CHAPTER IV

 

HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGION

 

 

            INTRODUCTION

 

1.        The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights continues its practice of including in its Annual Report to the General Assembly of the Organization of American States a chapter on the situation of human rights in member countries of the Organization, based on the competence assigned to it by the OAS Charter, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Commission's Statute and Rules of Procedure.  This practice has served the purpose of providing the OAS updated information on the human rights situation in those countries that had been the subject of the Commission's special attention; and in some cases, to report on a particular event that had taken place or was emerging or developing at the close of its reporting cycle. 

 

2.        The Annual Report of the IACHR for 1997 set forth five criteria pre-established by the Commission to identify the member states of the OAS whose human rights practices merited special attention and which consequently should be included in its Chapter IV. 

 

         1.         The first criterion encompasses those states ruled by governments that have not come to power through popular elections, by secret, genuine, periodic, and free suffrage, according to internationally accepted standards and principles.  The Commission has repeatedly pointed out that representative democracy and its mechanisms are essential for achieving the rule of law and respect for human rights.  As for those states that do not observe the political rights enshrined in the American Declaration and the American Convention, the Commission fulfills its duty to inform the other OAS members states as to the human rights situation of the population.

 

        2.         The second criterion concerns states where the free exercise of the rights set forth in the American Convention or American Declaration have been, in effect, suspended totally or in part, by virtue of the imposition of exceptional measures, such as state of emergency, state of siege, suspension of guarantees, or exceptional security measures, and the like. 

 

       3.         The third criterion to justify the inclusion in this chapter of a particular state is when there is clear and convincing evidence that a state commits massive and grave violations of the human rights guaranteed in the American Convention, the American Declaration, and all other applicable human rights instruments.  In so doing, the Commission highlights the fundamental rights that cannot be suspended; thus it is especially concerned about violations such as extrajudicial executions, torture, and forced disappearances.  Thus, when the Commission receives credible communications denouncing such violations by a particular state which are attested to or corroborated by the reports or findings of other governmental or intergovernmental bodies and/or of respected national and international human rights organizations, the Commission believes that it has a duty to bring such situations to the attention of the Organization and its member states.

 

        4.        The fourth criterion concerns those states that are in a process of transition from any of the above three situations.

 

        5.        The fifth criterion regards temporary or structural situations that may appear in member states confronted, for various reasons, with situations that seriously affect the enjoyment of fundamental rights enshrined in the American Convention or the American Declaration.  This criterion includes, for example:  grave situations of violations that prevent the proper application of the rule of law; serious institutional crises; processes of institutional change which have negative consequences for human rights; or grave omissions in the adoption of the provisions necessary for the effective exercise of fundamental rights.

 

        3.         On the basis of the criteria set forth above, the Commission has decided to include five member states: Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Haiti and Venezuela.

 

 

COLOMBIA

 

4.        The internal armed conflict in the Republic of Colombia continued to take its toll on fundamental human rights in 2005.  As in previous years, the situation matched the criteria set forth in Chapter IV of the Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).  Those criteria are relevant broadly and with respect to the persistence of immediate situations or structural conditions in member states that, for various reasons, are confronted with situations that seriously affect the enjoyment and exercise of the fundamental rights upheld in the American Convention on Human Rights.  Therefore, in keeping with the procedure established in Article 57(1)(h) of its Rules of Procedure,[1] the Commission has adopted the following observations on the matter, for inclusion in its Annual Report.

 

5.         The Commission’s analysis briefly examines the demobilization of the armed groups operating outside the law, its conformity with the State’s international obligations, and the toll that the violence unleashed by the armed conflict has taken on the civilian population in 2005, emphasizing the plight of indigenous peoples, Afro-descendant communities, community and labor leaders, human rights defenders, officers of the court and journalists.  The administration of justice and the issue of impunity are also addressed.

 

6.        Before offering specific and documented observations on these matters, the Commission wishes to make clear that it recognizes the efforts the State has made to fight armed actors and end violence in Colombia.

 

7.       Salient among the advances made in the area of human rights are the Government’s efforts to continue its “Programa de Protección de defensores de derechos humanos, sindicalistas, periodistas y líderes sociales” [Program to Protect Human Rights Defenders, Members of Trade Unions, Journalists and Community Leaders”] and its “Programa de Protección de Comunidades en Riesgo[2] [At-Risk Communities Protection Program] administered by the Ministry of the Interior.  This program protects numerous beneficiaries of precautionary and provisional measures adopted by the Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, respectively, and helps to protect the life and personal safety of thousands threatened by the actors in Colombia’s armed conflict.  While more progress is needed in this area and although difficulties or delays in implementing the protective mechanisms have occurred in some cases, this is a planned and institutional initiative deserving of the Commission’s continuing recognition.

 

8.        In addition, it is relevant to underline the autos de cumplimiento written by the Constitutional Court,[3] calling Governmental institutions to respond the facing consequences of the internal displaced in terms of the available budget, the respect of their rights, and the commitment in attention of the displaced population.

 

         9.        The Commission is pleased to note that in 2005 Colombia took an important step toward universalization of the inter-American system for the protection of human rights when, on April 12, 2005, it ratified the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, thus making fundamental progress toward protecting the rights of the people of Colombia and of the hemisphere.

 

          I.          THE ARMED CONFLICT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE CIVILIAN
                       POPULATION

 

       10.       To address the question of the armed conflict and its impact on the enjoyment of human rights in 2005, reference will first be made to the demobilization of the illegal armed groups and the approval of the Justice and Peace Law.  The impact that the violence unleashed by the conflict has had on the civilian population will then be examined, particularly the impact on the indigenous and Afro-descendant communities; community and union leaders, human rights defenders and officers of the court, and journalists.  The IACHR’s comments are based on the on-site visit it conducted in June 2005, on information reported in hearings and in the course of processing cases and precautionary measures, on reports prepared by intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and on information reported by official sources.
 

           A.      The process of demobilizing armed groups operating in violation of the law
                       and the Justice and Peace Law

 

         11.      After the election and inauguration of President Álvaro Uribe Vélez in August 2002, some leaders of the paramilitary organization known as Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)[4] announced their intention to negotiate for the demobilization of their forces and on December 1, 2002, declared a unilateral cease-fire.  In the ensuing months, representatives of the Government initiated contacts with members of the AUC[5] and on July 15, 2003 a preliminary agreement was reached establishing demobilization targets for December 31, 2005.  The process of dialogue between the AUC’s “negotiating high command” (“estado mayor negociador”) and the Government made considerable headway in 2005 on the demobilization of a number of units operating in different regions of the country.

 

         12.        As the Commission has said before, members of the paramilitary units involved in the demobilization process have been repeatedly cited as being responsible for grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including massacres of defenseless civilians; selective assassinations of community leaders, trade unionists, human rights defenders, officers of the court, journalists, and others; acts of torture, harassment, and intimidation; and actions aimed at forcing the displacement of entire communities.  The Commission has established the State’s responsibility in individual cases, as these serious violations of the American Convention were perpetrated with the acquiescence of State agents.[6]  Indeed, the Commission has referred some of these cases to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court.[7]  Against this backdrop, the organs of the inter-American system,[8] the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner,[9] and human rights organizations in Colombia and elsewhere have urged that the demobilization process must be coupled with guarantees that the State’s international obligations will be respected.

 

          13.      In 2005, the demobilization process made headway in terms of the number of AUC members who turned over weapons in ceremonies held in concentration areas set up in various regions of the country: over ten thousand men and women belonging to a number of AUC blocks have participated in these processes.[10]  Despite the gesture, the AUC have failed to honor their own cease-fire, in areas where weapons have already been turned in and in areas of the country where AUC blocks that have not yet been demobilized are present.[11]  Also in 2005 the State provided the necessary conditions to initiate a dialog with the ELN, and with other actors of the armed conflict.[12]  Those efforts are an objective of fundamental importance for peace, stability and governability in Colombia and are one that both the State and civil society share.

 

          14.       As for the Colombian State’s obligation to achieve truth, justice and reparations for the victims of the armed conflict, on July 22, 2005 President Uribe authorized enactment of Law 975 of 2005, known as the “Justice and Peace Law.”  This law establishes procedural benefits for members of armed groups operating outside the law and involved in the commission of crimes against the civilian population: those whom the courts have already convicted of these crimes; those being investigated or prosecuted for the alleged commission of those crimes, or those willing to confess to their involvement in crimes of this type.

 

          15.      In a press release issued on July 15, 2005, the Commission made public its general observations on the text of the Justice and Peace Law.[13]  It noted that the determination of the historical truth regarding what happened during the last few decades of the conflict did not figure as one of the law’s objectives, nor did identification of the sponsors of the paramilitarism or determination of the degree to which the various participants were involved in the commission of crimes against the civilian population, whether by action, omission, collaboration or acquiescence.

 

         16.       The law enacted focuses on the mechanisms to establish the facts in individual cases, in the framework of determining the individual criminal responsibility of demobilized persons who avail themselves of the benefits under the law.  However, its provisions fail to establish incentives that would encourage the demobilized to make a full confession of their guilt, in exchange for the generous judicial benefits they would receive.[14]  Consequently, the established mechanism does not guarantee that the crimes perpetrated will be properly solved; this means that the facts in many cases will never be known and the perpetrators will go unpunished.  The provisions of the law might favor the concealment of the commission of other crimes that, had they been discovered, might eventually have qualified for the same alternative penalties.  Further, these procedural benefits would not appear to be confined to crimes directly related to the armed conflict; instead, perpetrators of common crimes like drug trafficking might eventually one day try to avail themselves of the benefits provided under this law.

 

          17.       Likewise, the Commission observes that the institutional mechanisms created by the Justice and Peace Law lack sufficient strength to effectively face the duty of judicially clarifying the thousands of cases of massacre, selective execution, forced disappearance, kidnapping, torture, forced displacement and usurpation of lands, amongst other crimes, committed by several thousand demobilized individuals during the many years that paramilitary groups have operated in Colombia.  In addition, the Commission notes with preoccupation that over six months since the law approval the General Attorney’s Office has not designated the total number of delegated prosecutors that will be part of its Justice and Peace Unit, the unit in charge of law application.  Notwithstanding the State has indicated that delegated prosecutors will be supported in their work by a team of investigators, prosecutor assistants, prosecutor auxiliaries, and investigator auxiliaries in criminology in the effort to fortify the judicial structures.[15]  Within this situation, the obstacles in the implementation of the Justice and Peace Law and its Regulatory Decree 4760 from December of 2005, worries some the difficulties that victims from the conflict may face in trying to access their right to the truth and reparation.

 

         18.       In terms of reparation of the harm done by those responsible for the commission of heinous crimes, the law places greater emphasis on restitution of unlawfully acquired property than on the kind of mechanisms that will make full reparations for victims possible.  Specifically, it makes no mention of specific mechanisms to repair the damage done to the social fabric of indigenous peoples, Afro-descendant communities, or displaced women, who are frequently heads of household and rank among the groups most vulnerable to the violence perpetrated by the participants in the armed conflict.  The law makes no provision for reparations to victims in the form of measures directed at preventing a recurrence of the crimes committed, such as disqualification or separation from service of any State agents who may have been involved in the crimes, whether by commission or omission.

 

19.        The IACHR notes that the Justice and Peace Law only offers incentives to members of illegal armed groups against whom there are open judicial process who cooperates in the clarification of committed crimes.  Notwithstanding, several crimes perpetrated during the conflict are within the stage of previous investigation, without members from the AUC been related to these processes.[16]

 

20.       Summing up, the demobilization process is at a critical stage.  The negotiations, observance of the cease-fire commitment and the administration of justice must be informed by the principles and standards established in international law to ensure justice, truth and reparations to persons within the State’s jurisdiction.

 

B.         The violence resulting from the armed conflict

 

21.       Moreover the cease-fire commitment undertaken by the “negotiating high command” of the AUC, acts of violence and intimidation of the civilian population continue to be committed by all actors in the conflict: paramilitaries, whether or not engaged in the negotiations at Santafé de Ralito; guerrilla groups, in particular the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC); and state agents. The acts violence committed in the course of the armed conflict continue to result in grave violations of the civilian population’s human rights and international humanitarian law.  The most vulnerable sectors affected are particularly: indigenous peoples, Afro-descendant communities, and the displaced.  The selective assassinations and forced disappearances continued in 2005, targeting human rights defenders, trade unionists, community leaders, journalists, and candidates to elective office –including members of the Unión Patriótica political movement – among others.

 

22.        The Colombian Government has indicated that during 2005 it registered a reduction in human rights violations against people in Colombia.[17]  The government’s figures report 42 massacres between January and September 2005, claiming a total of 225 victims.  Seven of the massacres were purportedly the work of the FARC; two were attributed to the AUC.  The assailants in the other 33 massacres have not been identified.[18]  These same sources report that the number of cases is up 5% over 2004, while the number of victims is 3% higher than in 2004.[19]

 

23.         The Data Bank of the Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP) [Research and Public Education Center] shows that 297 selective executions purportedly occurred just in the six-month period from January to June 2005.  Of these, 53 were blamed on the Colombian Army, while the remaining 234 were allegedly the work of paramilitary.[20]  The data also shows 35 forced disappearances, 9 of which are attributed to the Army, while 30 were said to have been committed by paramilitary.[21]  As for the crimes committed by guerrilla groups, 113 violations of international humanitarian law –among them 65 selective homicides- have been blamed on the FARC.[22]

 

24.       The government’s figures, based on the registration of displaced people,[23] show a sharp drop in the number of persons displaced during the first half of 2005:  the figure given for the January-October 2005 period is 106,650, as compared to 143,325 for the same period in 2004.[24]  However, the statistics compiled by CODHES, based on the estimation per municipality by trimester and annually, show different results.  According to studies done by CODHES, violence displaced 252,801 people between January and September 2005, which would put the projected figure of the total population displaced in 2005 even higher than the figure CODHES recorded for 2004, which was 205,504 displaced persons.[25] 

 

25.       Furthermore, in August 2005 the Constitutional Court found that the measures taken by the Government to comply with its obligation and do more to protect the rights of the displaced population had been slow and uneven.[26]  As a result, in late August 2005, the High Court issued three orders instructing State agencies and offices to guarantee:[27] (1) the budgetary effort necessary to address the issue of forced displacement;[28] (2) a stronger budgetary and administrative commitment on the part of the territorial agencies to assist the displaced and for better coordination between local agencies and national agencies;[29] and (3) adoption of measures to correct institutional failings and to ensure that the displaced enjoy a minimum level of protection of their rights.[30]

 

26.       Finally, it is relevant to underline that the IACHR has received complaints alleging large-scale forced displacements and displacements of entire families in such departments as Bolívar, Caldar, Caquetá, Nariño, and Putumayo as a consequence of indiscriminate aerial fumigation supposedly for the purpose of destroying crops being grown for illicit uses.  The Government, on the other hand, has indicated that the only objective of the eradication of illicit cultivation is to comply with the international obligations in matters of eradication of illegal plantation, and as a result of the fumigations they have not received complaints of effects on human health.  Nevertheless, the State has added that they have suspended fumigation on national parks, and have implemented an alternative method of manual eradication of illicit plantations.[31]

 

1.        Indigenous peoples and Afro-descendent communities

 

27.       The violence targeted at indigenous peoples in Colombia was even more severe in 2005,[32] as they continued to be the victims of massacres, selective executions, forced disappearances, forced displacement from their ancestral territories, forced recruitment, loss or contamination of their food sources, food blockades, accusations, and threats to their autonomy.  This situation was verified by the IACHR during an in-loco visit conducted in June of 2005.

 

28.      In 2005, members of the Kankuamo, Wayúu, Embera-Chamí, Embera-Katío, Wiwa, Arhuaco, Páez, and Pijao indigenous groups were victims of massacres, selective assassinations, disappearances and kidnappings. Blockades of food and medical care, forced displacements and indiscriminate attacks caused malnutrition, endemic diseases, illiteracy and a lack of basic services.

 

29.       The Inter-American Commission has received information about the situation of the indigenous peoples in the northern sector of department of Cauca where in April and May of 2005 fighting and militarization of their ancestral lands in the municipalities of Toribio, San Francisco, Tacueyó and Jambaló took place.[33]  Concretely, members of the FARC launched an attack on police targets.  Armed clashes ensued within the town between members of the Armed Forces and the FARC resulting in deaths among of civil population and hundreds of displaced people.  The information received indicated that the Armed Forces had reacted disproportionately to repel the attack by the FARC, leaving one boy dead and 15 people injured and forcing some five hundred people to leave their community.  The Government, on the other hand, has indicated that the forces reaction of members of the Armed Forces to repel the attack was not at any time disproportionately and that displaced people received humanitarian aid.[34]

 

30.       The Commission must reiterate[35] its concern over the vulnerable state in which indigenous peoples in Colombia live, as evidenced by the murders, forced disappearances, massacres and forced displacements that the members of these indigenous communities have suffered, even in cases where provisional and precautionary measures have been ordered on their behalf. The constant acts of violence committed against the indigenous communities who ask for respect and protection of their basic rights, threaten not just the lives and safety of their members but their very existence as a people.  The situation demands concrete measures on the State’s part to vitiate the factors that generate violence and to move toward full respect for the individual and collective rights of indigenous peoples.

 

31.        In respect to the afro-descent communities, they and their community councils continue to endure food blockades, constant acts of harassment and violence, kidnappings and forced displacements.  Deforestation is a constant threat to the territory of these indigenous groups, as is cultivation of the African palm.

 

2.         Human rights defenders

 

32.       The vulnerability of human rights defenders continued to be a matter of concern in 2005.  The patterns of threats, killings, and harassment continued to obstruct the work of human rights defenders throughout the country.  The rights of those who promote and protect human rights in Colombia are at risk because of the work they do.  The risk factors did not abate this past year.

 

33.       During 2005, attempts were made on the lives of human rights defenders, some of whom were, at the time, under protection ordered by the organs of the inter-American system.  The body of Lucian Enrique Romero Molina was discovered in the city of Valledupar, in the department of Cesar, on September 11, 2005.  Romero Molina was a respected leader of a union made up of workers in Colombia’s food industry (SINTRAINAL) and a delegate of the Foundation Committee in Solidarity with Political Prisoners –an organization for which the Commission had sought precautionary measures.  He was bound and stabbed 40 times, somewhere in the La Nevada sector, an area alleged to be in the control of paramilitary groups.  The information received by the Commission indicates that because of his work, Mr. Romero had been receiving threats for a number of years, to the point that he was forced to leave the country for a number of months.  He had been back in Colombia for only a few months when he was killed.  The information also reported that because of the death threats made against Romero Molina’s life, the Foundation Committee in Solidarity with Political Prisoners had asked the Government of Colombia to include Romero Molina in the program to protect union leaders and human rights defenders.  The allegation is that the only protection he was given was to provide him with two mobile phones, and monetary support for national transportation.  The State, on the other hand, has indicated that from the facts it has been open a criminal process that is currently in the stage of investigation by the Prosecutor at Valledupar.[36]

 

34.       The Commission observes that the Colombian authorities continued to publicly discredit the work of the leaders and defenders of the peace communities.[37]  The Commission learned of statements that the President of the Republic made about the massacre in the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó, to the effect that “People who have lived there have made serious allegations about some of the leaders, sponsors and defenders [of the Community], accusing them of providing assistance to the FARC and of trying to use the community to protect that terrorist organization.”[38]  The Commission regrets that such statements are being made; they are so general and vague that they merely serve to place the Peace Community -its leaders in particular- in even greater peril.  The episodes of violence against this Peace Community were allegedly the work of uniformed individuals bearing arms, who identified themselves as members of the Army.  Luis Eduardo Guerra Guerra (a leader of the Peace Community’s Interim Council), his 11-year old son Deiner Andrés Guerra, his partner Bellanira Aleiza Guzman, Alfonso Bolivar Tuberquia Graciano, a leader of Mulatos and member of the Peace Council in the Mulatos humanitarian zone, his partner Sandra Milena Muñoz Pozo, his children Santiago Tuberquia Muñoz (age 2) and Natalia Andrea Tuberquia Muñoz (age 6), and Mr. Alejandro Pérez, were all alleged to have been taken by Army troops at the Mulatos River.  Five days later, their mutilated bodies were found on the banks of the Mulatos River and in a nearby grave.

 

35.       The Commission reiterates that public officials should refrain from making accusations about human rights defenders or from suggesting that human rights organizations are acting improperly or unlawfully merely because they are doing their work of promoting and protecting human rights.  The Government must give explicit instructions to its officials in this regard and must, when necessary, discipline those who fail to follow those instructions.  In this sense, the State has indicated that it is analyzing “the limits and inconvenience under the statutes” of a Unique Disciplinary Code establishing it a grave misdemeanor to “contempt the orders and instructions belonging to the Presidential Directress whose objective is to promote human rights and the application of international humanitarian law”.[39]

 

36.         The Colombian experience shows that irresponsible accusations made against human rights defenders and their organizations are followed by an increase in acts of harassment and threats.  In its Annual Report for 2004, the Commission expressed its concern over the repeated accusations from official sources against the Colectivo de Abogados “José Alvéar Restrepo” and the danger that such accusations posed for the members of that group.[40]  In 2005, the Commission received information indicating that the threats that members of the Colectivo de Abogados had received were on the rise.  On May 13, as she was arriving at her home in Bogotá, the President of the Colectivo de Abogados “José Alvear Restrepo,” Soraya Gutiérrez Arguello, received a strange package from the guard at the residential complex where she lived.  The package had been delivered by a courier service.  The human rights defender immediately contacted the National Police to have its anti-explosives team examine the contents of the package.  When they opened the package, the police found inside a beheaded and dismembered doll; there were burned marks on the doll and it had been stained with red nail polish –to simulate blood.  A cross had been drawn on the doll’s torso.  With the doll was a handwritten note that read:  “You have a very attractive family; take good care of it; don’t sacrifice it.”

 

37.       The Colectivo de Abogados reported that on that same day, persons not associated with the organization published classified ads in newspapers with nationwide circulation, intended to threaten the members of the Colectivo.  The first classified was seeking attorneys, psychologists, sociologists, other professionals and students as well, with or without experience.  According to the human rights defenders, the idea was to give the impression that the organization’s current members might be killed, thus creating vacancies that would have to be filled.  The second classified was advertising for security guards and instructed interested parties to bring their curriculums to the offices of the organization on May 14, at the very same time that a meeting with relatives of victims of human rights violations was scheduled.

 

38.        The Commission is again recommending to the State that it adopt urgent and effective measures to protect the lives and physical safety of the human rights defenders being threatened, and that these measures be arranged and decided upon in consultation with the defenders themselves.  The Commission is also repeating its recommendation that an effective and thorough prevention policy be adopted, intended to prevent attacks on human rights defenders.

 

39.         The IACHR observes that the Government initiated the communicational strategies “Defending human rights defenders” and “Human Rights the best plan DO IT FOR YOU AND FOR ALL” on December 1, 2005.[41]  The Commission insists on the importance of fortifying the efforts to prevent and protect human rights defenders, as without a serious prevention policy, the efforts of the Program to Protect Human Rights Defenders, Trade Unionists, Journalists, and Community Leaders will not be enough to end the violence against the persons being protected.

 

40.         The Commission continues to receive complaints of this nature, alleging that “frame-ups” are being used to discredit or silence human rights defenders who are engaging in such activities as documenting the human rights situation, providing legal counsel to accused persons, or representing victims before the courts and accompanying the communities that are at risk.  Domestic and international human rights organizations have reported on this situation.  The Commission has also received complaints about victims of arbitrary arrests, to the effect that the detentions were either groundless or without evidence or proof, were made in the course of military operations, or used as a tool of political persecution.[42] The Commission must underscore the point that the punitive power of the State and its machinery of justice must not be manipulated so as to harass those engaged in lawful endeavors.

 

3.         Trade unionists and community leaders

 

41.       Attacks and threats upon the lives and personal safety of union and community leaders continued in 2005.  The Commission received complaints of extrajudicial executions and assaults alleged to have been committed by paramilitary groups.  The official figures are 13 fatalities in the period from January to September 2005.[43]  The Escuela Nacional Sindical (National School for Union Leaders), for its part, reported that in the period from January 1 to April 20, 2005, 16 unionized workers were killed, 123 received death threats, attempts were made on the lives of two, four had been abducted, 40 had been detained arbitrarily, and death threats had forced six to move from their homes and workplaces.[44]

 

42.       And so, the situation remains serious, so much so that the Commission has continued to monitor the precautionary measures it granted to protect union leaders or the leadership of certain union organizations such as ECOPETROL-USO and SINTRAEMSDES, among others.

 

43.       Mr. Eislen Escalante Pérez, a displaced leader and President of the “Asociación de Desplazados Víctimas del sistema por una Colombia Nueva,” was killed in Barranquilla, in Atlántico department, on October 14, 2005.  According to the information available, the victim was killed by two hired gunmen, who were on a motorcycle.  They shot him twice in the head.  At the time, Mr. Escalante was with Amilkar Martinez Arias, an indigenous leader of the Kankuamo people, who has allegedly received a number of threats since.  Mr. Escalante Pérez and Mr. Martínez Arias were working together on projects to assist displaced persons and were complaining about the mismanagement of funds for projects intended to benefit the displaced population in that region.  Having received threats before, Mr. Escalante Pérez had requested protection from the Ministry of the Interior, which provided him with a walkie-talkie.[45]  According to what has been reported to the Commission, several risk assessments done by the authorities concluded that his security situation did not warrant any other type of protection.[46]

 

44.        Mr. Diego Gutiérrez, Vice President of the Communal Action Board of the hamlet of Malavar in El Castillo municipality, Meta department, disappeared on October 13, 2005.  Mr. Gutiérrez’ body was found the following day and showed signs of torture.  Mr. Gutiérrez had been stabbed 14 times in the left side; his testicles and left ear had been cut off.  Mr. Gutiérrez’ teeth had been broken, and his hands appeared to have been tied.  According to the information the Commission has received, the crime is alleged to have been the work of paramilitary groups.[47]

 

45.        The Commission was concerned by reports it received about an assault made upon union leader Rafael Cabarcas Cabarcas, a member of the National Executive Board of the USO, in Cartagena, Bolívar department, on March 2, 2005.  According to the information received by the Commission, Mr. Cabarcas and his bodyguard were exiting an education center when they were cut off by two persons on a motorcycle.  The gunmen shot and wounded the labor leader and his bodyguard.  The bullet that hit Mr. Cabarcas was to the body, around the neck area.  The bullet that struck his bodyguard hit him in the abdomen.  The two wounded men were taken to a hospital, where they spent several days recovering. The Commission will continue to monitor the precautionary measures granted to protect the members of the USO and calls upon the State to immediately take the steps necessary to carry out these measures.  The State has indicated that members from the USO have received protectional measures through the Protection Program from the Minister of Interior and Justice.[48]

 

46.         The Commission has continued to follow the issue of the Arauca community leaders.  In this regard, the Commission was informed of events on September 21, 2005, when persons identifying themselves as members Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) made several phone calls to educational institutions where professors Omaira Morales, Matilde Morales, Gladis Morales and William Bustos worked.  They are the sisters and brother-in-law of Professor Samuel Morales Flórez, President of the Arauca section of the Central Unitaria de los Trabajadores (CUT) [United Workers Federation].  Professor Morales Flórez is currently under arrest.[49] It was reported that the message received in one of the calls was as follows:  “Tell Professors Gladys and Omayra Morales that they have 72 hours to leave this department; we have Samuel Morales’ relatives in our sights and they should leave Arauca.”  Between that call and September 24, other threatening phone calls were received, both at the workplaces and at the homes of the above-named persons.[50]  The State indicated that competent authorities initiated investigations with regard to the phone threats received by Mr. Samuel Morales’ family.[51]

 

4.         Journalists

 

47.       Through the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, in 2005 the Commission continued to receive information relating to threats, kidnappings, intimidation and other acts of violence suffered by journalists and media outlets in Colombia.  Among the events reported by the Office of the Special Rapporteur during that period was the murder of Julio Hernando Palacios Sánchez,[52] the destruction of radio transmission towers in various regions of the country[53] and the death threats received by journalists Carlos Lozano Guillén, Hollman Morris and Daniel Coronell consisting of floral arrangements (wreaths) sent as if intended for their funerals.[54] The Office of the Special Rapporteur also was informed that in August 2005, journalist Daniel Coronell was forced to leave Colombia for the sake of his own safety.

 

48.        In 2005, the IACHR approved the report titled Impunity, Self-censorship and Armed Internal Conflict: an Analysis of the State of Freedom of Expression in Colombia,[55] prepared by the Office of the Special Rapporteur on the occasion of the on-site visit conducted in the cities of Bogotá and Arauca, April 25 through 29, 2005.

 

49.       The Report of the Special Rapporteur underscores the persistent pattern of impunity associated with crimes committed against social communicators.  The Office of the Special Rapport observed that the intimidating effect caused by the threats to and killing of journalists merely grows as long as these crimes go unpunished.  In its study, the Office of the Special Rapporteur examined the status of the investigations that the Public Prosecutor’s Office is conducting into various cases.  The evaluation left the Office of the Special Rapporteur with a number of concerns having to do with the weakening of the office in charge of investigating assassinations of journalists and the slow pace in investigating most cases of violations of freedom of expression, especially the assassinations.

 

50.        The investigation also points out that in recent years the incidence of violence against journalists in Colombia has shown a marked decline.  The implementation of government programs to protect journalists played a decisive role in bringing about this downturn in violence.  However, the Office of the Special Rapporteur has confirmed that the decline in these figures is also a result of self-censorship on the part of the journalists themselves.  The Report states that the climate of violence and aggression in Colombia is definitely acting to silence social communicators.  During the visit, it was also found that there are regions in the country where journalists are pressured by outlawed armed groups and even by Government officials, either to report certain news or to remain silent.

 

51.        The report also discloses the complaints received about certain statements made by high-ranking government officials, who have spoken out publicly against the work of the nongovernmental human rights organizations, both local and international, which has doubtless heightened tensions between the Government and civil society.

 

52.        The Office of the Special Rapporteur ends its study with a series of recommendations that urge the Government to take the necessary measures to protect the physical integrity of social communicators and the infrastructure of the communications media.  It also calls upon the competent authorities to conduct a serious, impartial and effective investigation of the acts of violence and intimidation committed against journalists, and then to prosecute and punish the guilty parties.

 

II.         ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

 

53.       In 2005, no significant headway was made with the investigations into crimes involving violations of human rights in which the international responsibility of the State has been established.  And so, the problem of impunity persists as does the practice of large-scale arrests and pressure exerted on prosecutors, judges and justice operators involved in investigations of human rights violations.

 

54.       As pointed out earlier, the IACHR continues to receive complaints of large-scale arrests of community leaders and human rights defenders for the alleged crime of rebellion and terrorism. The arrests have been made in the context of military and police operations deployed in areas inhabited both by the local civilian population and guerrilla elements. In many cases the detainees are deprived of liberty for the maximum period allowed by law – up to 180 days – after which they are released for lack of evidence. The detentions are frequently based on the testimony of members of the Government’s network of informers, or of former members of armed groups who have now become mainstreamed and provide testimony in exchange for monetary compensation.  In the case of those who have rejoined mainstream society, Decree 128 of 2003[56] establishes a procedure whereby the demobilized can claim benefits, including health care, protection and security, and cash payments, in exchange for collaborating by providing information on the activities of illegal organizations.[57]  It is worth noting that the IACHR has not received any complaints alleging noncompliance with Decree 128 by virtue of a failure to provide the benefits therein promised.  It has, however, received complaints and testimony about false accusations made against human rights defenders and community leaders, accusations made by persons who have rejoined mainstream society and have taken advantage of the economic incentives offered in exchange for providing information.

 

55.        The IACHR has received complaints to the effect that officers of the court are under pressure to legitimize the arrests made by military and police personnel in the course of special operations where massive and indiscriminate searches and arrests are made.  It has been said that those who question the legality of these practices as well as the grounds for depriving the detainees of liberty have been subjected to criminal or disciplinary investigations.[58]

 

III.        CONCLUSIONS

 

56.        The Commission acknowledges the efforts made by the State to combat armed actors and end the violence in the Republic of Colombia.  The Commission is also pleased to see that in 2005, the State took an important step forward with its ratification of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons.

 

57.        The Commission would also draw attention to the Government’s efforts to keep up its programs to protect human rights defenders, unionists, journalists, community leaders and the Communities at risk.

 

58.        However, the Commission is still troubled by the toll that violence caused by the players in the armed internal conflict has taken on respect for the fundamental rights of the civilian population in Colombia, particularly among the most vulnerable sectors: the indigenous communities, the Afro-descendant communities and the displaced.  Likewise, human rights defenders, community and union leaders, and journalists continue to be the target of attacks.  Despite the dialogue between the State and the negotiating high command of the AUC, the commitment to a cease-fire, and the demobilizations that have occurred in various parts of the country, paramilitary groups continue to strike at the civilian population.

 

59.        The IACHR is mindful of the fact that negotiation mechanisms must be used to get the armed actors to disengage and so end the complex, painful and protracted experience that Colombia has endured.  To ensure a lasting