alleged he shall order that the person concerned be brought before him and shall investigate whether the measure involved is in fact one of those which the Constitution or the laws authorize in extraordinary or special cases.
63. Notwithstanding the requirement concerning publicity of the place of detention, since the early days of the military government thousands of persons have been deprived of their freedom in non-public places such as barracks and other establishments of the Armed Forces. In this regard it should be pointed out that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in its report on the situation of human rights in Chile (1974) stated in Chapter VI that it had been unable to visit various detention centers “because they had recently been declared ‘military areas’” 
64. With the establishment and entry into operation of DINA, detention in secret places was institutionalized. In the Chapter on the right to a fair trial and due process, some of the many records, including judicial records in which the authorities not only recognize their existence but justify it “on grounds of security”, are transcribed. In the courts there are a large number of affidavits to the effect that, in Santiago, the buildings of Villa Grimaldi, Londres 38, José Domingo Cañas Street No. 1,367 and many other places--as well as in the provinces--are veritable clandestine prisons. 
65. In view of the many criticisms this situation gave rise to, on January 30, 1967, Supreme Decree No. 187 of the Ministry of Justice was published in the Official Gazette. It stipulated a number of measures for guaranteeing the rights of persons arrested under the state of siege. It provided, inter alia, that the arrest warrant must contain, among other requirements, the identification of the arresting officer and of the place to which the person arrested was to be taken. The places and establishments for persons arrested under the state of siege were to be determined by another supreme decree. This was Decree No. 146 of the Ministry of the Interior, published in the Official Gazette of February 25, 1976. That decree specifies the Puchuncaví camp in Valparaiso and the Tres Alamos and Cuatro Alamos camps in Santiago as the only places of detention. As a result of this measure, some type of publicity was given to the places of detention. But concurrently the secret places of the CNI continued --and to this day continue-- to operate.
66. Thus, in the application for amparo lodged with the Santiago Appeal Court on behalf of César Fredes (case 655-71), it is stated that the legal advisor of the CNI reported that two persons were detained in CNI premises “in a place that could not be reported to the Tribunal for security reasons
67. In another application for amparo of which the Concepción Appeal Court took cognizance in 1981, the Intendant refused to answer the enquiry of the Court concerning the place in which the petitioner was held because he was of the opinion that it was “highly dangerous and inadvisable for the normal operation of the work of the CNI to indicate in a proceeding the exact place of its operations”.
68. As already pointed out, Law No. 18,315 gives legal sanction to the practice of the CNI when it provides that while the measures adopted pursuant to the powers granted by Transitory Provision 14 of the Constitution are in force, arrests which are ordered in virtue thereof may be made by the CNI in its own premises, which will be considered places of detention for all legal purposes. This law is supplemented by Decree 594 of the Ministry of the Interior, published in the Official Gazette of June 15, 1984, which indicates the location, in different regions of the country, of CNI barracks.
69. However, it must be noted that the premises of the CNI do not acquire the character of public place indicated by the Constitution by the mere fact that the place where they are located is announced since the location of a barracks of the Armed Forces is also known and nevertheless it lacks the public character required of a place of detention. In support of this assertion it must be noted that, in the case of the CNI, the official responsible for the premises is unknown, the persons detained in its barracks cannot receive lawyers or relatives and the registration book of the persons arrested is not public. Finally, there is sufficient evidence to believe that, in addition to the “legalized” barracks, there are still many premises of the CNI in which detentions continue to be made, beyond any possible control.
Duration of the arrest
70. When the state of siege terminated in March 1978, the authority restricted its power to arrest persons for virtually unlimited periods. With the re-establishment of the state of siege on November 6, 1984, the situation has returned to what it was initially since, according to the provisions of Article 41 (7) of the 1980 Constitution, the power to arrest persons this article grants to the President of the Republic does not have a specified duration and therefore the deprivation of liberty may last for the period of time the state of siege is in effect. 
71. As already pointed out, pursuant to the modifications of the state of emergency regulated by the State Security Law, the Executive retained the power to arrest persons for up to five days, which period may be extended to up to 20 days  Under Transitory Provision 24 of the Constitution, the Executive may arrest persons for up to five days which period may be extended to 20 days if certain circumstances concur. 
72. However, it should be pointed out that, in 1981, in Santiago, according to information provided by the Vicaría de la Solidaridad, 525 arrests were made under the above-mentioned Transitory Provision; of this total, 449 lasted for up to 5 five days and 76 for more than five days. In 1982, of the 845 arrests made in Santiago, 49 lasted for more than 5 days. In 1983, 2,979 persons were arrested in Santiago, of which 49 were deprived of their freedom for more than 5 days.  Of the 5,110 persons arrested up to November 30, 1984, 267 were held for more than five days.
73. It should be recalled that for the extension of the arrest for more than 5 days there is, under the Constitution, a special requirement: the production of terrorist acts with serious consequences. The Executive may order an arrest for up to 5 days without giving any reason, but in order to extend it for more time he should not only certify that terrorist acts with serious consequences have occurred but also that the person arrested has participated in them in some way. In addition, as already mentioned, prior to the entry into force of Law No. 18,314, the conception of “terrorist acts” had no judicial connotation whatsoever and consequently could not be used to increase the administrative measure of deprivation of liberty.
74. Indeed, as will be shown later, very few persons whose arrest lasted for more than five days were subsequently accused before the courts of the commission of “terrorist” acts or, if they were, the courts rejected the charge.
75. In view of this finding, the prolongation of the arrest must be considered to be due in practice to the interest of the CNI in obtaining the maximum of information from the person arrested. Furthermore --and as was seen in the Chapter on the right to personal integrity-- there is evidence that makes it possible to state on solid grounds that in some cases the purpose of the prolongation of the arrest is to obtain additional time to allow the person arrested to recover from the ill treatment received and to be brought before the court without visible signs of blows, electricity burns, and other marks that may be left by the methods used for obtaining a confession or the information the CNI requires.
g. Disposal of the persons arrested
76. The Government often publicly attributes to the persons arrested the commission of “terrorist” offenses, in which case it is legally obliged to submit the complaint or the injunction to the competent court. The figures available show that a very large proportion of the charges are unfounded. Thus, of the 525 persons arrested in Santiago in 1981, 368 were set free without being charged, 37 were sent into enforced residence and 6 expelled from the country. The remaining 114 were brought before the courts on various charges: 27 of them were set free for lack of evidence, 23 were punished for misdemeanors and 64 were indicted, most of them for typically political offenses and not for the commission of “terrorist acts”.
77. Of the 845 persons arrested in Santiago in 1982, 425 were set free without charges having been brought, 42 were sent into enforced residence and 6 were expelled. of the 378 that were brought before the courts, 183 were accused of minor offenses (such as disorderly conduct), 189 were charged with non-terrorist offenses and only 6 were charged with the commission of terrorist acts. Of all the prisoners, only 39 (4.6%) were indicted. (It should be recalled that in that year 49 persons were held under arrest for more than five days on grounds of terrorist acts).
78. In 1983, as stated above, 2,979 persons were arrested in Santiago, of whom 971 were set free without being indicted and 116 were sent into enforced residence; 795 were charged before the courts and acquitted for lack of evidence, 848 were summoned before local police courts for minor offenses; 249 persons were indicted, only three of them for terrorist offenses, despite the 49 extensions of arrest for more than 5 days. The 1984 figures for Santiago were: of a total of 3,572 persons arrested, 1,793 were set free, 565 were sent into enforced residence, 80 were expelled from the country, 510 were brought before the courts for non-terrorist offenses, 27 were charged with terrorist offenses, and 723 were summoned before courts for misdemeanors or minor offenses.
Incommunicado and other irregular kinds of detentions
79. According to the Chilean legal system, the incommunicado state of the person arrested is an exclusive attribution of the Judiciary; none of the states of emergency grant the political authority the power to order the incommunicado detention of the arrested person.
80. The conception of incommunicado detention held by the political authority in Chile is, however, rather unusual. In the application for amparo case 707-75 of the Santiago Appeal Court, on behalf of Nelson Ricardo Viveros Lagos, the Minister of the Interior sent an official letter to the President of the Court on July 9, 1975 in which he stated:. “With respect to the incommunicado detention that would affect this citizen, I must inform you that it is not effective and that the only measure that could affect him is suspension of visits to the above-mentioned camp.  adopted exclusively for security reasons”.
81. This peculiar conception of incommunicado detention also emerges from the following documents sent to the International Commission of Jurists and to the United Nations Division of Human Rights:
If deprivation of liberty is an emergency measure that may be ordered by the administrative authority in the exercise of the power granted it by the state of siege, which may last for up to 6 months, the accessory measure of incommunicado detention has no limits other than that of the principal measure. 
It should be recalled that even in ordinary legislation the measure of incommunicado detention is an aggravating measure of deprivation of liberty and therefore accessory to it. Consequently, if deprivation of liberty is an emergency measure, which may be ordered by the administrative authority in the exercise of the power granted by the state of siege, which may last for up to 6 months, it has no limit other than that of the principal measure. 
82. The report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1974 on site visit) gives an account of periods of absolute incommunicado detention of persons arrested that lasted for between 40 and 60 days. 
83. In its presentation to the President of the Supreme Court in March 1978, the Vicaría de la Solidaridad mentions some cases of incommunicado detention that range from a minimum of 21 to a maximum of 330 days.
84. Their physicians, lawyers or relatives have not received authorizations to assist persons deprived of their liberty in the premises of the CNI either before or after they were designated “public places” of detention.
85. On several occasions the Government has used the system of successively applying two or more of the measures provided for in Transitory Provision 24, such as arrest for the maximum period followed by enforced residence ordered by the administrative authority.
86. Among many other cases of this kind, mention may be made of the following: on October 29, 1981 Juan Héctor Cifuentes Gutiérrez was sent into enforced residence in the locality of El Salado. After 26 days this measure was canceled, but three days later the Minister of the Interior again ordered his enforced residence in Lago Verde, a locality that does not –moveover-- meet the requirement of being an urban locality. In this way, under one and the same state of emergency, the person affected remained in enforced residence for 116 days when the legal maximum permitted is three months.
87. It is now appropriate to refer to the forced relocations ordered by the Chilean authorities of a broad category of persons.
88. The arrest of persons and their transfer to places remote from their homes actually began in 1973. On September 16, 1973, the principal figures of the Government of President Allende were transferred to Dawson Island (where there were already other prisoners from the region), located in the Province of Magallanes, in the extreme south of Chile. In several regions of the country, prison camps were set up in virtue of the state of siege:. Pisagua, Chacabuco, Isla Riesco, Isla Quiriquina, Chill9n, Linares, Concepci6n, Temuco, Puerto Montt, and Punta Arenas. In Santiago the National Stadium, the Chile Stadium, the Military School, the San Bernardo Infantry School and the Military Academy of the Air Force were used as prison camps. In Valparaiso the Esmeralda Training Ship and the Lebu and Mappo vessels were used for those purposes. The camps for long term forced relocation at the time were Ritoque and Puchuncavía in Valparaiso and Tres Alamos and Cuatro Alamos in Santiago. 
89. Forced relocations, with their present characteristics, began in 1980 when Decree Law No. 3,618 was enacted. Since March 1981, forced relocations have been ordered pursuant to Transitory Provision 24 of the Constitution. The persons affected by this measure were previously deprived of their liberty in the barracks of the CNI or Investigaciones. In a very few cases they were transferred directly to the place in which they were compulsorily to reside for 90 days.
90. The places selected by the Government are usually small remote villages that have limited communication facilities. The persons affected are taken to them by agents of Investigaciones, without any personal effects other than those they have at the time the arrest took place. Once they reach the locality concerned, they are left to their own devices and must cope on their own with the difficulties of survival (food, shelter, clothing, work, health, etc.). From the time they arrive, they are required to report to the police station of the Carabineros of the locality, where they are identified and registered and told how many times a day they must report to sign and at what times. The control to which these persons are subject is determined by the officer or non-commissioned officer in charge of the police station, and there is no rule in this regard. Some are satisfied with one signature a day, others require up to four.
91. The problems of subsistence and adaptation to a difficult and sometimes hostile environment are compounded by loss of employment or expulsion from the university in the case of students affected by this measure.
92. In these circumstances, in 1980, 106 persons were sent into forced relocation by administrative order; in 1981, 60; in 1982, 60; and in 1983 the figure of the previous year was doubled and the number of forced relocations amounted to 127. In 1984 the figure rose to 675 persons. In the first 10 months of that year, 251 persons were sent into forced relocation in different places in the country, in accordance with the usual procedures . At the end of October and during November mass forced relocations occurred. On October 29 the Government sent 134 persons described as “thugs” (hampones) into forced relocation in the area of Pisagua. On November 3, 115 persons were sent to the same place and were publicly described as habitual offenders. Almost all these persons are detained after large-scale police and military raids in the shanty-town communities of Santiago. On the same day 32 political and trade union leaders of the opposition were sent to Pisagua. On November 15, there was a raid in the community of La Victoria; 3,400 persons were “retained” and taken to the San Eugenio Stadium. After their backgrounds had been checked, 237 were arrested, of whom 15 were sent to Pisagua. The number of persons sent into forced relocation amounted to 399, to which must be added 25 persons in forced relocation from other provinces. Thus, on November 30 there were 424 persons banned to Pisagua.
93. These forced relocations were ordered pursuant to Transitory Provision 24 of the Constitution, which, as pointed out, creates a state of flagrant illegality for the reasons indicated below:
a. The Government has argued that the persons sent into forced relocation are persons with a criminal record.
b. The measures authorized by Transitory Provision 24 were not intended to fight crime but to prevent political disorders.
c. The Pisagua camp is not an urban area. It is a military camp  with a known background as a camp for political prisoners and was inaugurated in 1947 under the Government of Gabriel González Videla. According to the definition prepared by the National Statistical Institute, an urban locality is “any inhabited place that shows features of urbanization, at least incipient, regardless of the activity its inhabitants engage in and which has a minimum of 60 grouped and adjacent houses, provided its population numbers not less than 300”. This definition has been accepted by the courts in several writs of amparo. Yet the area of Pisagua does not have more than 150 inhabitants, as stated to the press by the Intendant of the First Region himself.
d. The persons banned there are incommunicado.
e. The persons banned there are, in practice, deprived of their liberty, since they cannot leave the camp, which in actual fact is a prison that does not meet the legal requirements for receiving detained or arrested persons.
94. To eliminate this irregular situation, on November 21, 1984 the President issued Supreme Decrees Nos. 1,291, 1,292 and 1,293, providing for the arrest, respectively, of 140, 141, and 142 persons that were sent into forced relocation. These decrees were issued under the authority to arrest persons conferred by Article 41 (2) of the Constitution on the President during the state of siege decreed on November 6. Article I of each one of these decrees states: “The arrest of the persons indicated below is ordered...”. Article 2 area that “the measure shall be carried out in the military camp located in the northern sector of the locality of Pisagua, Commune of Huara, Province of Iquique”. The third and final article provides that the persons arrested shall be subject to the supervision and control of the military garrison of Iquique or of the authority of the Armed or the Police Forces to which they delegate those powers”.
95. The arrest of persons who have already been deprived of their liberty was ordered by these decrees and their situation was worsened since the arrest could last as long as the state of siege, the state of emergency that was uninterruptedly in force between September 1973 until March 1978.
96. The conditions in which the arrested persons live are extremely difficult, as confirmed by the statement sworn on November 28, 1984 by Monsignor Javier Prado Aránguiz, the Bishop of Iquique.  He states that on two occasions he visited the Pisagua detention camp, on November 3, when the number was more than 400, and found that this group of persons was confined in an area surrounded by wire fences and unable to communicate with the outside world. He also stated that the persons detained were in the custody of soldiers, who on the day of his visit were not carrying machine guns. However, through a confidential communication from the prisoners he learned that that was so only when there were visits, since normally they were armed. He also stated that he could not personally confirm the existence of police dogs but that the prisoners stated they were hidden when a visitor arrived. He also alleged that up to the time of his most recent visit only three or four prisoners had received visits from their relatives and that officially the visits were not authorized, as stated to him by the Intendant. In addition, he stated that the prisoners could receive and send correspondence after it had been censored and could receive parcels from their families, which parcels had normally reached his Diocese. He was also of the opinion that the state of mind of many prisoners was poor, especially that of the last group that arrived at that place from the community of Cardinal Silva Henriquez. Monsignor Prado ended by stating that on repeated occasions he had expressed to the authorities his disagreement with this procedure and his concern about the difficult situations that could be created in the prison camp.
97. The signature of the Bishop was authenticated by Mr. Manuel Schepeler Raveau, the Notary Public of Iquique.
98. As may be seen from the foregoing account, the right to personal freedom has suffered a sustained deterioration because of the measures adopted by the Government of Chile during the period covered by this report. The periods of preventive detention have increased, from 48 hours under the earlier system to 20 days in the situation the present regime provides for. Remedies for the protection of this right have clearly diminished under the 1980 Constitution which stipulates that they are invalid during the state of siege and, de facto, when they are adopted under Transitory Provision 24 of the Constitution.
99. The classes of persons authorized to carry out preventive detentions has increased appreciably and even include the personnel of intelligence agencies that are not authorized by the Constitution to do so. The right to personal freedom has also been affected since the new normative system authorizes forced relocations in any urban locality of Chile. All this has been complemented by many stringent provisions concerning the states of emergency, which, in addition, have significantly restricted the powers of the Judiciary to protect so important a right.
100. This regulatory framework has been complemented by the practice of the Government of Chile in the matter of the right to personal freedom, from which it may be concluded that the minimum requirements of Chilean legislation and of international law for arrests are not fulfilled in a large proportion of cases. Thus, the exhibition of the arrest warrant is a non-existent formality in a great many situations and arrest by unidentified civilians is common. In these conditions, the arrests lose their status as such and become mere kidnappings. This is aggravated by the methods used by the arresting officers, who indulge in extreme violence and render the person affected absolutely powerless by hooding him and disorienting him on the journey to the place of detention.
101. These places of detention lack the public character required of them, and, although in some cases their location is known, they remain inaccessible to the relatives and lawyers of the victim as well as to court officials. In this context, efforts have been made to justify the incommunicado detention of the person affected through a pseudo-juridical argument that warrants the most decided rejection by the Commission. This situation is possible due to the mushrooming of the great extension of the functions of the intelligence agencies, which in Chile appear to enjoy special privileges that make them immune to the control of the jurisdictional authorities in the matter of personal liberty.
102. The violence with which the individual arrests are carried out seriously affects the members of the family of the person arrested when the event takes place in his home. Similar violence has been used on the occasion of mass arrests that have covered entire neighborhoods and resulted in the arrest of thousands of persons.
103. The right to personal freedom is also seriously diminished in Chile as a result of the practice of administrative banning orders, measures which have affected a growing number of persons which lack effective means to safeguard their rights in the face of such orders.
104. It must therefore be concluded that the right to personal freedom has been and is seriously violated by the Government of Chile, which is consequently creating a pervasive state of insecurity in the population and giving rise to conditions for the commission of extremely serious violations of the right to physical integrity and life, as follows from the accounts contained in the respective chapters.
 Case File 10.622-75 of the 4th Criminal Court of the Presidente Aguirre Cerda Department.
 It was also provided for in the 1925 Constitution.
 First Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile, p. 138.
 The ways in which detainees in these secret premises are treated will be dealt with in the chapter on the right to personal integrity.
 The state of siege has been renewed on two successive occasions since November 6, 1984 until June 17, 1985.
 The state of emergency lasted until September 1983 and was again decreed in March, July, September and December 1984.
 This state of emergency has been in effect uninterruptedly since its establishment.
 These are only cases known to the Vicaria de la Solidaridad. (Source: Annual Report 1981, 1982 and 1983).
 It is the Tres Alamos Camp. Subsequently, the person arrested was transferred to the Cuatro Alamos Camp.
 Observations of the Government of Chile on the Report of the International Commission of Jurists, p. 10.
 Letter of February 20, 1.975 from the Representative of Chile to the offices of the United Nations in Geneva to the Director of the Division of Human Rights.
 IACHR, First Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile, p. 113.
 In its First Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile, the Commission dealt at length with these detention centers. See pp. 77-136.
 Pisagua Norte military camp.
 Source: Application for Amparo case 152.150 filed on November 19, 1984, with the Iquique Appeal Court.